Office of the Historian

152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran1

Washington, July 8, 1966, 8:41 p.m.

4417. Joint State/Defense.

1.
Your statements to Shah, Aram and Alam (Embtel s 1762, 31, 80)2 have covered essential points on US-Iranian political and military relationship, our desire continue that relationship to our mutual benefit (provided GOI action does not make it impossible for us to do so), and political and security problems inherent in any Iranian decision to buy [Page 275] arms from Soviets especially if introduction of Soviet military advisors or technical personnel involved. We were particularly refreshed by your blunt conversation with Shah on seventh and Aram earlier. Trust you will feel free to use with Shah points in paras 5, 6 and 9 in Embtel 31 if you deem them useful.
2.
You should seek audience with Shah and make following points:
A.
You have reported conversation of July 7 in detail to USG which confirms views you expressed to Shah.
B.
In light of Shah’s sense of urgency regarding defense of vulnerable industrial and military installations, US actively considering sale of 2 F4 squadrons for delivery commencing in FY’69, sale to be within available $200 million proposed credit and remaining credit under 1964 Understanding. FYI. We are looking at squadrons of 12 to 16 each in C, D, and E series from point of view of pricing, availability and impact on U.S. inventory. Prices and availabilities will follow shortly by septel. End FYI.
C.
We believe it would be mistake for Iranians cancel plans purchase Hawk missile units. Hawk would play important part in any credible Iranian air defense capability and could not effectively be replaced by other types of surface-to-air missiles.
D.
U.S. willing move ahead on sale of PGM’s with first delivery about December 1968 if at least partially funded in third tranche.
E.
USG recognizes final decision on arms procurement is matter of Iran’s sovereign choice just as furnishing of military assistance is US sovereign choice. We earnestly hope that it will remain in our mutual interest to continue the intimate military relationship we have had in the past.
F.
USG urges that Iran not take steps which could damage this relationship. Shah well aware need for public and Congressional support for foreign assistance programs; there is no doubt that Iran’s entering into a military relationship with the USSR would produce a negative reaction in the US which would adversely affect this support. It is impossible to predict the future but the Shah can surely understand inevitability of such reaction to attempts to justify a concessionary military program (grant or sales) for Iran if Iran obtains arms from USSR, given the facts that the USSR is the only major long-term threat to Iran’s security, that our military assistance to Iran has been predicated primarily on that threat and that Soviets are opposing us and our Free World friends including Iran on Viet Nam. Additionally, there are security considerations affecting sensitive US equipment (FYI, such as F4’s end FYI) which would have to be weighed in the light of any Soviet or Eastern European arms program with Iran. FYI. If Shah again raises US-Soviet arms co-existence in India, Iraq, you should note that no sophisticated US equipment involved in either case. End FYI.
G.
We note that Ambassador Khosrovani has asked to see Secretary this coming week which will provide further opportunity for discussion these matters.
3.
FYI. We are looking into matter of all administrative costs, including R & D. End FYI.
Ball
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–IRAN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Crawford, Eliot, and Reed (DOD/ISA); cleared in draft by Warren, Colonel Haynes (DOD/ISA), Macomber, Wriggins, John G. MacCracken (EUR/SOV), and Hare; and approved by Acting Secretary Ball. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE and Moscow.↩
  2. Documents 148, 149, and 151.↩