259. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran1
121476. Ambassador Ansary asked to see Undersecretary Rostow urgently and alone on February 26. He said he had had a disturbing telephone call from the Shah asking him to come to Switzerland at once for consultations. Two issues were mentioned: a rumor that Americans had been seeing former Prime Minister Amini, and that we had not been neutral, but pro-Saudi, in the median line dispute in the Gulf.
Rostow saw Ansary again on February 27, after urgent checks. He said the episode was instructive and useful. For him the moral was that the Shah should feel solid confidence in the stability of American policy, despite the sometimes frenetic atmosphere of rumormongering on the part of those who were anxious about their careers or interested in creating difficulties between the United States and Iran. Our policy was clear and simple—it was one of friendship and confidence for the Shah and for Iran. We also had friendly relations with Saudi Arabia and with King Feisal, and we hoped that developing cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia could become the nucleus for stability and progress in the Persian Gulf. In this process, naturally, patient and statesmanlike leadership on the part of the Shah was indispensable.
Rostow said that according to the information we had been able to assemble overnight, no American had seen Amini for two years at least, and probably three years. This fact as he knew was contrary to our usual policy of staying in touch with a wide range of opinion. But we were aware of sensitivities between the Shah and Amini, and wished to do nothing to create difficulties for the Shah. There were even rumors in Tehran that I had seen Amini during my recent trip to Tehran.2 As he knew, this was nonsense. I had seen a former student, Parvez Saney, who called on me at the Embassy when he saw that I was in the city. I told the Shah about the young man, and he said he was interested in hearing his ideas.
As for the median line dispute, we had taken exactly the same line in both countries, stating our interest in a peaceful resolution of the conflict, and urging both parties, in the same words, not to take steps that would make it worse. Both Ambassadors were experienced and first-rate men, and had carried out their instructions fully. There were no currents of dissent [Page 465] about our Persian Gulf policy, so far as Rostow could tell, within the Department or the government.
Ansary asked whether we had messages for the Shah on other subjects. Rostow reviewed the present state of the Jarring mission, and suggested that the Shah might wish at this point to do everything he could, as we and the British are doing, to support Hussein, and to urge him not to go to the Security Council on the Jerusalem question. Rostow asked for any suggestions the Shah might have as to what could be done to improve the chances of peace in the Middle East.