Office of the Historian

276. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State1

Tehran, April 3, 1968, 0910Z.

4015. Persian Gulf. Summary: Shah reviewed with John McCloy his concern re Persian Gulf and re Soviets in Mideast. McCloy urged statesmanship. Shah is particularly disturbed re future USG policy.

1.
During hour and half discussion with John McCloy at Caspian April 1, Shah set forth his well-known views re Persian Gulf. McCloy received impression Shah more interested in mid-Gulf islands than Bahrein. Shah claimed islands are Persian and for British to turn them over to amirs would be “affront.” Stressing Faisal is his friend, Shah gave impression his irritations directed more at British than Arabs.
2.
Shah reviewed danger of Soviets gaining control of Mid-East oil spigots in order to compel Western Europe to dance to Soviet tune. Expressing view Europe is far too complacent and De Gaulle merely serving as “jackal” for Soviets, Shah deplored build-up of Soviet fleet in [Page 496] Mediterranean, conversion of fertile crescent to “red crescent,” Soviet exploitation of Arab-Israel conflict with imminent threat to Jordan and King Hussein. He urged USG support “regional strength,” particularly Greece, Turkey (which is unfooled by Soviets) and Iran.
3.
Shah seemed shaken by prospective loss of President Johnson’s leadership. He hoped President’s move does not foreshadow shirking by USG of its key responsibilities in Viet Nam and in world. Any “uncertainty” re USG’s “steadfastness” would cause loss of faith in U.S. commitments with devastating effect worldwide. Shah urged there be no diminution of USG’s statesmanship, vigor and decision.
4.
McCloy in turn urged Shah to demonstrate statesmanship in keeping Persian Gulf from being added to major problems which confront US. He reminded Shah Iran is big progressive country and Shah a respected leader who could afford to be big in dealing with his neighbors. Shah contended political concessions are difficult if he is to retain respect and leadership capability.
5.
While consortium problem was scarcely mentioned by Shah, Alam later outlined in detail Iran’s needs as well as alternatives which GOI considers open to consortium. McCloy reiterated what he had told Hoveyda that GOI should avoid any “rupture” in its profitable relationship with oil companies.
Meyer
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 U.S./McCloy. Secret. Repeated to Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, London, and Ankara.↩