Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

339. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic¹

Washington, June 25, 1964, 6:14 p.m.

6034. Jidda’s 1167, rptd 361 to Cairo.² Department continues be concerned by UAR failure make even token withdrawal troops from Yemen in consonance its disengagement undertaking. This fact alone has complicated USG relations with SAG, hardened UK position vis-a-vis Yemen, jeopardized continuation existing level USG economic support for UAR and, currently, risks bringing about demise of UNYOM and all that connotes. Accordingly, we propose following three-pronged demarche to UAR over next few days: (1) Assistant Secretary Talbot call in Ambassador Kamel, (2) Charge Boswell see Foreign Minister Riad, (3) First Secretary Horgan approach Presidency Advisor al-Kholi.

We believe prospective demarches should be made along following lines:

1. After period of one year, UNYOM has failed observe any net withdrawal of UAR troops, one of purposes for which it was designed. On contrary UAR troop level has increased since UNYOM arrived on scene. While we believe UNYOM has nevertheless served useful purpose, SAG—which has generally complied with terms of disengagement agreement—finding it increasingly difficult continue agree UNYOM’s renewal in face continued UAR non-performance. Repeated USG assurances to SAG over past year that UAR would in reasonable time withdraw its troops from Yemen now fall on deaf ears. Fact is Faisal seriously considering discontinuing his monetary support for UNYOM owing lack of even token UAR troop withdrawals.

2. We believe dispensing with UNYOM in no one’s interests, including UAR. For our part we shall endeavor urge SAG not cause UNYOM demise. But, speaking frankly, we question whether we will be successful in this regard in light of current SAG frame of mind—unless circumstances change.

3. Collapse of UNYOM would risk opening up Pandora’s box of problems, including (a) tossing Yemen problem into lap of Security Council where UAR nonperformance on disengagement would be openly aired and subject to attack; (b) inviting massive Saudi “re-engagement” on behalf of Yemeni royalists, further complicating UAR security problem in Yemen; (c) clouding and perhaps terminating incipient, friendly UAR-Saudi diplomatic relationship which, in turn, might lead to further drift in area away from “summit atmosphere”; (d) virtually eliminating prospect of damping down under UN auspices YAR-SAF border tensions; and (e) further setting back date when UAR enabled reduce its expensive Yemeni commitment.

4. In last few weeks USG has again heard reports of imminent UAR troop withdrawals from Yemen, including indication first step would be departure one UAR brigade. Nasser’s June 18 speech also mentioned drawdown UAR troop complement in Yemen. Yet up to moment we have received no indications whatsoever that any reductions have occurred. If withdrawals about take place or in fact taking place, we urge UAR adduce proof for benefit UNYOM and thus indirectly for benefit Saudi Arabia. Would be pity if UAR failure act in time produces collapse UNYOM.

5. We wish remind UAR USG could not afford sit idly by and allow worsening situation in Yemen (which would no doubt flow from removal of UNYOM) threaten security and stability Faisal regime.

6. In conclusion USG strongly urges UAR make immediate token withdrawal UAR troops from Yemen in order avert possible demise of UNYOM, and in consonance with its disengagement undertaking.³

For Jidda: You may inform Saqqaf confidentially of fact we making three-pronged approach to UAR. At same time, know you will continue urge him not allow Saudi Arabia be cause of UNYOM’s going down drain and impress upon him considerable advantages to SAG of its continuation regardless UAR failure perform on disengagement.⁴

For USUN: Believe you should outline for SYG our information about Faisal’s thinking on question of UNYOM’s extension, as reflected Jidda’s 1167. Source should of course be protected. You might indicate this information does not seem to square with SYG’s belief UNYOM extension will be easily arranged. (USUN 4593)⁵

For Cairo: Re your 3155,⁶ you should respond to al-Kholi as you propose, e.g. UN best suited perform role of mediator and April 9 SC resolution requested SYG use his good offices settle outstanding issues re south Yemen, in agreement with parties concerned. FYI. We prefer avoid undertaking mediatory roles. End FYI.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 UAR-YEMEN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Seelye on June 24; cleared by Davies, Buffum, Cleveland, Quinn (DOD/ISA), and in substance by Colonel Robinson (G/PM) and Officer in Charge of Politico-Military Affairs in the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Regional Affairs Colonel Donald W. Bunte; and approved by Jernegan. Also sent to Jidda and USUN and repeated to London, Taiz, Dhahran, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, CINCSTRIKE for POLAD, and Aden.
2. In telegram 1167 from Jidda, June 24, Hart reported that Saqqaf had transmitted to him Faisal’s intention to inform U Thant that although the Saudi Government had no objection to the continuance of the UNYOM presence, it saw no further reason why it should pay anything for it in view of UAR non-performance. (Ibid., POL 27-14 YEMEN/UN)
3. Telegram 6061 to Cairo, June 26, reported that the demarche outlined in telegram 6034 had been made by Deputy Assistant Secretary Jernegan to UAR Ambassador Kamel on June 26. Kamel had responded that anything that caused the demise of UNYOM would be a disaster, that the situation in Yemen was now in a “stage of relaxation” with the atmosphere ripe for gradual withdrawal, and that the United States should not permit Faisal to create suspicion when the situation was “moving forward.” (Ibid.)
4. In telegram 1189 from Jidda, June 28, Hart reported that he had talked to Saqqaf along these lines. (Ibid., POL 27 UAR-YEMEN) In telegram 1201 from Jidda, July 1, the Ambassador reported that on June 30 he had called on Saqqaf to congratulate him on obtaining Faisal’s agreement to renewal of UNYOM. (Ibid., POL 27-14 YEMEN/UN)
5. Dated June 23. (Ibid.)
6. Dated June 24. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN)