Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

51. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 30, 1964, 10 a.m.

US-UK TALKS

SUBJECT

• Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula

PARTICIPANTS

• Sir Geoffrey Harrison, Deputy Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office
• Mr. T. Frank Brenchley, Head of Arabian Department, British Foreign Office
• Mr. Anthony Ackland, UKUN
• Mr. John E. Killick, Counselor, British Embassy
• Mr. Patrick R. H. Wright, First Secretary, British Embassy
• NEA—John D. Jernegan
• DOD/ISA—Frank K. Sloan
• NE—Rodger P. Davies
• NE—Talcott W. Seelye

1. Saudi Arabia

Mr. Jernegan said that despite the Saudi family squabble and the unpopularity of the Saud regime in certain circles in Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Faisal’s position remains quite strong. While there is the ever-present possibility that a cabal of princes could cause trouble, Faisal has emerged successfully from his power struggle with King Saud. Sir Geoffrey Harrison agreed with this assessment. Mr. Jernegan expressed the view that Faisal might be even better off now had he attended the Cairo Summit Conference. It appeared that the King’s prestige may have risen a bit as a result of his attendance.

Sir Geoffrey inquired whether the Department had any information indicating that the King had “given anything away” at Cairo. Mr. Jernegan said the King had been effusive in his response to Nasser’s cordial reception but that he had not been in a position to commit himself to anything. At least Nasser is now disposed to improve his relations with Saudi Arabia.

Sir Geoffrey thought Faisal had lost nothing tactically by not going to Cairo. The British had heard from Saqqaf that there was a possibility of a continuation of the Saudi-UAR dialogue. Mr. Jernegan said that Saqqaf had indicated to our Ambassador at Jidda a Saudi desire that UAR representatives visit Saudi Arabia. However, the Department has the impression from reports emanating from Cairo that the UAR will probably not agree to send anyone to Saudi Arabia. Mr. Jernegan hoped that Mr. Spinelli, who has proceeded to Jidda from Cairo, might lay the groundwork for further talks.

Mr. Jernegan said we are pleased with the cessation of UAR propaganda. Sir Geoffrey expressed the view that it would take some months to overcome the unsettling effects in Saudi Arabia of past UAR propaganda attacks. Mr. Jernegan thought that Faisal personally appeared to be more affected by these attacks than the Saudi public. Mr. Seelye said the Department has received reports in the last year that UAR propaganda has been considered somewhat of a joke in some Saudi circles. Sir Geoffrey cautioned against underestimating the effects of Nasser’s propaganda.

Mr. Jernegan commented that the Department is encouraged by recent signs of more rational economic development in Saudi Arabia. He thought that there had been an important “take-off”. Sir Geoffrey said he was struck by the incredible incompetence of the Saudi Government machinery. Mr. Davies said that the situation in the Government has improved compared to what it was some ten to fifteen years ago. There is now a semblance of modern government. Sir Geoffrey acknowledged that there had been some progress in this regard. If the Saudis can agree increasingly to accept foreign advice, they can make more rapid progress. Mr. Davies said the Ford Foundation is under contract to modernize the administrative apparatus of the Government. Sir Geoffrey commented that the greater the natural resources of a country such as Saudi Arabia, the more waste there is likely to be.

Mr. Jernegan inquired as to the latest British information regarding the size of the White Army. Mr. Brenchley said that the figure being “used in the planning stage” is 10,000 or ten units composed of 1,000 men each. Mr. Davies said that our figures indicate that the present size of the White Army is between 16,000 and 20,000. Mr. Jernegan recalled a recent report suggesting that the White Army is three times this size. Mr. Seelye said that the report to which Mr. Jernegan referred emanated from the chief British advisor to the White Army; the figure of 50,000 which he is quoted as citing, however, may have been garbled in transmission. Mr. Brenchley said that the British advisors favor decreasing rather than increasing the size of the White Army to make it more mobile. The Foreign Office has no recent report on its current size. Mr. Davies expressed the hope that our two military advisory missions can keep in close contact and follow “parallel lines”.

Mr. Brenchley noted that the British do not have representation in the Eastern Province, as does the United States, and therefore information available to the Department on Saudi Arabia is likely to be more complete. Mr. Davies said that the size of Saudi Arabia and the dispersion of the populace makes it difficult always to feel the pulse of public opinion. In reference to earlier discussion, he wished to call attention to a message which had just come in from the field reporting that the UAR has been dropping leaflets over Yemeni royalist territory showing pictures of King Saud meeting with Sallal, Nasser and Hussein in Cairo.

