Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

454. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, July 23, 1967, 0931Z.

281. State 10446.²

1. Appreciate rationale re Dept’s conclusion that no positive action should be taken now to assist various anti-UAR Yemeni groups. I should point out, however, that pursuant SecState 219929³ I have stopped actively urging Saudis not to assist Yemeni royalists or to continue restrain them. Instead, I have taken line with Rashad and others that Saudis aware of dangers and matter is one for them to decide. Saudis have quickly sensed our more relaxed line which, I suspect, is one reason we beginning hear rumors of Saudi help to Yemeni royalists and of permitting them try their luck.

2. I respectfully request Dept’s reconsideration of one possible item of aid to Yemeni royalists, namely 20,000 (or as many as we can provide) gas masks. UAR continues indiscriminately use poison gas in Yemen. On our part we no longer seeking obscure this fact. Various items in US press including US News and World Report and Drummond’s article in Washington Post, are publicizing it. Pursuant State 217282,⁴ we here are also discreetly urging Yemeni royalists give wider, more effective publicity to these poison gas attacks. However, apart from more publicity, a real need exists for some gas mask protection. We could supply such masks though Saudis if we prefer not to be directly involved. Even if it became known, provision of such equipment could scarcely be labeled as offensive help to Yemeni royalists, but as essential defense need to meet blatant UAR use of gas against combatants and non-combatants alike in Yemen. It would also show Yemeni royalists that our concern with Yemen is an impartial one.

3. In this connection, I assume that with YAR withdrawal of recognition from USG our political commitments in Yemen have been wiped clean. We ought now try to establish contact with as wide spectrum of Yemeni political contacts as possible. We should seek develop at least some influence with all groupings, but at this time commit ourselves to none. By doing so, hopefully, we may at some future time be able to exert constructive influence for a broadly based Yemeni Govt. This will have to include Yemeni royalists who have shown remarkable staying power. It is unrealistic continue to ignore them. Apart from few personal contacts with Ahmad Shami, we have heretofore leaned over backwards to avoid contact with royalists to avoid embarrassing our relations with UAR and YAR. These considerations obviously no longer apply. Assume Dept has no objection to a discreet but overt effort on our part to broaden, our personal bases, our circle of Yemeni royalist contacts.⁵

4. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] concurs.

Eilts

1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel Telegrams, Jidda. Secret; Roger Channel; Special Handling.
2. Telegram 10446 to Jidda, July 20, informed the Ambassador that after further examination of the possibility of assisting Yemeni groups, the Department had concluded that no positive action should be taken at that time. (Ibid.)
3. Document 451.
4. Dated June 27. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 YEMEN-SAUD)
5. Telegram 13532 to Jidda, July 27, informed the Embassy that the Department had no objection to a discreet effort to broaden its circle of Yemeni royalist contacts on a personal basis. Regarding the Ambassador’s request for 20,000 gas masks for the royalists, the telegram stated that the United States should avoid direct involvement with any Yemeni faction at that stage. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel Telegrams, Jidda)