Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

105. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Karachi, April 21, 1965.

1995. 1. When I saw Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed April 19 (Embassy telegram 1981)² he said he wanted to mention off the record another matter, namely “US communications installations.” He had five requests to make, enumerated below.

(A) He wanted full statement from me in near future as to recent, current and prospective expansion of facilities at Peshawar installation. He said this report should cover both equipment and buildings. Said he had studied 1959 agreement and realized that expansion now taking place did not contravene “letter” of agreement since area not being expanded. However, GOP felt that any additional buildings or equipment not authorized by it violated the “spirit” of the agreement, especially since we had sought and failed to obtain President Ayub’s agreement to certain expansion proposals some time back.

(B) He wanted information as to when we could close down the “three smaller installations” (not otherwise identified, but obviously referring to [2 lines of source text not declassified]). He said if we were not prepared to close them down soon, GOP would want explanation as to why they could not be closed down and would have to insist on negotiation of agreements to provide for their continued operation. He said the three facilities appeared not to be covered by any written agreements at present, and GOP understood they had been installed as “ad hoc” arrangements for short term period. He said GOP was not well informed about functions of these units and would like better access. I commented that we had not considered installations to be on ad hoc or temporary basis but rather for indefinite period. I noted that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] had full access, and had personally inspected some or all of them, as I recalled it. I asked if he was suggesting blanketing of small installations under 1959 Peshawar agreement. He said if small installations could not be closed in near future GOP would expect separate agreements to be negotiated for each. He did not refer to 1964 discussion of “regularization” of status these units [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

(C) [10 lines of source text not declassified]

(D) He wanted full and unlimited access to every sector Peshawar installation granted for a [1 line of source text not declassified]. While he was vague I gather he was asking for blanket clearance for any person who might be designated by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to inspect on his behalf at any time, and not necessarily the individual who has the official title of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

(E) He wanted us to exclude from Peshawar installation any naturalized American citizen of Indian origin. He complained strongly about a naturalized non-commissioned officer of American Air Force named Singh, formerly stationed at Peshawar, who he said had returned occasionally for unexplained visits and had also visited India after his Peshawar trips. He said there was “another Sikh” with American papers who also had visited the installation and who was a source of concern to Pak intelligence.

2. I was noncommittal with Aziz Ahmed, only stating that I would be in touch with him later as to the general subject. I questioned his invocation of “spirit” as a workable basis for interpretation of the explicit provision of an international agreement.

3. When I saw Finance Minister Shoaib privately on April 20 I made guarded reference to Aziz Ahmed’s attempt to intrude the Foreign Office into this delicate intelligence field. Shoaib confirmed my surmise that nothing transpired during Moscow visit which would seem to jeopardize existence of our facilities and that Aziz Ahmed probably was free-wheeling to some extent in an effort to make trouble for us. (It would be a major coup for Aziz Ahmed if he could seize complete control of negotiations and operations in this field [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], capitalizing on continued Russian diplomatic pressure and threats, and on undoubted desire of President and entire GOP to get maximum mileage out of their cards.) Shoaib advised me strongly to resist Pak Foreign Office intrusion into this subject if I possibly could, since it would at a minimum greatly complicate our difficulties. But he did not know offhand the best means of handling this tough, tactical problem.

4. I expect to transmit further thoughts and recommendations when I have considered matter further and examined it more completely with Shaffter. Meanwhile, I request Hughes to inform Secretary, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

5. I plan to request renewal of my consultation orders near future and this will be one of major subjects I will expect to take up in Washington, hopefully early May.

McConaughy

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 15 PAK–US. Secret; Priority; [classification designator not declassified]. No time of transmission is given on the telegram, which was received at 3:39 p.m.
2. McConaughy’s meeting with Ahmed on April 19 was devoted in large part to a discussion of Ayub’s visit to the Soviet Union. (Telegram 1981 from Karachi, April 19; ibid., POL 7 PAK)