Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, April 1, 1964, 8:01 p.m.

2581. Subj: Security Council Meeting on Yemen-Aden Problem. Pending further clarification tactics British plan pursue in Security Council in countering Yemeni complaint² and, of course, subject to unforeseen developments in Council itself, following are our thoughts and general guidelines for your use in Council:

1. We inclined agree with British and your assessment that there will not be enough votes for serious condemnatory resolution directed against the U.K. We would expect therefore that the outcome of the Council meeting would be adjournment with no resolution or a relatively mild resolution deploring the situation and urging all parties concerned to refrain from further exacerbation of the situation and urging them to settle their differences.

We would hope to see the debate limited to the incidents per se but doubt that this can be done. If the debate expands to include a broad and vitriolic attack on the British position on Aden, we presume the British will respond by pointing to the fact that the UAR has failed to carry out its agreement to disengage and continued Egyptian military presence in Yemen has now given rise to the border incidents. While we would not want to initiate a debate which drags the UAR into the picture, if others have already done so we may wish to find some way of referring to the matter in our statement.

2. Resolution. The general parameters of an acceptable resolution seem to us to be as follows:

(1) Resolution should not be condemnatory nor fix blame. A paragraph which deplored the various violent incidents which had taken place without specific mention of one side or the other would seem appropriate. As an ultimate fallback, and providing the British are also prepared to accept, we could live with a resolution which deplored the various incidents on both sides but in which specific mention was made of the British attack of March 27 which precipitated the Yemen complaint.

(2) We doubt the need or desirability at this juncture for injecting a UN presence or field operation of any sort into the situation and presume the U.K. would not want such presence at this time. Furthermore, we foresee a probable reluctance on the part of the SYG to become engaged in the tangled web of U.K.-Arab disputes. If the U.K. could accept, and if there is substantial pressure for involvement of the UN, we could agree to a general request to the SYG to exercise his influence as he deems appropriate with the parties concerned to restore peace and order on the Yemen-South Arabian frontier.

(3) In its operative paragraphs the resolution presumably would call on the parties to the conflict to cease violent action and attempt to settle their differences. We see some advantage to having the call made on all members of the UN to cooperate in avoiding actions which exacerbate tensions and lead to violence in the area. This broad language has the merit of embracing the UAR and USSR.

(4) We, of course, would not want to introduce a resolution ourselves and presume that this would be done by one or more non-permanent members of the Council, perhaps Brazil or Bolivia. Hopefully such a resolution would dissuade Morocco or others from introducing a strong and unacceptable condemnatory resolution which would have no chance of passing.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 31-1 UK-YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by Deputy Director of the Office of UN Political Affairs William G. Jones; cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William C. Burdett and Talbot; and approved by Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Harlan Cleveland. Repeated to London, Taiz, and Cairo.
2. In an April 1 letter to the President of the UN Security Council Yemen charged that the United Kingdom had committed more than 40 acts of aggression against it since September 1962, culminating in the air attack against Harib on March 28. A British letter of March 28 stated that the attack had been launched to protect the South Arabian Federation after a series of Yemeni air and ground attacks during the month of March. The Security Council convened on April 2 to consider the charges and countercharges.