Office of the Historian

312. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State1

Tehran, October 19, 1968, 0755Z.

1735. Iranian Arms Procurement.

1.
In course of two-hour discussion 18th, Shah made clear that just as Iran is launching $10 billion fourth five-year plan in economic field Iran is also projecting five-year military program at only fraction economic plan’s cost. Naturally, he said, he wishes to maintain American orientation of his military establishment but if present Congressional discussions restrict credit sales to Iran he intends to purchase elsewhere. He hopes at least, he said, to keep Iran Air Force American-oriented.
2.
Without any taint of blackmail, Shah reported Soviets are almost daily manifesting eagerness to expand arms sales program begun year ago, with repayment in natural gas. Shah frankly acknowledged Soviet purpose is to wean Iran away from Americans. My impression is that Shah is well aware not only of Soviet purposes but of inferiority of Soviet equipment.
3.
Shah noted French also are eagerly making sales pitches. Their aircraft are high quality, he said, but their other wares are exorbitant (probably referring to helicopters and tanks).
4.
Shah expressed his conviction that USG after Viet-Nam not likely to come to Iran’s support in case of trouble. He also reiterated his long-held view that Iran must take care of itself and that Iran itself is in better position to ascertain its military requirements than outsiders. He noted that five-year military plan is being worked out with ARMISH/MAAG.
5.
Once again Shah referred to size of Turkish establishment, almost four-fold that of Iran and heavily supported with MAP grant funds. He said it is difficult to understand American hesitation to sell arms to credit worthy country like Iran which has almost entirely American-oriented military establishment.
6.
Shah expressed great concern over influx of Soviet arms to Arab neighbors. He said UAR Air Force been 80 percent replenished. Syrians have been re-equipped beyond pre-hostility capacity, and Iraqis too receiving abundant arms including Sukhoy bombers.
7.
I did my best to urge Shah to keep military expenditures to minimum, noting wastefulness of Arab military build-up and lesson taught by Israelis that equipment is much less important than quality of personnel.
8.
I also explained in detail present state of play in Congressional Conference Committee re military credit sales. Shah said he willing to wait another month but if it develops that procurement from U.S. is not feasible we should not be surprised if he places orders elsewhere.
Meyer
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–IRAN. Secret; Limdis.↩