Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

431. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, April 2, 1967, 1500Z.

4047. SecState 164518;² Jidda 4008.³

1. Met with King Faisal for about two hours late last night. Rashad Pharaon present throughout audience. At outset Saqqaf also there, but soon left and did not reappear. (He is ill.) King relaxed and in good form and spirits.

2. I first reviewed long-standing USG interest in encouraging peaceful solution to Yemen problem. Recalled that during first several months my mission here and in wake failure Haradh conference, we had done utmost keep direct SAG-UAR dialogue going to resolve divergent interpretations Jidda agreement. Subsequently, when direct dialogue aborted, we had actively encouraged Kuwaiti mediation effort. Although regrettable latter now also stalled, our interest in peaceful solution remains. I then carefully gave him substance para 2 State 164518. (In doing so, I thought it best gloss over delay between Ambassador Battle’s original proposal and March 28 reply to avoid, if possible, King’s taking similar time to reply.) I noted that in accepting in principle renewed US mediation, sole UAR stipulations were (a) Saudi concurrence in such mediation and (b) opportunity approve terms of reference. These perfectly understandable and, if His Majesty likewise agreeable in principle, such terms of reference as might be prepared would of course also be submitted to him for consideration and acceptance. Thereafter, and once nomination Ambassador Hare approved by both sides, new USG initiative to assist parties in reaching settlement could formally get underway.

3. Faisal listened carefully and with obvious interest. He then said wished speak very candidly and hoped USG would take his comments in spirit offered. From many previous talks with him on subject of Yemen, I certainly aware of background of problem and of details his position. He assumed USG fully briefed on these. They remain unchanged. All previous pertinent agreements had been broken by Nasser. He frankly doubtful Nasser any more sincere this time. More likely this another Nasser trick either to buy time or to obtain USG help. Nasser had cooperated with Bunker mission to keep PL-480 flowing. When assured of this, he lost interest. Similarly, immediately after Jidda agreement Nasser went to Moscow where, King charged, he used Jidda agreement to extract more Soviet aid and then jettisoned agreement. Also, time growing short before Brits leave Aden. There body of opinion in Saudi Arabia that believes USG is in “collusion” with Nasser and is not really concerned about getting UAR troops out of Yemen lest this aggravate Arab-Israeli problem. Similarly, there are reports that USG indifferent to possibility of Nasser-dominated South Arabia. In telling me this, King insisted did not wish to suggest he believes these charges, but they involve matters which have to be considered. He personally is convinced USG wishes SAG well and would do nothing deliberately hurt latter’s interests. However, US unwillingness recognize Nasser threat inexplicable and worrisome.

4. USG, he recalled, had been first to attempt to mediate Yemen problem in form of Bunker mission. It subsequently disengaged contending Yemen entirely an Arab problem. SAG had initially placed complete reliance in US mediation effort. Solemn promise had been made to him from very chair I sitting on that all prestige President Kennedy and American people would be exerted get Nasser out of Yemen. Nothing had happened. Some Saudis contend USG did not really try. He does not share this view. USG had indeed tried, yet its efforts totally unavailing in getting Nasser out. Is renewed USG mediation effort likely be any more effective? Furthermore, while Amb Hare is esteemed personal friend, how could Nasser make Hare’s designation a “condition” of any such mediation? Surely if Nasser really wants US mediation, it should be through USG rather than through any individual person. King could only speculate about Nasser’s purpose in proposing specific individual. Faisal quickly added did not wish his comments be interpreted as a Saudi refusal, but he would obviously have to know more about “basis” on which any USG mediation would operate before giving definitive reply.

