Office of the Historian

96. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State1

Tehran, August 31, 1965, 1610Z.

244. In nearly two and half hour session thirty-first, Shah told me he has been spending many sleepless hours meditating re orientation Iran’s policies. These meditations obviously sparked by his recent visit to Moscow. Highlights of this discussion follow:

1.
US friendship. Shah gratified by personal greetings from President and Secretary which I conveyed. He said his pronouncements in support of our Viet Nam policy based on friendship for US and even more on his conviction in principles.
2.
Viet Nam and US. Shah pleased by firm U.S. policy re Viet Nam. He convinced situation is taking turn for better. Soviets, he believes, anxious to avoid escalation to major confrontation. He admits, however, that Chinese not peace-minded.
3.
Viet Nam and Soviets. When Soviet leaders expressed horror at American bombing attacks in North Viet Nam, Shah pointed out if Viet Nam falls to Chinese, rest of Southeast Asia including Indonesia will also fall under Chinese control. Shah also alluded to Soviet-supported activities by Nasser in Yemen. Soviets, he says, made little effort to defend Chinese or themselves re Yemen. Shah confirms Soviet-Chinese rift is deep. It was particularly evident when he needled Soviets about question their being invited to Algiers Conference.
4.
Soviets’ southern neighbors. Shah tried to write off current Soviet attention to Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan as “series of coincidences.” He contended that Soviet friendliness toward these countries is not something new; they tried in 1965, at which time they asked him to intercede with Turks for better relations. Major Soviet purpose, according to Shah is to have friendly cordon of states around Soviet Union so U.S.S.R. can get ahead with its major task of developing its economy. He added, however, there undoubtedly is added incentive for Soviets of rallying as many non-yellow countries as possible behind Soviets in long-term struggle with ChiComs.
5.
Stand-on-own-feet policy. Shah’s central theme was that Iran must stand on its own feet, militarily and economically. “Intervention” by outsiders is increasingly outmoded, he said. In maintaining Iran’s independence vis-a-vis Soviets no one (not even Americans) could be more “patriotic” than Iranians, he added.
6.
“Moribund” CENTO. In most disparaging description he has yet made of CENTO, he described it as “moribund” and as “masquerade” that meets to little effect every six months, although he mused “we better keep it.” When Soviets said they did not like CENTO, he told them he would be glad to see it terminated when all other pacts are terminated, e.g. NATO, Warsaw, etc. He said he told Soviets they had little to fear militarily from CENTO.
7.
Soviet-Iran non-aggression pact. Shah said Soviets proposed to him an un-registered “non-aggression pact for 200 years.” He had turned conversation aside and has “not yet” given Soviets an answer. He wondered whether having such a treaty might not serve Iran’s purposes by assuring that Soviets would spare Iran if world-tensions break out in hostilities. When Soviets had made proposal of this kind in 1959, he had turned it down, mostly because U.S. and U.K. urged him to reject it. Note: This is first indication Embassy has had of this proposal. In interests maintaining dialogue with Shah, Embassy hopes there will be no leakage.
8.
Regional entente. Commenting that Afghan policy seems to be successful, Shah at one point mentioned possibility Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan getting together in common policy of independence.
9.
Grievances vs U.S. During conversation, Shah uncorked whole set of personal grievances against U.S., including:
a.
Bevan-Byrnes and Molotov in 1944 or 1945 made an agreement pointing to autonomy in Iran for Kurds, Azerbaijan, and Khuzistan. Ambassador Wallace Murray had been commissioned to bring him this unhappy news. Note: This is surprise to me. Wonder if Dept can shed light on this.
b.
During Azerbaijan crisis of 1946, Ambassador Allen had been instructed to make clear that USG would not support Iranian cause militarily.
c.
While U.S. economic aid has been deeply appreciated, virtually all of it has been extended only after agonizing wrangling. Specifically, Americans sabotaged British-German steel mill project seven years ago. President Eisenhower spoke to Shah sneeringly of countries insisting on having “damn steel mills.” Friendly countries like Iran naturally are bitter when they see American critics like Nasser and India receiving aid on more generous terms and at time when aid to Iran is being curtailed.
d.
Similarly Shah deeply appreciative of U.S. military aid but there have been many delays and continued resistance even when he is obtaining it through purchase. He said he has only recently realized that loans for military equipment are not on favorable basis. Meanwhile, while Iran has virtually no air defense equipment, even Afghanistan has SAM sites and MIG–21’s.
e.
US steadfastly refused to join CENTO, Lincoln White stating publicly that it was in deference to Arab world (read Nasser) sensitivities.
f.
Among list of other irritants, Shah particularly bitter about Gudarzian case which in his view has dragged on an unnecessary eighteen months.
10.
Therapy. Several times underscoring our impressive record of friendship and help for Iran. I sought to straighten Shah up at various appropriate points including such arguments as: a) since Iran increasingly becoming model for progress in Mideast it would be sad for Iran and for free world if its leadership now tries to follow a route taken by leadership in countries not doing so well; b) since as Dean Acheson once said treaties are mere pieces of paper registering an existing situation there is no assurance that piece of paper would deter Soviets from over-running Iran if they felt impelled to do so; c) masses of Afro-Asia including Iran take their cue from on high and tend to stampede in direction leadership points them and leadership then no longer in control; d) as Dulles once said at SEATO meeting US aid is limited and is not reward for good behavior but is deployed where it can do most good in life-and-death struggle between free world and slave; e) Shah’s great strength has been that he is man of principle and this is no time for him to shirk the principles which both our countries uphold. I specifically discouraged any moves toward dismantling CENTO or toward non-aggression pact with USSR. Shah seemed get some lift when I told of how home leave was valuable in reassuring me that American system can outstrip any other, e.g. burgeoning business and industry establishments in Manhattan where Shah also had been amazed by new construction, verdant prairies of central Illinois which producing more food than ever, and Gemini 5 space feat which gives indication that we ready compete with Soviets even when they get head start.

Comment. Obviously Shah had prepared himself to pave way for possible shift in his future policy. Also obviously his talks with Soviet leaders have made marked impression. He may be in one of those moods re which Ambassador Holmes talked to me about. Hopefully he can surmount it without going too far toward Soviets. Meanwhile, our attention must be as cordial and cooperative as possible without being panicky.

Meyer
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 IRAN. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Ankara, Kabul, Karachi, Moscow, and London.↩