Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

393. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic¹

Washington, March 15, 1966, 8:34 p.m.

5175. Your 2334.²

1. Concur with approach to Nasser on Yemen suggested reftel. You may say USG convinced Saudis sincerely want settlement and appears there are honest differences of opinion on interpretation and implementation Jidda Agreement, but these do not necessarily imply bad faith.

2. You should make clear, however, that detailed suggestion about ways out of impasse your personal views. USG wishes avoid becoming party to negotiations and does not espouse any particular formula for implementing Jidda Agreement.

3. Desirable you recall Kaissouni request for new PL-480 agreement and need for review within USG of developments in US-UAR relations before we decide whether or not to begin negotiations. This connection, you should indicate, in whatever way seems most appropriate, that among factors to be weighed will be UAR actions and attitudes vis-a-vis Yemen and South Arabia and tangible progress toward solution these problems.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Atherton and Davies, and approved by Hare. Repeated to Jidda, London, Taiz, and Aden.
2. In telegram 2334 from Cairo, March 14, Battle reported that he was disappointed but not greatly surprised by Faisal’s negative response to Nasser’s proposals as reported in telegram 636 from Khartoum. (See footnote 4, Document 392.) He had asked for an appointment with Nasser and planned to tell him that the United States was convinced that the Saudis sincerely wanted a settlement and that although it appeared that there were honest differences of opinion on interpretation and implementation of the Jidda Agreement, these did not necessarily imply bad faith. The Ambassador also planned to suggest that both sides ignore the republican and royalist designations and try to pick out a representative group of 20-30 men to run the country. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN)