Office of the Historian

263. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State1

Tehran, March 5, 1968, 1350Z.

3619. Eyes Only for Under Secretary Rostow. Ref: State 124570.2

1.
Shah’s grievances, as reported by Ansary, strike me as ill-founded and over-dramatized. Gratifying, however, they are now on table. Hopefully frank discussion such as you with Ansary and between Shah and me when he returns can clear the air and restore mutual confidence. Point by point comment substance reftel follows:
A.
In casual dinner conversation with General Amini’s widow some time ago possibility of seeing Amini some time was mentioned. If necessary to take up specifics of these allegations, perhaps you could say plain fact is we have had no contact with Amini. Given present sensibilities this is probably not the time to dwell on broader issues. Shortly after my arrival I tried to persuade Shah, apparently without success, that it is in his interest for true friends like ourselves to maintain contact with people out of power. I noted how helpful it had been in Lebanon in bringing the govt and outsiders together and in preventing explosions. I made clear to Shah all of this was done with full knowledge and confidence of President Chehab. Unfortunately traditional Persian disposition is to suspect and then eliminate, or at least quarantine, any diversity of thought. Incidentally, one reason for not pursuing this broader question more recently was our assumption, until present flurry, that political opposition was insignificant.
B.
Any contact we have had with students had been most casual and normal. If there are any specific allegations of questionable contact, we should like to have them.
C.
Having assisted Shah in satisfactory solution re four major points in crisis with consortium just over year ago, plus consortium’s subsequent concessions re OPEC discount, devaluation problem, refinery throughout, etc., it difficult to understand charges of being less than neutral re oil problems. Re median line, we have not even suggested position that GOI must ratify initialled 1965 line. We have, however, expressed impartially to both sides our hope that further confrontations can be avoided and reasonable mutually satisfactory solution found at early date.
D.
Re cancellation of Saudi visit, Shah’s primary impression obviously derives from fact we worked so hard to try to have visit materialize. [Page 470] “Two sources,” to which Ansary refers, could be FornMin Zahedi and Alam, to both of whom, in discussions after visit cancelled, I voiced view that on this issue we had obviously had honest difference of views but assumed our friendship strong enough to withstand some diversity of opinion. Around town, including Diplomatic Corps, we have sought carefully to avoid any implication we lobbied for visit, for we fully aware that key factor in Iranian policy-making is posture of “national independence.”
E.
Re Bahrein and Gulf federation, this first inkling we have had re Shah’s embryonic reaction. (This may be Ansary’s own initiative.) Obviously we here have no comment.
F.
Re present consortium problem, our effort been directed to obtaining clearer understanding and good will both sides. FYI. It not unnatural consortium becoming increasingly impatient Shah’s incessant demands, and our fear is that there only limited further give possible by member companies. My talk with Alam (Tehran 3587)3 was designed to be helpful, including implicit suggestion that gap-narrowing concessions, e.g. elimination OPEC discount, increased refinery output, best foot forward, etc. might serve as face saving device for getting GOI out of box if it so wishes.
G.
Re arms, I have informed Samii that we are proceeding along lines recommended by PriMin in our talk February 25 (Tehran 3471).4 I have added that everything seems be on rails, i.e., Jablonsky having extensive review of shopping list in Washington light [list?] is coming out in couple of weeks, and “pacing factor” is progress on annual economic review. Samii assures us he hopes have data available by March 9 so we can try to meet Department’s March 15 deadline (State 123603).5 Undoubtedly one of key factors behind Shah’s present questioning of our integrity here is report from Iran Embassy Washington (perhaps delivered to Shah by Ansary), which has been cited to us by Samii, that Pentagon has confirmed draft agreement re new five-year military program was sent to Embassy “some time ago.” Under Department’s guidance, we been telling Iranians we had no such draft. Ted Eliot can fill you in on details. It is quite likely Shah suspects I personally have blocked this action so dear to his heart, perhaps because of chagrin over cancellation of Saudi visit. At least Embassy been cast in role of prevaricators.
H.
Re rumors of possible change of govt, we heard nothing about them until reading stories in press and PriMin Hoveyda’s public remarks.
2.
Assessment of what is behind this obvious attempt to dredge up insubstantial grievances will follow tomorrow as will recommendations for counteraction. Meanwhile, Embassy’s airgrams (A–4176 and A–4657) may be useful to you as background.
Meyer
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL IRAN–U.S. Secret; Priority; Nodis.↩
  2. Document 261.↩
  3. Dated March 31. (Department of State, Central Files, PET 6 IRAN)↩
  4. Dated February 25. (Ibid., DEF 12–5 IRAN)↩
  5. Dated March 2. (Ibid.)↩
  6. Dated February 10. (Ibid., POL 33 PERSIAN GULF)↩
  7. Dated March 3. (Ibid., POL 12 IRAN)↩