Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

108. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, April 24, 1965, 1305Z.

3018. References Embtels 3015,² 3016.³ DCM called on Foreign Secretary Jha afternoon April 24 to solicit facts and statement of GOI policy into which Chaudhury’s presentation fits. Jha’s comments boiled down to effort to place on U.S. onus for restraining further Pak “aggression.” He also seemed to be fishing for offer of good offices in getting cease-fire and talks. Finally, it apparent that all or most of this will be in tomorrow morning’s papers.

Efforts to illuminate facts added little to previous knowledge and Chaudhury’s presentation. Tank attack had occurred at 7 A.M. this morning and in Jha’s view fits into growing pattern of Pak aggressiveness. This is compounded by fact attack took place while GOP was presumably awaiting GOI response to latest formulation of proposal for cease-fire. Jha several times used the phrases “grave situation” and “general war,” saying in latter connection that the country is in no mood to take any more pushing around in Rann of Kutch and Government of India may be constrained retaliate elsewhere, where conditions more favorable to Indian forces. He said this has not been decided by GOI.

Jha summarized exchanges between himself and Pak High Commissioner over last several weeks on cease-fire and talks. He said he thought both GOP and GOI had agreed on desirability of cease-fire and that problem arises over search for agreed formulation. Jha gave DCM text which he said has been given to GOP and remains GOI position:

• “1. There should be a cease-fire effective from (date to be agreed);
• “2. Immediately thereafter, there should be an official level meeting to determine the status quo ante which should be restored; and

• “3. Thereafter, there should be a high level meeting to discuss the Kutch-Sind border question.

  “Both governments have assured each other of their sincere desire and determination to find a peaceful solution to the Kutch-Sind border problem and to avoid the use of force.”

Latest Pak proposal he described as serious retrogression even from previous Pak proposals, and supplied text as follows:

• “1. There should be a cease-fire effective from (date);
• “2. Immediately thereafter the armed forces of both India and Pakistan whether civil or military shall be completely withdrawn from the disputed territory namely the area which extends from a line running south of Kanjarkot to the disputed Sind-Kutch boundary which runs roughly along 24 degree latitude;

• “3. Thereafter there should be a high level meeting to resolve the dispute relating to the above-mentioned territory.

  “Both governments have expressed their desire to reach an early settlement of this dispute through peaceful means.”

Jha said that although there may be something to talk about in respect of precise location of boundary, and small disputed area “around Kanjarkot,” it is quite intolerable to identify disputed territory as reaching to 24th parallel in ground rules for talks. He would be telling Pak High Commissioner so immediately following this conversation.

DCM deplored possibility of escalation hostilities and repeated importance of getting cease-fire. Jha continued insist there is no doubt who is aggressor and reiterated it should be matter of deep concern to USG that GOP is using U.S. weapons in face of Eisenhower-Nehru and subsequent assurances to GOI.

Leaving aside question of weapons, DCM stuck to importance of cease-fire and, speaking entirely personally, wondered whether it would help any if friend or friends of India and Pakistan were publicly to call on both to cease-fire. Jha said he had been trying to demonstrate that GOI wants cease-fire and he hopes GOP does too. He also threw out point about good offices, making clear, however, that these should not go to substance of dispute (e.g., mediation or arbitration) but only to getting agreed formula for talk. He clearly did not think GOP is receptive to this sort of proposition. In fact, at one point, elaborating on dangers of “general war,” he speculated that GOP and ChiComs are in collusion to try provoke GOI. DCM said this was a grave accusation, or better hypothesis, to which Jha replied “accusation” would do.

In reply DCM query whether GOI would be turning to United Nations, Jha disparaged capacity of UN to do anything constructive in this situation.

Conversation concluded with Jha’s assertion that one cannot keep out of the press either the “fact” that U.S. tanks have been used by Paks or that GOI has brought USG into this issue.

Comments follow.⁴

Bowles

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. IV, Cables, 12/64–6/65. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to DOD for DIA, CINCMEAFSA, Karachi, and London, and passed to the White House.
2. In telegram 3015 from New Delhi, April 24, the Embassy reported that the Chief of the Indian Army Staff, General J.N. Chadhury, had requested U.S. assistance in restraining the escalation of what he described as an attack by Pakistani tanks of U.S. origin supported by infantry in the Rann of Kutch. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 3016 from New Delhi, April 24, reported on Chadhury’s request in greater detail. Chadhury said that he had irrefutable evidence that the tanks being used in the Pakistani attack were of U.S. origin. It was his understanding, he said, that the United States had promised to intervene if either India or Pakistan used MAP equipment against the other. (Ibid.)
4. In the comments that followed in telegram 3019 from New Delhi, April 24, the Embassy concluded that unless the United States could disprove that U.S. equipment was being used in the Pakistani attack, the Indian Government and populace would expect the United States to take effective action to stop such use. (Ibid.)