210. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Middle East Crisis
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- His Excellency Hushang Ansary, Ambassador of Iran
- Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., Country Director for Iran, NEA/IRN
Ambassador Ansary began by expressing concern about demonstrations in the Arab countries against American citizens and installations. The Secretary referred to malicious and false reports that American planes participated in the Israeli attacks. He said that the UAR knows where our carriers are; Soviet destroyers are in their area. But such reports incite Arab mobs.
The Ambassador mentioned that there have been reports that the Kuwaitis and Iraqis have stopped the flow of oil.
The Secretary said that it is important for as many countries as possible to remain detached. What is involved is the Jehad psychology on one side and the apocalyptic psychology on the other. Mob pressures in the Arab countries make it impossible for Arab governments to be detached. Hopefully, some of them will be able to draw a distinction between what they say and what they do. We are pleased that Israel has said it has no territorial ambitions. Nasser is riding a tiger; it is difficult to see how he can disengage from a holy war which cannot succeed.
Ambassador Ansary commented that the ill effects of the war are likely to last for some time. Iran, which values its progress and stability, is quite concerned and hopes for a settlement.
The Secretary said we want His Majesty to understand that the United States was not involved in the outbreak of hostilities. We had received commitments from both sides not to attack. We had no advance notice from either side. We are making no judgment as to who started the fighting. Our advice to all capitals concerned was to give the Security Council and diplomatic efforts a chance to find an answer.
The Ambassador said that the Israelis had apparently felt that time was running out for them. The Secretary replied they had been touchy as far as the military problem was concerned. They had had a report of 400 Egyptian tanks moving on Elath. Ambassador Ansary commented that [Page 389] they were also concerned about the Egyptian Vice President coming to Washington. The Secretary replied that we have had no such information from the Israelis.
The Secretary then reviewed the history over the past 10 years of our support for the integrity of the states of the area, mentioning support we had given to the UAR, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Kuwait, Tunisia and Morocco. We have had a consistent and even-handed interest in protecting the integrity of the states of the area. All this is forgotten when the issue is Arabs against Israel.
Ambassador Ansary said that it was too bad that the Yemen problem had not been solved. The Secretary, mentioning the use of gas by the UAR, said that Nasser’s attitude toward the Yemen was not in accordance with usual standards of conduct.
The Ambassador asked if the United States and the USSR would get together on a resolution in the Security Council. The Secretary said that we may get together on a resolution, but that the resolution might be a complicated one which would mean different things to different people and hence might be the beginning rather than the end of a problem. He stressed that we could not persuade Israel to go back to the status quo before June 5. The Israelis have made clear that closing the Straits of Tiran was a casus belli. What is involved for the United States is not only the general principle of freedom of an international waterway but also the fact that in 1957 we persuaded Israel to withdraw from the Sinai peninsula on the condition that there would be freedom of passage through the straits. We cannot forget such a commitment.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ARAB–ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Eliot and approved in S on June 9.↩