479. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia1

249230. For Ambassador.

1.
Following guidance provided in connection your prospective call on King Faisal.
2.
Yemen. When you last discussed this issue with Faisal (Jidda 4831),2 he said he noted no sign of movement between Republicans and Royalists to compose their differences and commented, among other things, that Republicans were divided between leftists and more moderate Amri/Iryani group. Subsequent developments would appear have changed this picture. Recent “exile” 22 leftist officers to Algeria, reconstitution YARG cabinet and Amri/Iryani approach to Italians (State 2454883 and 248204,4 para 3) suggest situation may be somewhat improved. Saudi public statement Oct 2 on Yemen (Jidda 5504)5 would appear reflect this trend. Current Amri trip Moscow hardly reassuring, but you may note confidentially we understand that what YARG regards as SAG failure react positively to recent Yemen developments may have played part in timing Amri trip. Dept would be interested King’s current assessment situation, particularly whether Imam’s return Yemen likely foreshadow further fighting or real effort get Yemeni peace dialogue going which King and we both favor. You may add USG policy on non-resumption relations with YARG remains firm and we continuing do what little we can encourage parties establish meaningful [Page 880] contacts. This connection, you may wish probe for any evidence continuing quiet SAG/YARG contacts.6

[Here follows discussion of Arab-Israel and Persian Gulf issues.]

Katzenbach
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL SAUD-US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Brewer on October 2; cleared by Deputy Director of the Office of UN Political Affairs William H. Gleysteen, Eliot, and Atherton; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Tehran and USUN.
  2. Document 478.
  3. Telegram 245488 to Jidda, September 26, reported that on September 22 Italian Ambassador to Yemen Bernucci met with Prime Minister Al-Amri and YAR Republican Council Chairman Iryani, who told him that the Yemeni Government had now purged itself of extremists. They described this as a guarantee of its good intentions to work for improved relations with Saudi Arabia but warned that this was the “last act of moderation” that could be expected; if the Saudis did not respond, the present regime would be unable to resist for long Soviet pressure for the return of the extreme leftists to positions of influence. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN)
  4. Telegram 248204 to Jidda, October 1, stated that it was unclear how the Yemeni desire for improved contacts with the Saudi Government had been communicated to the Saudis. (Ibid.)
  5. Dated October 2. (Ibid.)
  6. In telegram 5721 from Jidda, October 23, Eilts reported that he had discussed Yemen with Rashad Pharaon, who acknowledged that some YAR emissaries had been in touch with the Saudis. He said that the King had reiterated his long-held position that the Saudi Arabian Government was not a party to the dispute and that the republicans should meet with the royalists to work out a settlement. (Ibid.)