154. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran1
5931. 1. Following summary July conversation is FYI and Noforn. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon.
2. Khosrovani began by stressing Iranian friendship for US, hope that close relationship would continue and gratitude for past and present US aid. He said he instructed explain that momentum of development and reform programs must be sustained while at same time defense program requires attention in light Egyptian trouble-making in Persian Gulf. If US not able assist as much as before, Iran hopes it will understand if Iran procures what it needs at cheaper prices from elsewhere. Iranian military cooperation with US will be maintained and there should be no US apprehension.
3. Secretary replied he familiar with talks Ambassador Meyer has had on this subject with Shah and Aram. He said we have always held Shah in highest esteem and continue do so. Under his leadership Iran has [Page 281] never been more stable, secure and progressive. We have greatly valued relationship and hope it will continue. We understand what we have offered may not be as much as Shah wants, but it very large in light US fighting war and other burdens on U.S. taxpayer.
4. Secretary said Iran is of course as sovereign as U.S., but we are concerned about path on which Shah may be embarking because we do not see where it will lead. If there is trouble in area, it comes from USSR through its provision of arms to UAR and Iraq and its encouragement of trouble-making. Secretary said it difficult understand what Iranian arms purchases from Soviets will mean for Iran or for U.S.S.R. Soviet attitude to Iran well known, and Aram himself has in past commented on his concern about “friendly Soviet subversion.” It not surprising Soviets might want sell arms cheaply, for example SAM’s after their experience with them in Viet Nam. Of over 300 fired in Viet Nam only 14 on target, and head of Soviet missile program is in Viet Nam to see what is wrong.
5. Secretary added it difficult perceive longer-term effects on US-Iranian relations of contemplated Iranian steps. Since 1946 we have given strong support to independence and security of Iran. We don’t know what Congress and American public will think about Iran’s turning for arms to the principal source of trouble in area. This not something which executive branch alone can control. Hence reaction cannot be predicted, but we hope our relations will remain intimate as they have been of mutual benefit for past twenty years. In short, we concerned about future.
6. Secretary also pointed out we might have serious security problems if Iranian purchases from Soviets expose our sensitive equipment such as F–4’s to penetration.
7. Khosrovani responded by saying admittedly USSR a threat, but immediate danger comes from elsewhere. He said Iran feels need as independent nation be able defend itself and stronger Iran will be better friend of US. He twice expressed hope we would make clearer in Tehran what it is we are prepared to offer, saying that Iran must make best use of its limited financial resources.
8. Ambassador Hare mentioned that we have been pursuing in Tehran question of program for our available credit and that Ambassador Meyer has told Shah we are considering second F–4 squadron.
9. Secretary said if there are problems about amounts of money and delivery dates this is because we are demonstrating in Viet Nam, by among other things spending extra billion dollars per month, that friendship of US is important to security of our friends. Most important security asset Iran has is friendship of US.
10. Khosrovani, saying he speaking personally, commented that there is a psychological factor involved in that at certain stage of development countries feel they should have independent means of defense.
[Page 282]11. Secretary responded Iran’s armed forces are for defense of Iran and Iran’s policy is independent but repeated we do not understand what it means for Iran to turn for arms to the source of trouble in the area.
12. Khosrovani asked if this would not neutralize Soviet policy, to which Secretary replied it works other way too and Soviets may want have important influence on Iranian policy. Replying US should not worry about that as GOI will maintain close ties with US military mission, Khosrovani said Iran wants to be free to procure in any available market. Iran understands, he said, value of US friendship and is grateful and hopes any new steps will not be misunderstood.
13. Secretary concluded conversation by once again stressing US has respect for Shah’s great service to his country and has continuing desire for friendship but does not have complete understanding because we do not see where contemplated steps lead.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 17 IRAN–US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Eliot, cleared by Hare, and approved by Walsh. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE.↩