408. Telegram From the Embassy in Yemen to the Department of State1

340. Ref: Cairo MRN 1116,2 Kuwait 178.3

1.
Reftels confirm our recent growing conviction that UAR playing double game in Yemen. Idea that Egyptians merely seeking honorable way out does not square with their activities here. Admittedly they appear be sincerely and patiently participating Kuwait mediation. But we note that only point among Kuwait proposals which actually reduces their power dominate Yemen or frustrate emergence representative leadership is one on which UAR balks, namely the withdrawal of its army. We can also not shake suspicion that UAR planning keep its forces in place here for day of “liberation” South Arabia 1968 in anticipation of new opportunities.
2.
UAR with ease can manage arrange delays and postponements of the proposed Harad conference and the nine-month troop withdrawal specified in Kuwaiti proposals, just as UAR appears able create [Page 775] circumstances to justify maintaining itself in effective control government Yemen. More important, it has tested its ability recently to do so and the angry but impotent and scattered government may be best evidence really of Egyptian sovereignty in Yemen.
3.
Were there any hint that this smothering dominance of the Yemenis had begun be lifted during recent hopeful period of Kuwait mediation we might be inclined more relaxed view. But UAR controls, rumor mongering, incitements, military actions, pamphleteering, claims of British “overflights” and border intrusions” are increasing.
4.
Part of the stepped up campaign is clandestine and open propaganda against US. Another leaflet (second seen by Embassy) has been circulated which links US (charging dollar subsidies) with anti-Sallalist Republican Council dissidents in Taiz. Radio Sanaa is constant purveyor claims to effect US is midst dark plots against republic. Newspapers are channels anti-Western diatribes. Al Khouli’s assertion reported para 2 Kuwait’s 178 is poppycock. “Hostile press” claim is evidence of government-controlled media UAR. We assume Kuwaitis as aware of this as Saudis.
5.
UAR of course not pleased over presence US in Yemen. We are only mission observing UAR’s blatant conduct affairs here Egypt has reason to worry about. While we can probably have little effect on UAR policy I believe time has come at least to register our displeasure at their propoganda and whispering campaign against US in Yemen. I suggest Department authorize Embassy Cairo to approach UARG at high level to protest unfounded and flagrant vilification of exemplary US conduct in Yemen.
6.
Thus as Egyptian intervention in Yemen becomes even more devious and heavy handed, playing at negotiation through Kuwait mediation on one hand and on the other seeking undermine the group of reasonable men who are still determined gain sovereignty of their own country, we suspect UAR identifies us as prime obstacle to its having completely free hand in this region Arabian peninsula. We note that already a variety of anti-American activity led by Egyptians in Yemen has had its effect. In these efforts the UAR is aided and abetted by Soviets and Chinese. We are not quite quarantined from contact in the community but all Yemenis, particularly officials, are wary about relations with US. (Tribal personalities who disregard or do not feel this pressure are an exception to this general rule, but relations with these men have their limitations.)
7.
Successful Kuwait mediation which guaranteed prompt exit UAR troops would be historic event of good omen here and would be crippling blow to what I believe are current Egyptian plans dominate Yemen, if necessary by force it is unable establish puppet government, [Page 776] until such times Brits evacuate South Arabia when the whole area can be exploited.
Dinsmore
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Noforn; Limdis. Repeated to Aden, Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, and London.
  2. Dated August 30. (Ibid.)
  3. Dated August 28. (Ibid.)