410. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yemen1
55142. 1. In farewell call on NEA Assistant Secretary Hare September 26, YAR Ambassador Al-Aini2 gave lengthy account recent events Yemen3 and his views future developments. Following is summary detailed pouched memcon.
2. Al-Amri and colleagues’ trip to Cairo was last desperate measure to forestall outbreak fighting between tribes and Sallal supporters. Unhappy events which followed have one positive effect of showing whole world extent Egyptian control Yemen. Nasser no longer can legitimately claim he is supporting revolution in Yemen.
3. Concerning next steps of Yemeni “moderate” group, Al-Aini said he had in past refrained from raising subject Yemen in UN in order avoid embarrassment to whole Arab cause arising from Nasser’s suppression Yemenis. However, in last few days he had extensive discussions his Arab colleagues NY emphasizing Arabs themselves must now take action to settle problem. If this does not develop, it possible that moderate republicans would send delegation to UN Committee of 24 protesting Egyptian colonization Yemen and requesting UAR set date for withdrawal from Yemen just as British had set date in Aden.
4. In response query, said thought Egyptians wish remain Yemen but emphasized they could not do so in face growing consolidation Yemeni opposition. Added that Nasser does not know what he wants; return of troops to UAR in semblance of defeat would face him with possible Egyptian military revolt; staying in Yemen threatens Yemeni revolt.
5. Answering question on Russian interest Yemen, Al-Aini said USSR seemed favor Nasser presence Yemen for pressure it put on British in Aden and had originally channeled all support to Yemen through UAR. Subsequently, at Yemeni request, Soviets made agreements [Page 778] with Sallal for direct aid. However, few of these agreements fully implemented; Russians now seem to be shifting their support away from Sallal to more neutral stance vis a vis Yemeni Republican elements.
6. Sees little hope for success Kuwaiti mediation in view continued Nasser-Faisal distrust. Noted that Faisal unsuccessful in four-year attempt get UAR out by working through royalists. He now should trust Yemeni people (i.e., moderates) who equally desire ousting Egyptian troops. Moderates need only assurances that Hamid al-Din will not be forced on them by Saudis if they take action against Egyptians. If moderates thought for moment that Hamid al-Din controlled any important part of the country they would deal with them. However, royalists represent nothing but Saudis. Saudi support for Hamid al-Din continues give Nasser excuse stay in Yemen and limits extent anti-Egyptian activity by moderates. Expressed oft-repeated hope we could explain this to Faisal.
7. Shafai-Zaidi friction has little significance for present course of Yemen. Egyptians had tried use confessional differences as basis for split of country, but failed. With long history as single entity Yemen will continue stand as one country, be it all republican or all royalist.
8. Al-Aini expects leave US in week or so, traveling via Rome and Beirut, to accompany family as far as Asmara on their return to Yemen. Ambassador will determine in Asmara whether he also should return Yemen (which he desires) or possibly travel to other Arab capitals in service cause Yemeni moderates.
9. Al-Aini expressed particular gratitude to Secretary and Asst Sec Hare for continued sympathetic reception accorded him in Department during nearly four years in US.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17 YEMEN-US. Secret. Drafted by Moore, cleared by Gabriel J. Paolozzi (IO/UNP), and approved by Hare. Repeated to Cairo, Jidda, London, Aden, and USUN.↩
- Ambassador Al-Aini resigned on September 21.↩
- On September 16 the UAR press announced the resignation of the Hassan al-Amri government, most of whose members were then in Cairo. On September 18 President Sallal announced formation of a new Yemeni cabinet composed almost exclusively of hard-line UAR supporters. Members of the Al-Amri government were placed under house arrest in Cairo, and a purge of moderates in the Yemeni Government and Army began, culminating in the execution of former Minister of State for Tribal Affairs Muhammad al-Ruaini and four associates on October 25.↩