81. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State1
1205. Shah’s Interest in Arms. After giving me build-up re economic and social progress Iran is making and his philosophy how Iran must be capable of coping with war by proxy,2 Shah twenty-seventh stressed importance of prompt and favorable U.S. response to his recent requests for more modern military equipment.
I pointed out U.S. disposition toward Iran has been uniquely friendly, there being no other country where U.S. has involved itself in 5-year arms program. More than that equipment in that program is well advanced over equipment which we providing most other countries in this part of world.
Referring to economic review currently under study, I said Shah was on right track in seeking “balanced program” of economic and military progress. Shah said that he hoped following his return from forthcoming month-long journey, economic review and subject of his arms needs can be brought to successful conclusion, e.g., end of May.
[Page 146]Shah said main point is that it takes such long time from date of order to date of delivery. Meanwhile, area threat (Nasser) is increasingly imminent. He, therefore, must have early decision as to whether he can have advanced equipment, so adequate training and planning can be undertaken in years intervening before equipment is actually delivered.
Having made his major pitch to General Eckhardt (being reported separately) re his desire for F–111, Sheridans and more Hawks, Shah said he wanted to mention to me one further “detail.” Originally he had asked for destroyers for defense of Persian Gulf. USG had demurred, on basis destroyers beyond Iran’s capabilities. His request for motor torpedo boats had also been turned down. Mention had been made, however, of “bull-pup” air to surface missiles. It obvious, he said, that if Iran had capability deliver its own weaponry, it much preferable to time-consuming maritime vehicles. I told Shah this was new subject as far as I was concerned and I would have to look into it.
Shah made clear his greatest defense concern is Persian Gulf area. He said he had to have suitable weaponry and would like to get it from the U.S. if possible.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–3 U.S.-IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE and DOD.↩
- In telegram 1204, April 27, Meyer reported that during a private talk following presentation of his credentials the Shah had discussed his “White Revolution” at length, and had made the point that the more successful his revolution became, the more desperate were his enemies. (Ibid., POL 15–1 IRAN)↩