Office of the Historian

217. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State1

Tehran, August 3, 1967, 1005Z.

557. Subject: Shah’s Washington Visit.

1.
In discussing August 2nd his forthcoming trip to Washington, Shah stressed that he considers it a “working visit in depth.” He is pleased that program provides wide range of opportunities for talks with USG leaders.
2.
Once again Shah stressed his interest in agriculture. He said that at pace Iran is going now, even though it has almost self-sufficient supply of food this year, full development of Iran’s resources will take another century. What is needed, he said, is large-scale commercial farming of hundred thousand acres or more and only US has know-how for this. He mentioned not only Khuzistan, but also Jiroft area (where Kim Roosevelt’s project has uncovered abundant water supplies), Sistan Basin, and Gorgan where real successes been scored this year with American hybrid corn.
3.
Linked with agriculture is Shah’s interest in desalination. He wishes to push forward in this field pursuant to talks which Minister of Water Rouhani has had with Secretary Udall and other well-disposed Department of Interior officials.
4.
One of most important purposes of Shah’s visit will be to get reassurance that we intend to continue our cooperation in military field. Although he will probably not go into detail in his talk with the President (and did not mention such details in the August 2 interview), we know that his greatest interest is in the following, which he will hope to discuss at least in general terms during his Washington visit: (a) filling gaps caused by attrition and other insufficiencies in our jointly agreed program; and (b) planning four and five years ahead in Iran’s defense program. Re latter, he will be interested in: (c) possible re-hab F–4’s; (d) possible follow-on plane(s) to F–5 (he has appointment with Northrop official); (e) Sheridan tanks; (f) helicopters to make his military mobile enough to counter Viet Nam-type guerrilla activities which are Iran’s most likely threat; and (g) communications to assure command control. In this connection, I am pleased that DOD is suggesting ARMISH/MAAG Chief General Jablonsky be available.
5.
Shah indicates he will also wish to make known in Washington his views that since Iran is most stable and trustworthy state in Mideast, Western oil companies should assure that high level of present liftings be [Page 398] maintained and in fact increased. He sees no reason why Arab producers should be allowed to blackball certain markets and still retain production levels higher than Iran.
6.
Obviously of major interest will be exchange of views between Shah and USG officials re Mideast situation. Shah is proud that Iran is almost a model of progress and constructivism in this part of world and he ready to play whatever role is feasible in encouraging similar state of affairs in Arab world. He remains convinced, however, that until Nasserism is checked, as in Yemen, there is little hope for progress in Arab world.
7.
Since my departure for Washington is only one week away, Shah and I agreed that unless he or Washington had something special to discuss before my departure we would tidy up any loose ends re his trip via either Court or Foreign Ministers.
8.
Comment: Shah shared my view that on eve of his Washington visit US-Iran relations are as warm and healthy as they have ever been. There is in Embassy’s view, however, a dark cloud on horizon, i.e., Senatorial action already taken blocking concessionary credit and sales by Henry Kuss’ department in DOD. During our last audience Shah made clear he feels entitled to know where he stands re military supplies from US in future. In August 2nd discussion he pointed out Soviets continue to pump in arms to Iran’s potential enemies and at much lower prices and two and half percent interest rate. While we sure he will avoid over-dependence on Soviets, we also sure that if USG is unresponsive to his future military needs Shah will without question turn to French, U.K., FRG and other suppliers. Embassy has consistently favored some diversification in Iran’s military procurement, but we see present situation as somewhat of a crossroads. If we abdicate role of principal supplier, it will be a severe setback to present healthy relationship which we believe can be retained at small cost both financially and even arms-wise. While such setback in itself will not be fatal, we wonder if USG really wishes to alienate such a staunch friend and at same time surrender concomitant benefits we have here, notably our strategic communications facilities.
9.
Embassy realizes Executive Branch is making Herculean effort to counter present unrealistic trends among our friends in Senate. Shah has been apprised of Senatorial concerns. We would like to think that via personal testimony he can play a key role in assuring that Iran-US relationship remains healthy.
Meyer
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 IRAN. Secret; Limdis.↩