Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

381. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

Washington, October 6, 1965, 6:06 p.m.

149. Re Taiz tels 97² and 98³ to Dept. (Being repeated addressees.) Concur your response to Numan, pointing out continued US support for YARG, US policy non-interference, our support of Jidda agreement, and our serious concern if any country should take action to prejudice agreement or success of Haradh conference. While we intend continue our currently planned AID/Y activities in Republic,⁴ believe decision any further US economic and technical assistance programs should be held in abeyance, pending formation transitional government which expected to evolve from Haradh conference. (US military assistance clearly out of question at this time.) In addition other considerations, we judge that starting new program, other than further deliveries under Title II aid, would open us to accusation taking sides prior to Yemeni Haradh conclave.

Realize, however, that whatever government develops after November 23 will be in immediate serious need of assistance, probably straight budgetary aid in addition to food and material help to rebuild country. As Taiz aware, expanded PL 480 program in north Yemen dependent on success present program. We believe for number reasons, however, that at same time area states should also be urged consider early, direct financial and material assistance to Yemen in order help new all-Yemen government attain stability. Moderate Arab states have obvious interest in success Jidda agreement and should be prepared support financially development moderate regime in Yemen. Additionally, public statements at present of interest and concern for Yemen and willingness deal with post-Haradh government would be encouraging gestures.

Unless reasons to contrary perceived, addressee posts are requested to discuss at appropriate level with host governments importance of above for future stability and development Yemen, and encourage them give urgent consideration to what assistance possible for them give Yemen.

On current situation you may say while that there is evidence of some behind scenes maneuvering, both Saudis and UAR appear to be moving forward with implementation of Jidda agreement. Joint Saudi-UAR ceasefire supervision teams reportedly now in operation, exchange of prisoners is being affected, and UAR forces reportedly beginning evacuation to Hodeida. We are optimistic re agreement’s chances of success and hope all parties will cooperate in avoiding potentially disruptive actions. Where appropriate you may wish point out threat of Communist countries further solidifying their positions if Yemenis forced rely heavily on them for underpinning for new government. You should offer share with them on continuing basis our assessment of situation in Yemen as it develops.⁵

Ball

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore on October 5; cleared by Israel, Lebanon, Yemen Desk Officer Harry F. Hemmerich (AID/NESA/NE), Robert W. Kent (EUR/GER), Symmes, and in substance by Grant V. McClanahan (A/FN); and approved by Davies. Also sent to Bonn, Beirut, Jidda, Kuwait, and Tripoli and repeated to Cairo, London, Taiz, Aden, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA for POLAD.
2. In telegram 97 from Taiz, October 3, Clark reported that he had met with former Yemeni Prime Minister Numan, who delivered a strong appeal for U.S. military and financial aid to Yemen. Although he was suspicious of UAR motives, Numan also feared that if the Jidda agreement were implemented, the cards were stacked against the republic. The United Arab Republic had prevented Yemen from developing an independent, effective government and the country would be left without an army or treasury. Clark responded that the United States had recognized and supported Yemen by all appropriate means and that a cornerstone of U.S. policy was the principle of non-interference in internal Yemeni affairs. He noted that the U.S. Government welcomed the Jidda Agreement, and would be seriously concerned if any action were taken to prejudice the agreement or the success of the Haradh conference. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 98 from Taiz, October 3, transmitted Clark’s comments on his conversation with Numan, including his advice that if the United States was to have any leverage with the current or future leaders of Yemen, further U.S. aid would be an important factor. (Ibid.)
4. U.S. aid to Yemen in FY 1965 amounted to $4,520,000. (Airgram A-40 to Kuwait, June 23; ibid., AID (US) YEMEN)
5. In telegram 292 from Jidda, October 13, Seelye reported that he had discussed the contents of the Department’s telegram with Mas’ud on October 12 and had emphasized that the U.S. Government hoped that the Saudi Arabian Government was planning to provide economic assistance to the new Yemeni Government, Mas’ud replied that the King had indicated that he was prepared to “do everything possible” in the area of economic and financial assistance to Yemen once an appropriate government was formed and stability returned. (Ibid.)