304. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State1
Tehran, July 12, 1968,
0905Z.
5666. Shah’s Defense Concepts. Summary. In tour d’horizon re Iran’s defense program, Shah emphasized vital importance of security of Gulf and Iran’s key role in attaining that objective. Kuss succeeded in securing Shah’s consideration of cost effectiveness and of need for gearing shopping list to other factors such as supply of technicians.
- 1.
- Shah 11th opened two-hour conversation with Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary Kuss and me by contrasting Iran’s military posture with that of its neighbors. Question he emphasized is not merely preparing against threats but maintaining military “balance” so as to deter adventurous aggression.
- 2.
- Doubting Soviets would risk world war by direct attack on Iran, Shah said Iran would nevertheless resist as long as it could should Soviet aggression take place. More likely, however, would be “wars by proxy”
- 3.
- Shah noted Afghanistan has MIG’s, SAM’s (which Iran does not have), and Soviet technicians. Iraq, he said, is “big question mark,” capable of going either anti-Communist or to chaos. He noted Iraq has more [Page 540] fighters than Iran plus sixteen Sukhoy bombers with sixteen more to come. Radical Arab states have vast quantities of Soviet arms, supported by Soviet technical personnel (3,000 in UAR alone). More recently Saudi Arabia has bought Hawks and Lightnings, Kuwait and even Qatar are seeking arms deals with British. When Kuss pointed out none of these countries serious military threat because of personnel incompetence, Shah noted they hiring mercenaries. Discussion re British, FAA and Bahrein being reported separately.2
- 4.
- Shah stressed vital importance of Persian Gulf to Iran. It simply not possible to permit vacuum which will occur by British withdrawal to be filled by irresponsible forces. To assure Iran’s interest and, therefore, Gulf security Iran must play role consonant with its size and capability. Most effective means for doing so would be potential control of Strait of Hormuz. Knowledge that Iran has such capability would in Shah’s view serve as most effective deterrent. We emphasized Iran must be prepared by end of 1971, date of British withdrawal.
- 5.
- Shah placed highest priority on air defense, radar and navy. Army requirements could if necessary be to some extent deferred.
- 6.
- Noting Iran not interested in fighting Iraqi KOMAR ships but is more concerned re larger vessels (such as UAR destroyers coming around Arabian peninsula). Shah discussed merits of land-based missiles at mouth of Gulf. He felt they would have maximum optical impact of deterrent nature. If land-based missiles (he has impression Tartar missiles have 40 mile radius) unfeasible, missile-carrying boats would be alternate. He mentioned possibility of Bagrielle missiles and expressed belief their Israeli origin could be successfully camouflaged by saying they were French-made.
- 7.
- Noting this is complicated question, Kuss said thorough study being made by DOD experts. Meanwhile, we called Shah’s attention to fact that air force is potent weapon indeed in handling threat from enemy navy. Nothing could give greater optical impact than Phantoms screaming across horizon. Shah was concerned that air force could not do job at night or during inclement weather. But readily agreed that air force would be primary instrument inside Gulf.
- 8.
- Throughout conversation Kuss stressed trained manpower as limiting factor. Shah reported his discussion with President re possible USAF technicians as soon as some could be spared from Viet Nam scene. Shah hinted he might pick up at least part of tab for USAF technicians. He also mentioned possibility of “mixture” of USAF technicians with some civilians hired under contract.
- 9.
- Shah affirmed Iran must avoid duplications in country-wide communications systems. He reiterated, however, that air defense communications must be independent, mentioning again the ease with which potential enemy can knock out microwave pylon. Kuss pointed out no nation has completely separate military communications and noted that if pylon knocked out alternative routings would be possible. Shah eventually concurred that PTT should be backbone of basic military system and even that separate air defense communications be installed in order of priority, utilizing at least temporarily such PTT links as are already available. Kuss stressed saving in money is secondary to economic utilization of Iran’s limited supply of technicians. He also noted that TOPO communications centers just as vulnerable as microwave centers. Re Peace Ruby, Kuss agreed USAF would complete “statement of work” within three months. Shah at least tentatively decided to save time by negotiating with sole source rather than resorting to competitive bidding.
- 10.
- Recalling how two years ago USG cut back Iranian pilot training slots to five, Shah expressed gratification for 75 slots provided as result his discussions with President year ago. He expressed unhappiness with training of 25 pilots in Pakistan, on grounds program is inferior, trainees being supplied with ChiCom propaganda, and Paks are even asking Iran for training equipment and instructors. Shah stated he prepared to postpone expensive present plans for developing pilot training in Iran if there is assurance that USG will continue to train pilots to meet Iran’s needs. Kuss agreed question reasonable and would take up with Chief Air Force and other US authorities.
- 11.
- After extensive discussion of tank situation, Shah tended to agree to slippage, if necessary, of Sheridan tank procurement, provided few such tanks could be made available for advance training. Kuss noted how Shileleigh also would be drain on technician supply. Shah stressed Sheridans needed for tank destroyer mission. He agreed to Gen. Twitchell reviewing situation to insure best equipment for this mission. Re M–47, he has decided Swingfires too expensive ($140,000) and tends toward use of 105 mm gun with perhaps some of M–47’s retaining 90 mm gun. Re engines for retrofit, Shah tends toward Continental because it is identical with engine in M–60, but will await results of test runs made in Italy. Kuss agreed obtain test data and provide.
- 12.
- Shah stressed his need to have firm commitment for five year program. Kuss reiterated standard USG position re our “intention” and noted qualifications which we have mentioned have been present in previous years but they particularly delicate this year because of legislation before Congress. Kuss recognized five year plan worked out with ARMISH/MAAG but urged Shah’s support for going beyond “shopping list” [Page 542] type planning to broader joint planning which delineates manpower, training, operations, and financial requirements in keeping with material timing.
Meyer