Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

417. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait¹

Washington, November 17, 1966, 1:12 p.m.

86358. Cairo 2662,² Jidda 1871,³ Yemen.

1. Al-Khouly’s analysis current status Kuwait mediation indicates basic sticking point is UAR concern that troop level at which Saudis willing oust Hamid al-Din is too low to insure security and order in Yemen.⁴ To meet this concern might be useful if Kuwaitis would propose to SAG and UAR an increase in the planned number of troops to be requested from other Arab countries, e.g., two or three thousand from each of three countries instead of the projected 1,000. This might or might not also involve a matching number of UAR troops as in first proposal.

2. We have no desire get directly involved in details of solution and are under no illusion that foregoing would be touchstone for settling problem. However, it might be useful gimmick to enable Kuwaitis keep door of negotiations open a bit longer, which seems to be desire of both sides.

3. Since Kuwaitis have in past asked for our ideas, request you discreetly suggest this possibility to them in your further discussions concerning their mediation effort.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore, cleared by Bergus, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Cairo, Jidda, and Taiz.
2. See footnote 4, Document 416.
3. Dated November 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN)
4. Telegram 2662, November 15, also reported Al-Khouli’s statement that the only remaining issue to be settled was timing of the departure of the Hamid ad-Dins from Yemen. The United Arab Republic had proposed what he called a “reasonable compromise”—removal of the Hamid ad-Dins when evacuation of UAR troops was half completed. The Saudis rejected this and proposed their removal when UAR troop strength was down to 3,000. The United Arab Republic was unwilling to accept this, fearing that this was not enough to permit it to control the military situation. (Ibid.)