5. I pointed out to King that Nasser had not made designation of Amb Hare a “condition” of USG mediation. While I did not know exactly what had prompted mention of Amb Hare, I wanted to suggest a more constructive reason for this than one he had adduced. To me, Nasser’s mention of Hare as possible mediator highly heartening development. It suggested Nasser may be genuinely anxious try to resolve Yemen problem. Hare well and favorably known in UAR, in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in Near East. Until his recent retirement he could properly be called Dean of American diplomats serving in Near East. We here in Jidda had in fact from time to time suggested Hare’s name to Dept as possible mediator. If as King feared all of this no more than another Nasser trick, I thought Hare would surely be last person whom Nasser would want to bring into matter. Hare intimately acquainted with Yemen problem and with psychology of major protagonists. Prospects either party attempting pull wool over his eyes slim. If anyone able find way through maze of divergent viewpoints and recriminations, Hare ideally qualified to do so. Faisal acknowledged validity these points.

6. As for alleged USG-UAR “collusion” that he had mentioned, I hoped he would not take it amiss if I also spoke frankly and called charge utter nonsense. I confident Faisal too wise believe it. I recalled he and I had discussed identical charge prior King’s trip to US last summer, and reminded him of Secretary Rusk’s specific statement to him at Blair House that objective USG policy was get UAR troops out of Yemen so that Yemeni people might decide their own future. As far as I aware there no change in this policy. Faisal recalled conversation. As for indifference to future of South Arabia, without mentioning names, I said had also heard this claim here in past few days. I was authorized categorically deny any such charge and spoke to him along lines para 1 SecState 165551.⁴ He seemed gratified. As for “basis” of US mediation, I reiterated purpose present talk was merely to ascertain if King also agreeable in principle to renewed US mediation. If so, appropriate terms of reference could be drafted and submitted to him, and to Nasser, for consideration and approval. I emphasized that US mediation offer made only after most careful study. It represents constructive effort continue search for peaceful settlement. As friend, I personally hoped he would give this offer very serious study it deserves.

7. Faisal responded that, in context my comments, he wished USG to know that he has “no objection in principle” to renewed USG mediation. However, he would not wish USG be under any misapprehension. It should be clearly understood from outset that any Saudi participation in renewed USG mediation subject to certain “qualifications.” Specifically, (a) SAG not willing commit itself to any particular actions or restraints while mediation going on, but reserves right to act as its interests dictate; (b) aim of mediation should be that no vestige of UAR influence remain in Yemen and that Yemeni people have right decide their future; and (c) during period of mediation is in progress, no special USG aid to UAR should be offered or given. He reiterated his suspicion that primary purpose Nasser’s agreement is to obtain renewed concessionary food aid. Once assured of this, Nasser will again lose interest. If these qualifications not acceptable, Faisal thought there little purpose in USG attempting mediate.

8. I asked him exactly what he meant by not being willing commit himself to any particular actions or restraints. I pointed out, for example, that unless Yemeni royalists continue be restrained from resuming hostilities, there little prospect for anyone’s mediation. UAR could rightly be expected to hit back. Faisal claimed fighting already taking place in Yemen. UAR bombing of northern Yemeni villages going on daily, and Yemeni royalists must take steps defend themselves. I recalled various previous assurances he had given me that no Saudi arms going to Yemeni royalists and asked if this still represents Saudi policy. He told me that it did when we last discussed matter, but situation now changed. While he did not specifically admit that Saudi arms aid to royalists resumed, he said “if royalists ask us for arms, we will provide them.” I urged him take another look at this. I recalled he had constantly assured me [he] wanted a peaceful solution and would leave no stone unturned to achieve this. While no one could say with any certainty whether renewed USG mediation will succeed, it offers sole present prospect continue search for a peaceful settlement. As such it is highly significant development. Many Saudi friends had urged that only USG could help break impassse. But if we are to try, it requires wholehearted cooperation of all. Alternative is war which no one can win and which in no one’s interest. He again insisted that war is going on and that UAR air attacks on Yemeni royalists continuing. In this situation, if Yemeni royalists ask for arms, he insisted [he] has no honorable choice but to provide them.

9. Re any new US aid to UAR, said I doubted USG could make any such blanket commitment. However, drawing on SecState 165522,⁵ I noted UAR has withdrawn its long-standing request for food aid. Hence, question of food assistance to UAR no longer current matter in US-UAR relations. He made no comment.

