Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

119. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, May 10, 1965, 0930Z.

3210. For Secretary Rusk. Deptel 2349.² I shall comment on questions posed in your personal cable as briefly and precisely as I can.

1. I agree that Shastri in dealing with present crisis has been weak, unsophisticated and needlessly fearful of his Parliamentary opposition. Because Parliament has been in session this has further complicated already complex situation and added to dangers. (Note: Parliament recesses this week until August.)

2. In present heavily charged atmosphere it would have been serious mistake for Abdullah to have returned to Srinagar; riots encouraged by Pak and/or ChiCom agitators could readily have got out of hand. However I believe Sheikh could have been persuaded voluntarily to stay away from Kashmir until dust settles. Fact that GOI instead of attempting so to persuade him arbitrarily sent him off to South India under house arrest reflects their present state of jitters.

3. In regard to US protest to Paks on use of US equipment, GOI has had only your statements to B.K. Nehru and my guarded off the record statements here to go on, and these did not help them in dealing with agitated oppositionists on floor of Parliament. Moreover unchallenged Pak insistence that USG had in fact made no protest further confused our public position and left us open to bitter attacks from leftwingers and suspicion from moderates.

In this context Shastri’s impatient reaction to taunt in Parliament (apparently based on leak from Talbot’s talk with B.K. Nehru) that we had warned India against attacking Pakistan reflects Indian resentment at being bracketed with Pakistan in situation where they genuinely believe themselves to be victim. Nevertheless Shastri’s comment was uncalled for and I shall so state when I see L.K. Jha this afternoon.

4. We believe US equipped Indian troops now in vicinity of West Pakistan border are limited to two brigades. We have asked clearance for USMSMI officer to visit area and ascertain facts.

Most immediate danger lies in fact that both armies which by common consent had been five miles back from each side of border are now directly on border. UK HICOMM has expressed agreement with my suggestion that when and if we get cease-fire UK should continue in its mediating role to press for return to their former positions.

5. If we were publicly to chastise Paks for misuse of US equipment as urged by B.K. Nehru we would greatly ease public resentment against us here in India, which would make our lives easier, but we might also destroy hope for negotiated agreement. Under these circumstances, I agree with our position and have supported it vigorously with Indian press, members of Cabinet and other opinion makers.

6. In regard to border dispute itself Pak-India border was accepted at time of partition in all British official agreements and maps as the border between old state of Sind which went to Pakistan and old state of Kutch which went to India and is so registered on all US maps. Consequently it is difficult for either US or British, who were originally responsible for establishing border, to see how Indians could lose the case before impartial tribunal.

India does not, however deny that disagreement exists as to precise location of this border since it was never demarcated by British and hence may run few hundred yards north or south of present line as shown on map. However not until 1954 did Paks introduce proposition that Kutch was inland sea and that hence they were entitled to half of it; i.e., down to 24th parallel.

7. In regard to who started Kutch squabble no one can be sure. Blow-up may have been result of deliberate Pak push to make Indians look foolish; if so, mission was accomplished. It is also conceivable that there was some tie with Chinese. However it seems to me more likely that fight started by accident as in case of two small boys pushing each other on playground after school.

In any event, India with her deep concern over China which until three weeks ago was uppermost in minds of most Indians had nothing whatsoever to gain from attack on Pakistan. Moreover if India should in fact have plotted attack on Pakistan it surely would not have chosen area where Indian armed forces are at such disadvantage in regard to terrain and logistics. India had only police in area. Nearest Indian military was battalion sixty miles away on other side of sandy waste.

8. India right now is in angry, unreasonable, and indeed irrational mood due to combination of reasons: i.e., lingering humiliation from Chinese attack, Chinese prestige gain with nuclear bomb which India could also produce, Indian Army’s alleged defeat at hands of Pak Army in Kutch, and frustrated feeling that US, whom six out of seven Indians according to our public opinion poll of few months ago considered India’s best friend, does not understand their position.

While Shastri has been responsive to this mood, and at times even contributed to it, he has thus far firmly retained power of decision at each step along way toward cease fire.

Barring some accident there is no reason to assume that war is at hand. British HICOMM John Freeman believes that cease fire agreement may be reached before adjournment of Parliament Tuesday night. Shastri leaves for Moscow Wednesday and has extended his visit which had previously been cut to three days to comply with his original schedule. He will also leave on schedule for London, Ottawa and Algiers as planned.

9. In regard to how USG can best support British John Freeman believes that our most effective move would be to make it clear to Paks that US arms are not to be used against Indians except in clear case of Indian invasion of Pak territory. Barring this private reiteration of our previous statement we both feel US should stay on sidelines.

In meantime we have made most vigorous effort to impress Indian leaders and opinion makers with total folly of retaliatory attack on Pakistan, to warn of Chinese plot designed to wreck both Pakistan and India, and to explain our unaligned position as best we can, etc.

10. Even though situation settles down as we feel it is likely to do, considerable ground will have been lost in India. I can foresee two particularly unhappy possibilities and one potentially favorable one.

A. Whether or not we believe it to be justified Indians have been genuinely and deeply disturbed. As long as we describe ourselves as an ally of Pakistan they will not henceforth trust our guaranties. In view of their fear combined attack by both China and Pakistan this lack of confidence may lead them into costly and foolhardy guns ahead of butter approach with possibility of decision to proceed with nuclear explosion regardless of implications to US aid or to economic progress.

B. If Soviets want to make big play for India, door is now wide open; even many normally sober and pro-American Indians for moment at least are easy target for Soviet blandishments.

It is open question, of course, as to how Soviets may choose to use their opportunity. Soviet resources are limited and too close a relationship with still democratic India would confuse their Leninist role as revolutionary leader. I would expect them, however, to go considerable distance in Moscow meeting with Shastri, perhaps very great distance.

C. One positive element that I can see at present is possibility that present eyeball to eyeball confrontation may have same sobering effect on Pakistan and India that Cuban confrontation had on US and USSR. If so, it could open range of more favorable possibilities.

This, I hope, answers your specific questions. I am preparing more complete cable which will provide background in depth which I believe is urgently needed if we are to prevent rapid and disastrous erosion of US position in South Asia which we have been laboriously building up for last decade.

Bowles

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. Document 118.