172. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- Ambassador Meyer’s and Tim Hoopes’ Talk with the Shah about the Defense Package
They had a good talk with the Shah2 which may have gone a long way toward moderating his somewhat irrational feeling that we have been neglecting him. The Shah expressed his deep regard and affection [Page 312] for you and asked Hoopes to convey his sincere appreciation for your interest and for all the U. S. has done for Iran since World War II. He reiterated his desire to maintain a close relationship with us.
Hoopes led off with a detailed exposition of our interest in Iran, our problems and what we could do to help. After a lengthy discussion, they succeeded in persuading the Shah willingly to make some hard choices, cutting out some of the less important items of equipment which would not fit under his financial ceiling. This in itself is a gain, since the Shah has talked recently as if he were going off the deep end buying everything in sight.
They believe that they dissuaded the Shah from buying Soviet SAMs but expect that he probably will buy a few anti-aircraft guns and trucks which he can get there at much lower prices. They explained to him quite frankly that our offer of F–4 aircraft was conditional on how far he went in getting equipment from the U.S.S.R. The Shah vowed that he would not allow Soviet technicians in Iran, and Hoopes and Meyer believe he will not permit serious penetration of his country.
The Shah summarized the discussion as “constructive, comprehensive and expensive.” The upshot of it is that we will send a technician to Tehran to negotiate some of the military details while the Governor of Iran’s Central Bank, who will be here next week on another project, will negotiate financial details in the Pentagon.
I think we have come out of this pretty well. I would not be personally worried if the Shah were to buy a few minor Soviet items, although every breach in the wall makes it more difficult for other leaders like King Hussein to resist Soviet blandishments. Nevertheless, I think both your letter and your sending Hoopes out there have gone a long way toward keeping the Shah from going overboard. We will undoubtedly have to adjust to his increasingly independent tendencies, but for the moment we have managed to keep the worst we had feared from happening.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Iran, Memos & Miscellaneous, Vol. II, 1/66–1/69. Secret. A handwritten “L” on the source text indicates that it was seen by the President.↩
- Telegram 634 from Tehran, August 10, reported on Ambassador Meyer’s and Assistant Secretary Hoopes’ discussion the same day with the Shah regarding U.S. military sales to Iran. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 U.S.-IRAN)↩