Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXII, Iran

246. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, November 20, 1967, 1330Z.

2210. Augmentation of Soviet-Iranian Arms Deal.

1. From Iranian General Staff, ARMISH/MAAG Chief Jablonsky has received confirmation that Iranians have agreed to 40 million ruble extension of Soviet-Iranian arms deal. Equipment purchased consists of 2200 Zil jeeps for gendarmerie, 200 wheeled APCs, 300 track APCs, 40 tank transporters and five mobile maintenance shops. In training field, about dozen Iranians will go to USSR for brief period to learn how to man mobile maintenance shops.

2. While there was a certain amount of inevitability in this development, given much-publicized Congressional curtailing of US arms sales and attractiveness of getting Soviet equipment “for nothing,” i.e., in exchange for Iranian natural gas until now flared, haste with which Iranians have moved is disturbing. As recently as October 19, Shah gave impression (Tehran 1735)² that significant purchases elsewhere were being held in abeyance pending the outcome of Congressional deliberations.

3. Via Jablonsky-Toufanian channel, we have already given indication that timing of this new procurement from Soviets can only multiply problems which USG has been having with Congress on whole question of military programs abroad. I am seeing Alam tomorrow and speaking more in sorrow than anger I intend to stress how difficult it is to understand why Iran would take such inopportune action when there really no urgency for such add-on military equipment from Soviets. I intend also to note unfortunate damage this causes Shah’s image which has reached an all-time high in US pursuant to HIM’s recent visit. I will also note disappointment and trouble this causes for those who have been Shah’s and Iran’s closest friends.

4. In this post-coronation period, there is certain amount of intoxication apparent in Iranian attitude. Therefore, in taking line mentioned in foregoing para we must be careful to avoid implying Iran is not fully sovereign, etc. Furthermore, we see little chance of deal being recalled and, therefore, must consider it within framework of our actual future relationship with Iran, including specifically limitations on our capability for maintaining special position we previously enjoyed in supplying military equipment.

5. It is our hope that foregoing attitude will commend itself to our Washington colleagues. This subject may or may not arise during Governor Harriman’s forthcoming visit but if it does the above line would seem to us to be most appropriate.³

6. As Dept will recall, when first Soviet-Iranian arms deal was negotiated, news which we had received in confidence from Iranians appeared short time later on front page of New York Times. It is our earnest hope that similar leakage will not occur this time. It is for that reason that this telegram is being slugged Exdis.

Meyer

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–6 USSR-IRAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA and Moscow.
2. Dated October 19. (Ibid., DEF 19–8 U.S.-IRAN)
3. Telegram 72956 to Tehran, November 22, concurred with the Embassy attitude expressed in telegram 2210 and approved use of this line if the subject arose during Harriman’s visit. (Ibid.)