Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

374. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, August 11, 1965, 1531Z.

102. Acting Deputy Foreign Minister Mas’ud summoned me on one and one half hours’ notice to meet with him and Minister of Defense Prince Sultan at Foreign Ministry August 11. After exchange courtesies, Sultan informed me of SAG decision purchase F-104G and associated package (subject separate telegram).² He reviewed close USG-SAG relationship and expressed desire it should continue. He pulled from his pocket sheaf of telegrams he had just received from Saudi border posts. Reading from telegrams he listed following aggressive UAR actions:

1. August 9, UAR tanks crossed Saudi border vicinity Jizan penetrating Saudi territory one-half kilometer vicinity villages Jalban, Twal, and Malwan. After reconnoitering, tanks withdrew behind border. (Unable locate on our maps villages named but presumed somewhere southeast Samitah.)

2. August 10, UAR observers suddenly pulled out of last remaining joint UAR-SAG observation post at Abs. (Department will recall Saqqaf stated to me August 1 (Embtel 64)³ that Egyptians had withdrawn from all five observation posts.) According Sultan, Egyptians had earlier withdrawn from four posts and method of withdrawal throughout peremptory and “savage.” Saudis had allegedly been forcibly escorted from posts to border and deprived of food and water.

3. UAR had bombed Saudi territory twice in vicinity Jizan some ten days ago, accounting for minimum damage (presume same bombings referred to in Embtels 66 and 72).⁴

4. UAR overflights of Jizan, Najran and, to some extent, Abha occurring almost daily. (SDI has received no reports overflights last few days.)

5. UAR “massing” troops in Yemen, including in such border towns as Harad, for purpose aggressive action against Saudi Arabia.

6. SAG has knowledge secret UAR plan bomb Taif and Al-Kharj, as well as Jizan, Najran and Abha. He claimed Al-Kharj listed as target because of important military depot. (When I asked for sources this information, Sultan was evasive.)

Sultan said whereas Saudi military units along Yemeni border had earlier been instructed secretly not open fire on Egyptian ground forces (in order, he said, to avoid escalation), he had now instructed these border posts to fire immediately on any UAR-YAR units crossing border. In response my query, he said that previous Saudi instructions withhold fire had not applied to anti-aircraft units.

Sultan said he had asked to see me on King’s instructions. View foregoing indicators re UAR intention attack Saudi Arabia, King had three requests to make of President Johnson and Secretary Rusk:

1. USG should be made aware of foregoing indicators.

2. SAG desires that USG dispatch destroyers to Saudi Arabia soonest to Jizan area for purpose deterring UAR.

3. SAG requests USG dispatch “unit” of fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia as further deterrent to UAR attack.

My first response to Sultan was to indicate my personal impression that buildup of tensions over Yemen appeared to have subsided somewhat. I cited conciliatory nature recent UAR press commentary re Yemen developments (Cairo’s tel 34 to Jidda)⁵ and evidently beneficial effect USG public statement August 4. I then suggested that SAG immediately submit its bill of particulars to President Security Council. Sultan replied that while this move “under consideration” by King, SAG’s experience with UN in connection with Yemen question indicated “Mafish Fa’edi” (it is of no benefit). He said Saudi Arabia relied on itself and on its friends. I reiterated advantages to Saudi Arabia of registering complaint with UN in order balance current YAR complaint before Secretary General and also as useful parallel action to relying on itself and its friends.

With regard to King’s three points, I replied as follows:

1. I would immediately communicate to Washington information he had provided me.

2. I noted that an American destroyer is scheduled to call at Jidda on August 25. Sultan said this was too far off and SAG wanted several visits. In that case, I said, I would undertake to request that the visit of destroyer USS Fox be advanced, and that I would endeavor to ascertain possibility of subsequent early visits by other destroyers. Sultan asked to be informed immediately upon receipt USG reply to this possibility.

3. Re squadron US aircraft, I reminded Sultan of USG-SAG dialogue this subject over past two years and, in particular, Ambassador Hart’s conversation with King in March.⁶ USG position remains as before, i.e., difficult justify any USG military action to assist SAG in face UAR attacks against purely military targets in Saudi territory near Yemen border. While we have repeatedly informed SAG that we will come to its assistance against unprovoked attack, I said dispatch of USG military units to Saudi Arabia while latter allows its territory be used as base for Yemeni Royalists was, insofar as I aware, precluded. Possible exception this policy is if UAR attacks should spread elsewhere in Saudi Arabia (i.e., beyond purely military targets near Yemen border), at which time USG would review its position. I asked Sultan whether SAG had given serious thought to stopping its aid to Yemen Royalists. This triggered long lecture on how SAG had in fact stopped its aid for period of time only to find UAR had no intention fulfill its part of agreement, i.e., withdrawal UAR troops from Yemen. He claimed he could not understand, in view SAG’s demonstrated cooperation with US re Bunker agreement, why Saudi Arabia should now be penalized for what he characterized as legitimate Saudi effort get UAR troops out of Yemen and return Yemen to Yemenis. Sultan said that if condition for dispatch air unit is cessation Saudi aid to Royalists, then Saudi Arabia did not wish air unit. He asked my forebearance if he were so bold as to criticize USG policy which forced staunch friends of US at times like this to seek military help wherever they could find it. I told Sultan that in any case I would forward King’s request to Washington.

Comment: I regret Saqqaf’s absence at this time since believe he might have talked Sultan and King out of requesting air unit—at least under circumstances in which Saudi Arabia continues actively support Yemen Royalists. Sultan obviously excitable and appears be exaggerating seriousness current threat. However, view his statement he speaking for King, am obliged convey as King’s request plea that (1) destroyer visits Jidda and vicinity be stepped up and (2) air unit be dispatched immediately Saudi Arabia. I would be hesitant recommend dispatch air unit under any but most dire circumstances view problems we experienced in deployment Hard Surface 1963-64. Seems to me we should rather continue explore all possible alternative means for deterring possible UAR attack. Fact that up to now we have attached conditions to dispatch of air unit and fact Saudis now unprepared accept these conditions may be blessing in disguise. I do not take seriously Sultan’s subtle threat re turning elsewhere for military support. Recommend we make effort cooperate re accelerating destroyer visits—including advancing visit USS Fox while politely demurring on air unit, citing not only Saudi involvement Yemen but perhaps heavy USG military commitments elsewhere. This connection we might consider implementing current proposed plan deploy in training exercise reinforced rifle company supported by aircraft (tentatively scheduled for October 1). However, any decision proceed this exercise should be made soon in order permit advance planning.

Seelye

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POLSAUD-UAR. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Aden, Cairo, Dhahran, London, Taiz, CHUSMTM, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, COMIDEASTFOR, and USUN.
2. Not further identified.
3. Telegram 64 from Jidda, August 1. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POLSAUD-UAR)
4. Telegrams 66 and 72 from Jidda, August 2. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN and POLSAUD-UAR)
5. Telegram 401 from Cairo (34 to Jidda), August 5. (Ibid.)
6. See footnote 5, Document 363.