116. Special Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Supplement1
ASSESSMENT OF NON-SOVIET THREAT TO IRAN
Conclusions
Iran’s Ability to Cope with the Real Non-Soviet Military Threat
The arms inventory of the Arabs continues to increase in quantity and quality, but reportedly for use against Israel. The Arab’s capacity to absorb sophisticated equipment is limited, however. Such equipment could be employed on a selective basis against Iran, e.g., Iraqi fighter aircraft, Iraqi and UAR bombers, and UAR naval craft. Its use en toto against Iran is unlikely in the next five years in view of inter-Arab rifts, Arab fears of an Israeli preemptive attack, and of current Arab commitments in Yemen and against the Kurds. Neither the Iraqi ground forces nor the estimated projected improvement of the Iraq Air Force pose a very formidable threat to Iran. The source of Iran’s wealth and subsequent ability to develop itself has been and is likely to remain its oil-rich southwest. Iran has recently realized that its concentration at Abadan and the supplying oil fields must be spread out, and it has taken steps to accomplish this dispersion. Additionally, it is developing other capital investments—and potential targets—throughout Iran. Although this dispersion will make each target relatively less important if it is destroyed, concurrently they will become more difficult to defend and will require ever-increasing amounts of defensive equipment—which the Iranians do not have the trained personnel to operate. The Iranian AC and W System currently faces north. Regardless of how tight the Iranian defense system may become, however, some aggressive segment of an attacking force is more than likely going to reach its objective.
Iran’s Ability to Cope with the Real Non-Soviet, Non-Military Threat
The urbanization likely to follow the increase in capital development will bring with it the problems already evident in other areas of the world—problems of housing, jobs, and food shortages which provocateurs will attempt to use to their advantage. The mullahs used these problems in June 1963 to instigate the urban riots which were strongly repressed by military forces and which can and probably will be repressed [Page 208] in the future. The bad effects of the traditional landlord-peasant relationship and the tribal nomadism have been broken, in part, by the land-reform program. This program will continue, but it will be phased so as to disrupt as little as possible. Social reforms will likewise be continued, but at a pace which will not alienate the conservatives. The Medical Corps and the Literacy Corps will receive more emphasis to implement these reforms.
A more literate public will expect a larger share of the economic and social benefits from Iran’s oil wealth. This is reported to be true in Khuzistan, the source of the oil, not only of the sizable Arab population there but of the other inhabitants as well; some tribes claim that the oil fields were taken from them. The exact number of Arabs in the population of the province is not known, although reports indicate that at least 100,000 Arabs live in the sugar cane area north of Abadan and another 100,000 live in the date groves to the south. The latest census of Iran (1956) counted about 2,000,000 people in the entire province. An estimate of the number of Arab-speaking people in the province is about 500,000, half of Iran’s Arabs.
In line with the historic aversion of the Persians to the “late-coming” Arabs, the Government of Iran until recently had not given much thought to the far-off Khuzistanis, especially the Arabs. Currently, however, it has indicated the district’s importance and the potential for subversion of its Arab population. It has increased the amount of government funds spent there and has instituted some repressive measures against the Arabs. Although reports indicate that the Arabs have become less apathetic than heretofore, continued interest in the area by Tehran should preclude the start of the type of terrorism that changed British policy in Palestine and Cyprus and is working against UK presence in Aden.
Possibly a greater danger to the government’s operation of the oil fields will occur if the labor unions which are planned there get out of hand. The government is attempting to permit the laborers to “let off steam” by establishing several tightly controlled unions. These unions might merge and subversive elements could inflame attitudes as they did recently in Bahrein. The government appears to have recognized this potential problem. Whether it is willing to mend its autocratic and bureaucratic ways and satisfy the aspirations of the laborers and the other Khuzistanis, including the Arabs, however, is open to question.
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- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Iran 381, 28 Jan 66. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. The study was prepared in response to a request from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.↩