2. Aden and the Persian Gulf

Switching to Aden and the Persian Gulf, Mr. Jernegan commented that it is the Department’s understanding that HMG considers Aden as the key to its commitment in the Persian Gulf. He said that the Department has followed recent developments in Aden with interest and anxiety. Sir Geoffrey said, “So have we.” He said that since he had to leave the meeting briefly in a few minutes he would at this point prefer to talk about the Persian Gulf and return to Aden later.

Sir Geoffrey recalled the Persian Gulf US-UK talks held in London in April 1963² and said that the British have little to add at this time. The UK political and military presence in the Gulf accomplishes the twin objectives of fulfilling the British obligations to the Persian Gulf states and to Kuwait. Aden is the base which gives the British commitment in the Gulf political and military “substance”. If the British political and military influence were removed, anarchy would result. This would have two dangerous implications: (1) it would open the Gulf to the influence of other powers, such as the USSR (Mr. Brenchley interjected to include Saudi Arabia in this connection, noting that the Saudis have still not cut their links to the Omani rebels) and (2) it would threaten the flow of oil to the West. Disruption of the oil could be “inconvenient”. If all the Gulf oil resources fell under one state, it would be difficult to keep the price of oil within reasonable limits. Sir Geoffrey said that while the form of the British relationship with the Gulf states appears anachronistic, it is important to remember that the rulers are backward and conservative and it is difficult to get them to move forward as fast and as far as one would like. Nevertheless, HMG is conscious of the need to do so.

Sir Geoffrey said that the basic British philosophy is to preserve order and stability in the Gulf while at the same time encouraging progress at a rate circumstances will allow. It is not in HMG’s interest to encourage developments which threaten the traditional society. HMG recognizes that the pace of change in the Gulf will not satisfy the Afro-Asian powers and that the issue may be raised in the UN. He said the Labor Party thinks HMG should move faster.

Mr. Jernegan inquired whether the British have an overall plan for dealing with the Gulf states. He recalled mention a few years ago of a federation. Mr. Brenchley replied that HMG is thinking of a federation of Trucial States (excluding Bahrein, Kuwait and Qatar) but this would be difficult to achieve. Sir Geoffrey said that to produce coherence in an area which is so fragmented is an intractable problem.

3. Kuwait

With regard to Kuwait, Mr. Brenchley said HMG is encouraged by the recent rapprochement with Iraq. Kuwait’s admission to the United Nations, Iraq’s recognition of Kuwait and agreement on the Kuwait-Iraqi border are good signs which remove the immediacy of the Iraqi threat. There had been no change in Iraq’s policy toward Kuwait following the recent change in the Iraqi Government. The British know from talking with the Emir of Kuwait that he is extremely cautious in dealing with Iraq. He considers the 1961 agreement with the UK ³ as the key to safeguarding Kuwait’s integrity.

Mr. Brenchley said that HMG is determined to maintain its capability to come to Kuwait’s defense. In order to be able to do so, British forces must be kept on the alert and be available on short notice. The commitment of British troops to East Africa complicates the picture somewhat. In addition, Iraq, for internal reasons, recently moved a tank regiment to the Basra area. This regiment could conceivably capitalize on any internal coup effort in Kuwait and move in a matter of hours.

Mr. Brenchley said that the available British military force has two functions: (1) its very existence encourages Kuwait to undertake an independent policy, and (2) it serves as a deterrent to Iraq. The critical military element consists of one battalion of troops and Hawker Hunter aircraft located in Bahrein. The British do not know to what extent the Iraqis are aware of the need for backing up the Bahrein military contingent with troops from Aden.

Mr. Brenchley asserted that the UAR political support for Kuwait’s independence is of considerable importance. Obviously, the UAR would not wish Iraq to swallow up Kuwait. While UAR teachers exercise influence in Kuwait, it is the British view that Nasser has no intention of subverting the Kuwait Government. If Nasser so desired, he could “do a lot” in Kuwait. His influence there is much stronger than Baathist influence.

Mr. Sloan noted that this seemed to indicate that the UAR was using “more subtlety” in its dealings in Kuwait than elsewhere. Mr. Brenchley agreed. Kuwaitis are satisfied that the UAR is not using its assets against the Kuwait Subah family. Meanwhile, the Kuwait Government undertakes to maintain good relations with the UAR by doing such things as financing UAR-approved projects and by hard currency deposits in the UAR.

