Office of the Historian

290. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson1

Washington, June 7, 1968.

SUBJECT

  • Your Meeting with the Shah of Iran, June 12, 1968, at 12:30 P.M.

Our aim during the Shah’s visit will be to reassure him that despite the forthcoming change in our Administration and despite our involvement in Vietnam and with our domestic problems, we wish to continue the intimate relationship we have with Iran. To this end, you might:

1.
Speak to him of your conviction that no matter who succeeds you in the Presidency, our fundamental policy toward Iran will continue.
2.
Tell him that we will do our best to continue our close military cooperation with Iran:
  • —After careful review, we have determined that we can make available $100 million in credits for FY 1968.
  • —For the longer term we must continue to have the support of the Congress for authority and funds to carry on the credit program, and we will do our best to convince the Congress of its desirability.
3.
Take the Shah into your confidence on major world problems:
  • —Vietnam. The Shah has played a helpful role in trying to bring about peace talks.
  • —The Arab-Israeli problem. The Shah is concerned about King Hussein’s position.
  • —US–USSR relations.
4.
Congratulate the Shah on Iran’s domestic progress and on its self-reliant foreign policy:
  • —We hope that Iran’s military procurement will not impede its spectacular economic development.
  • —We are confident that the Shah’s awareness of long-term Soviet objectives will cause him to continue to limit Iran’s involvement with the Soviet Union, especially in the military and political fields.
  • —We do not desire to replace the British in the Persian Gulf, but strongly hope that the littoral countries, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia, can cooperate to ensure the Gulf’s security and progress. The recent visit of the Shah to King Feisal in Jidda on June 3 is a welcome step in this direction.

Dean Rusk
[Page 520]

Attachment

POINTS THE Shah MAY RAISE AND SUGGESTED RESPONSES

1. United States Military Credit Program for Iran

a.
The Shah may indicate concern about the uncertainty of our commitment to assist Iran with military credits in future years. You might respond by saying that all of our previous military credit agreements with Iran have been conditioned, like the latest one, on Congressional authorization, the availability of funds and annual economic reviews.
b.
The Shah may ask that the FY 1968 credit finance patrol craft (PG–84’s) armed with Tartar ship-to-ship missiles, which he desires to defend against similar craft the Iraqis are to receive from the USSR. You might respond that the PG–84 armed with Tartar missiles is still in the development stage and that it would therefore be premature to fund them this year. We are examining other possible systems which could meet this requirement.
c.
The Shah may ask for assurances that we will supply him with the two additional squadrons of F–4’s which he desires in the early 1970’s. You might respond that we have no objection to supplying these aircraft if Congressional action and our annual reviews permit.
d.
The Shah might ask again about training for Iranian pilots. You might respond that per his request last summer we have allocated 75 spaces for Iran annually through 1970—half of the available pilot training spaces for all allied countries—and that any further increase would be extremely difficult.
e.
The Shah might ask that we supply US Air Force technicians to maintain the F–4 aircraft he will start receiving from us this fall. You might respond that even aside from the demands of the Vietnam war on our Air Force, we could not do this under our military assistance program, and suggest that Iran hire civilian technicians, possibly from McDonnell-Douglas Aircraft Corporation which the Shah will visit on June 14.

2. Oil

a.
The Shah may ask your assistance in persuading American oil companies to lift more Iranian oil so that Iran can obtain more oil revenues for its development program. You might respond that this is a matter for our private oil companies, adding that the statistics indicate that their performance in recent years has been to the great benefit of Iran as well as themselves.
b.
The Shah may ask assistance in opening up the American market to more Iranian oil. You might respond that U.S. oil import quotas are issued to [Page 521] domestic refiners who are free to procure their imports from any producing country; increased participation in the U.S. market for Iranian oil can best be obtained by the GOI’s ensuring, in collaboration with producing companies, that Iranian production is economically attractive to American refiners who have the allocations to import crude oil.
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Iran, Visit of Shah of Iran, 6/11–12/68. Secret.↩