10. Assured him I would at once convey his views to USG for study. In doing so, however, I had frankly to tell him that if Saudis encourage resumption of hostilities in Yemen by new arms aid to royalists or other means, it could well raise question in minds US officials whether SAG really wants a peaceful settlement and whether there any purpose to renewed US mediation. Faisal responded “You may assure them I want peaceful settlement, but that I will not be tricked by Nasser again. In my view, his main purpose is to gain time and to get renewed USG aid. Same time I have no objection in principle to renewed USG mediation, with Ambassador Hare as mediator, subject already mentioned qualifications. I shall want to see terms of reference.”

11. King then rehearsed at some length his well-known theme re Communist encroachment into Middle East, Saudi Arabia only state standing against this, US interests here enormous, yet USG appears discount threat and doing little cope with it. Perhaps pertinent Saudi information sometimes exaggerated. However, even in lesser form, Communist threat very real. Who would have believed ten years ago there might be Saudi Communists. Now there are, all taught in UAR. Nasser himself may or may not be Communist, but he mainly responsible for furthering Communist objectives in Near East. Unless USG takes threat more seriously now, another Vietnam will ultimately ensue in this area. I assured King we take threat just as seriously as he does, but also believe vigorous programs of economic, social and political reform offer best way of grappling with this admittedly difficult problem. For this reason we applaud programs King has instituted and look forward to still more being done. It being close to midnight, we did not pursue subject.

12. Comment: Notwithstanding his “qualifications,” Faisal’s quick agreement in principle is encouraging. I had frankly thought he might ask for more time to think it over. His qualifications come as no surprise. They reflect areas in which he feels he has been burned in previous mediation attempts. They also reflect his utter lack of confidence in anything Nasser may say or do. As seen from here, most disturbing is his present unwillingness commit himself to continued restraint vis-a-vis Yemeni royalists. Even this may not be as ominous as it sounds. If we can get mediation moving ASAP with Amb Hare, and can obtain some indication of UAR willingness take tangible steps to defuse UAR-Saudi relations and to stop air attacks on northern Yemeni villages, I think there is still good chance that Faisal can be persuaded find quiet ways exercise needed restraint. Domestic and other pressures on him will be heavy and he (through us) will have to produce, but I believe we should give it a try. We currently in process preparing some recommendations for possible inclusion in terms of reference.

13. In connection with foregoing, also recommend Dept now solicit HMG’s early support as suggested by Saqqaf (Jidda 4008). I have of course said nothing to UK Amb about above approach. However, UAR Amb apparently informed by his govt. He pulled me aside at FonOff dinner for UN mission last evening to ask if King has accepted Hare as mediator. I could truthfully tell him had not yet seen King but hoped do so later that evening.⁶

Eilts

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Cairo.
2. Document 430.
3. Dated March 30. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN)
4. Telegram 16551 to Jidda, March 30, stated that the U.S. Government was concerned at the deteriorating security situation in Aden and supported British efforts to ensure an orderly transfer of power to the new state. (Ibid.)
5. Dated March 30. (Ibid.)
6. In telegram 5937 from Cairo, April 3, Charge d’Affaires David G. Nes commented on Faisal’s conditions, stating that although condition A was acceptable, providing it was reciprocal, clearly B and C were not. He pointed out that it was unreasonable to expect the United Arab Republic, before entering mediation, to agree that it was going to lose out. In addition, condition C amounted to an attempt to interfere in U.S.-UAR bilateral relations. If Faisal were to impose such conditions, he suspected the Egyptians would prefer to forget the whole thing. On the other hand, when it got down to details, they would probably have conditions too. The problem was that the United States had to tell the Egyptians soon whether Faisal had accepted the offer and any delay or hedging would be seen as evidence that he had imposed conditions. Nes suggested the possibility of sending Hare to the region on an exploratory mission with no definite terms of reference to see whether could do something to resolve the crisis of confidence. (Ibid.)