207. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State1
19869. Dept pass AmEmbassy Tehran immediate. For the President and the Secretary of State from Harriman. I had a long talk alone with Shah at noon today, interrupted only by news despatches of Arab-Israel [Page 385] fighting. I gave him AFP despatch from Moscow to the effect that Russian position would depend on that taken by the US, which he said was most important.
The Shah listened to my explanation of our attempts to restrain Israel and Arabs, possible Soviet encouragement of Damascus and Cairo belligerence, but our belief Soviets did not now want military action and their surprise over Nasser’s closing of Gulf of Aqaba. Furthermore, the President believed Shah’s interest was to remain as aloof as possible without interruption oil shipments and that he hoped Shah would use his influence, particularly with Faisal. I said the President would be most interested in getting the Shah’s opinions and judgment.
He replied that perhaps we should not talk about the past, but only the future. On the other hand, we must learn from past mistakes. He went over the familiar ground of our assisting Nasser, not accepting the inevitability of his aggressive policies. We had missed opportunity to stop Nasser over other issues in the past, over Yemen, and such outrageous actions as use of gas. Now things were difficult since on the issue of conflict with Israel all Arabs would be united. His Ambassador had seen Faisal who, although concerned over Nasser and other issues, stated he would give full support to Nasser against Israel.
He reported that Soviet Ambassador had called on him this morning. Ambassador stated that hostilities should be stopped, and in this the French might be useful. Security Council action should be sought.
The Shah emphasized several times that the long range problem was how to stop Nasser in future. Some other issue than Israel must be found. Although he continued to consider Nasser a dangerous and aggressive dictator, interested only in his aggrandizement, the Shah could not oppose a Moslem cause. He would, therefore, have to give “lip service” support, specifically referring to earlier UN resolutions. The Shah suggested we should give the impression we wanted to stop the fighting, but implied that he hoped Nasser’s forces would be humiliated. He considered our long range major objective was “how Nasser could be destroyed”.
Although he looked forward keenly to seeing the President in Washington, he feels he probably must return home as his people would not understand his traveling in Paris and visiting the fair in Canada.
He rehearsed again, as he had done when I saw him last November, his belief that Iran must be militarily strong enough to deal with Nasser and Iraq without US intervention. He again expressed regret that we had not done more to strengthen Iran militarily, referring particularly to our extensive aid to Turkey.
I of course went over the familiar ground of Turkey’s NATO membership, etc.
[Page 386]He seemed relieved when I offered to call on him tomorrow if there were any further developments of importance, and when I told him that I felt sure we would continue to consult him closely, he repeated necessity that he must give lip service to Moslem solidarity, but his primary concern was how Nasser’s influence could be reduced and eventually destroyed. Otherwise, there could be no peace in the Middle East. He indicated that currently oil shipments would continue without interruption as normal commercial transactions, and that he would in other ways attempt to calm situation.
Please instruct if any reason for me to see Shah again tomorrow morning.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ARAB–ISR. Secret; Exdis. Although the Embassy requested that the Department pass the telegram to Tehran eyes only for Meyer, a note on the source text indicates the Department did not do so. There is no indication on the source text that the telegram was passed to the White House.↩
- Harriman’s “Further Notes on Conversation with the Shah,” June 5, are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files of W. Averell Harriman, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson Administrations, Shah of Iran.↩