Mr. Jernegan asked to what extent HMG tries to influence Kuwaiti policy. Mr. Brenchley replied that since the treaty of 1961 the British have been careful not to seem to be endeavoring to exert influence on Kuwait policy. HMG proffers advice only in response to Kuwaiti initiative. The British have the potential to influence Kuwait more and would do so if the stakes were high enough. The British are confident that any lingering Kuwaiti suspicions of the UK will subside and that the “pendulum will swing back” in the direction of increasing Kuwaiti solicitation of British advice. “A known devil is preferable to the unknown.”

4. Southern Gulf

With regard to the southern Gulf, Mr. Brenchley said the British have been devoting attention to getting rid of “the anachronisms”. This flows from a desire to bring about modernization and because of the prospect that the UN will give increasing attention to the Persian Gulf. He noted that the British are responsible for the defense and external affairs of these states. In certain respects HMG is involved in internal affairs—for example, in exercising legal jurisdiction over foreigners. Since 1960 the British have been pressing the rulers to set up the necessary machinery for dealing with non-Muslim foreigners. This policy of “retrocession” has progressed furthest in Bahrein.

Mr. Jernegan inquired how the British exercised legal jurisdiction in these states. Mr. Brenchley replied that jurisdiction is exercised by British Political Agents and special British judges. British courts apply Indian law. In addition to Bahrein and Qatar, the policy of retrocession is now being applied in Abu Dhabi in the form of turning over traffic matters to the local administration. In all cases the British make the appointment of a qualified judge as a sine qua non for the turnover.

Mr. Brenchley said that a council of Trucial States exists which meets under the chairmanship of the Dubai Political Agent. The British have suggested to the Trucial State rulers that an executive committee be formed composed of their deputies which would meet regularly and concern itself essentially with economic development. As an inducement, the British have doubled the previous amount of British funds earmarked for economic projects in the Trucial States. The momentum toward federation is difficult to generate since each ruler tends to hate his immediate neighbor.

Mr. Brenchley said that some progress had been made in resolving frontier problems. Negotiations are taking place with regard to the “one remaining undemarcated border” between Abu Dhabi and Muscat.

5. Buraimi

Mr. Jernegan asked whether the Buraimi question were quiescent. Mr. Brenchley said that this was not entirely the case. He recapitulated the UN step-by-step approach to the problem envisaging the return of the refugees. By October 1962 Mr. de Ribbing’s work was virtually completed. However, the Saudis “went back on their promise” to allow the refugees to return, setting a condition that there be a modus vivendi. By this they meant the establishment of an international body to oversee Buraimi. This was not acceptable to the Sultan of Muscat since it threatened his sovereignty. The Saudi representative, Azzam Pasha, keeps reminding the Secretary General that the next move is up to the British. HMG has frankly dragged its feet since it wishes to keep up UN interest in the matter while at the same time recognizing that in view of the Sultan’s adamant position the British reply must be negative. Mr. Brenchley thought that the reason the Saudis had recently become more interested in the problem was because the British oil company in Abu Dhabi recently drilled a well close to the modified Riyadh line. The location is in the so-called “standstill” area, which the British do not consider applicable.

Mr. Jernegan wondered what Aramco’s response to this development had been. Mr. Seelye said that Aramco has reflected Saudi concern with the British company’s drilling of a well in the “standstill” area but is not itself operating in this area. Mr. Brenchley preferred the term “ex-standstill” area and stated that in any case this area is not in the Aramco concession.

6. Muscat and Oman

With regard to Muscat and Oman, Sir Geoffrey said that the British have acquainted the Committee of Five in detail with the history and nature of British relations with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. He expressed the hope that the US would also provide the Committee with the details of its treaty relationship. Mr. Jernegan said he was under the impression we already had. Mr. Seelye said that we had earlier made a statement before the Committee of Twenty-four and that we would be happy to explain our treaty relationship with the Sultanate before the newly-formed Committee of Five.

Sir Geoffrey said that HMG will decline to act as a channel of communication between the Sultan and the UN. The British have found the Secretary General to be understanding of British difficulties with the Sultan. The SYG saw an analogy between the situation of the Omani rebels and internal chieftains in Nigeria. Mr. Jernegan wondered why the General Assembly had shown so much voting enthusiasm on the subject. Sir Geoffrey said there has been a great deal of “mystification” over the UK-Sultan relationship. It is the British view that if the Sultan would be more forthcoming, he might be able to make a good case before the Afro-Asian Bloc. HMG regrets that the Sultan cares so little about the UN.

