100. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1
1145. For Ambassador McConaughy from Secretary. You should seek private appointment with Ayub soonest and deliver following message from President:2
“Dear Mr. President:
I need not tell you of the importance which the Government and the people of the United States have steadfastly attached to relationships between our two countries. These relationships have been good for both of us and strong enough to allow the frankest of discussions on matters where we do not share the same views.
It was for this reason that I have been looking forward to your visit to Washington so that we might profit from our confidence in each other to discuss frankly our common problems and to chart our courses together for the troublesome months and years that lie ahead.
The fact that you and I have both recently received unmistakably clear and strong mandates from our electorates to pursue our national and international goals has made this meeting seem even more opportune and desirable.
What I now propose, therefore, comes only after the most serious reflection during the past few days and with our common interests foremost in mind. I have in fact reluctantly come to the view that this month is not a good time for the two of us to meet in Washington.
Our foreign aid legislation is now before the Congress, and my years of political experience in Congress, as Vice President and President, have led me to the conclusion that your visit at this time would focus public attention on the differences between Pakistani and United States policy toward Communist China. This I fear might gravely affect [Page 216] our ability to assist your Government in the economic and defense programs on which you are embarked and would work against the shared interests of the United States and Pakistan.
I cannot overstate the full depth of American feeling about Communist China. The mounting number of American casualties in South Vietnam is having a profound effect upon American opinion. This is being felt in Congress just at the time when our foreign aid legislation is at the most sensitive point in the legislative cycle.
Under these circumstances I think it would be in the interests of both our countries and contribute to the assurance of close and mutually helpful relations between us if we could postpone our meeting until later this year—perhaps early in the fall.
Certainly there is much for us to talk about when we do meet. While some of our [your?] policies have caused concern to us, our mutual interests unquestionably outweigh our differences. For my part, I shall continue to seek the most friendly and constructive alliance relationship with you and your country.
I shall, therefore, look forward to a full, frank and friendly discussion, but I do think it can be more profitable in a few months than at the moment. I would appreciate your judgment on this matter and I would be guided by your thoughts as to how a postponement can best be worked out with a minimum of awkwardness on both sides.”
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pakistan, Vol. I, Pres. Ayub Correspondence, 12/15/63–12/31/65. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Ball and Handley, cleared with McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to New Delhi.↩
- Rusk sent an accompanying personal message to McConaughy explaining that there was no give in the President’s decision to postpone Ayub’s visit. He encouraged McConaughy to stress to Ayub that the mood of Congress was such that his presence in Washington would seriously jeopardize foreign assistance for Pakistan. McConaughy was authorized to tell Ayub that Shastri’s visit was also being postponed. (Telegram 1143 to Karachi, April 14; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 PAK)↩