Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

450. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 7, 1967.

SUBJECT

• US-YARG Break in Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• His Excellency Abdulaziz al-Futaih, Ambassador of Yemen
• Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
• Mr. William D. Brewer, Country Director, Arabian Peninsula States

Ambassador Battle said that he had asked Ambassador Futaih to call. He deeply regretted the purpose of this meeting. We had, however, been informed by our Charge in Sanaa of the YARG’s decision to break relations with the US.² This was a source of particular regret to us due to the baseless nature of the charges on which the YARG action was founded. Ambassador Battle noted that Ambassador Goldberg on June 6 had publicly invited the United Nations to send investigators to the Sixth Fleet to satisfy themselves that the charges that US aircraft had been involved in support of Israeli military operations were groundless. With a very minimum of effort, Ambassador Battle thought that the accuracy of these allegations could have been correctly established.

Ambassador Battle told Ambassador Futaih that we must now reciprocate the YARG action. Accordingly, we must request that all YARG diplomats accredited to the US be withdrawn from this country within 48 hours. Ambassador Battle assumed Ambassador Futaih, as his Government’s accredited representative to the United Nations, would go to live in New York. Other members of the Embassy staff had until 3:00 PM on June 9 to leave the country, slightly more time than was being given to our representatives in the Yemen.

Ambassador Battle continued that he was deeply disturbed by reports just received that our installations in Taiz were on fire. He very much hoped that the break in relations would be dignified and that full protection would be accorded our diplomats in Yemen as it would be to Ambassador Futaih and his staff here.

Ambassador Futaih said that he had received no word from his Government. There was nothing that he personally could do. He felt that the political and social system in the US made it easy for one group to manipulate public opinion. US policy then had to reflect this public opinion. He thought this had brought great trouble on the US and expressed hope that those responsible in this country would think increasingly of Near Eastern problems in their basic human terms.

Ambassador Battle said that we had recognized the YARG early on. We had extended considerable aid to the Yemen. The USG had extended much more aid to the Arab countries than to Israel, including over one billion dollars in assistance to the UAR alone. Ambassador Futaih commented that the USG had been held in much higher regard by the Arabs years ago, even before major aid programs had been instituted. Both Ambassadors expressed personal regret that their association had been so short.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA/ARP Files: Lot 69 D 350, POL YEMEN-US, YEMEN 1967. Confidential. Drafted by Brewer.
2. Telegram 208565 to Sanaa, June 6, instructed the Embassy to take immediate steps to evacuate all personnel and to close both Sanaa and Taiz, and stated that the U.S. Government was asking the Italian Government to represent U.S. interests in Yemen. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 US-UAR) Telegram 210053 to Asmara, June 10, informed former Charge d’Affaires Lee F. Dinsmore that the Italian Government had formally agreed to serve as the protecting power for U.S. interests in Yemen. (Ibid., POL 17 US-YEMEN) Telegram 210598 to Rome, June 13, instructed the Embassy to inform the Italian Foreign Ministry that the Somali Embassy in Washington had informed the Department that the Government of Yemen had asked Somalia to act as the protecting power for Yemeni interests in the United States. (Ibid., POL 17 YEMEN-US)