Mr. Jernegan inquired whether the Sultan is an Arab. Sir Geoffrey responded in the affirmative. Mr. Seelye said it was his understanding that the Sultan is half Indian. He said the problem is that the Arabs do not regard him as an Arab. Sir Geoffrey acknowledged that this was why the British hoped that no Arab would be appointed to the Committee of Five. Mr. Brenchley noted that the question is sometimes asked why the British bother with the Sultan. They do so for the following three reasons: (1) the desire for stability in the area; (2) the fact that if the British rupture relations with the Sultan, the confidence of the other rulers of the Persian Gulf in the British would be undermined; and (3) the British have important staging rights at Salalah and Masira, essential links in their Persian Gulf defense chain.

Sir Geoffrey noted that the American Consul in Aden has responsibility over Muscat and Oman and wondered whether the Department has any plans to establish a resident Vice Consul in Muscat. Mr. Seelye recalled that six or seven years ago the Department had seriously considered appointing a resident Consul in Muscat. However, because he would have little to do and in view of the difficulties of living in Muscat, the Department had decided against doing so. Mr. Davies said that the Department has been considering the possibility of assigning two Arab specialists to Dhahran who would develop special expertise in the Persian Gulf area. Sir Geoffrey hoped the Department would bear in mind the need to build up the image of the sovereignty of the Sultanate.

7. Aden

Mr. Brenchley, while noting that Aden comes under the jurisdiction of the Colonial Office, said that Aden as a colony presents the UK with difficulties. A large portion of the population is Yemeni. The internal situation is complex. The Yemen revolution has “complicated things”. Recently, there has been a certain “swinging back” as the Adenis have recognized the ineffectiveness of the YARG and the fact that Yemen is “no bed of roses”. The resolution of the moderates has been weakened. One of the problems being tackled is that of the franchise. Britain’s principal interest continues to be the free use of the military base.

Mr. Brenchley identified three sources of trouble for Aden: the nationalists, Yemeni threats from across the border, and the UAR. Pressure from the direction of the UAR has increased in recent months, including propaganda and incitement. He referred to a report just received concerning the ambush of a Federal Regular Army patrol by Yemeni dissidents masquerading in Yemeni Republican National Guard uniforms. He said that the Army had been attempting to intercept a camel convoy headed into Radfan from Yemen. The Yemeni dissidents had apparently been trained in Yemen. Mr. Seelye noted that those troubles in the Aden-Yemen border areas which appear to have been stirred up from outside have occurred only in recent months. He suggested the possibility that they had been inspired by reports, some accurate and some inaccurate, of arms shipments from Aden to the royalists. It seemed unfortunate that the Federal Regular Army, while tracking an incoming caravan, failed to intercept caravans headed outward into Yemen. Mr. Davies commented that reports of shipments of arms from the Sharif of Beihan to the Yemeni royalists were first received last October, before the border troubles began to mount.

Mr. Brenchley thought that the stepping up of outside-inspired incidents may have been connected with forthcoming elections in Aden. In any case, these developments complicate steps which might be taken in the direction of independence. HMG has not yet reached a decision on this matter and the matter of franchise is now being considered. Mr. Davies commented that the organization of the SAF appeared to have progressed fairly well. He noted the complex problem of endeavoring to meld the less advanced protectorate shaikhs with the more advanced Aden Colony residents. The security measures taken in Aden following the deplorable grenade-throwing incident appeared to have been dictated by the shaikhs, who oppose the forces of change. Mr. Brenchley noted that the SAF Council decided on these measures and Aden State has a representative in this Council who voted in favor of the strict measures taken. Aden must accept the consequences of the federal government being responsible for the state of emergency.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA/ARP Files: Lot 69 D 257, POL—Political Affairs & Rel., 1964, Middle East General, POL 3-a, US-UK Talks, January Position Papers, January 29-30, 1964. Secret. Drafted by Seelye on February 3.
2. For documentation on the April 1964 talks, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XVIII, pp. 559–561.
3. On June 19, 1961, the United Kingdom signed a new treaty with Kuwait recognizing its independence and providing for U.K. military assistance if Kuwait were threatened and the Amir asked for protection. Following a June 26 Iraqi claim that Kuwait was “an indivisible part of Iraq” and what seemed to be an imminent Iraqi invasion, the Amir asked the United Kingdom for military assistance and U.K. military forces were sent back to Kuwait.