323. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Yemen
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- NEA—John D. Jernegan
- NE—Talcott W. Seelye
- The Lord Harlech, British Ambassador
- John E. Killick, Counselor, British Embassy
The Secretary expressed the view that the time had come to reassess the situation in Yemen in the light of recently restored relations between the UAR and Saudi Arabia.2 He observed that the British have created the impression that they are actively supporting restoration of the Imamate, inducing the YAR and the UAR to “go after” them in South Arabia. He recalled that earlier in Cairo the USG had expressed support for the British position in Aden. He wondered if the British believed the UAR was seriously trying to evict them from their Aden position or whether HMG felt itself committed to do something for the royalists.
The British Ambassador said that his government is endeavoring, not wholly successfully, to discourage Aden-based operations in support of the Yemeni royalists and noted that the British mercenaries fighting with the royalists are “a private enterprise.” He denied further that mercenaries are in the employ of either Faisal or the Aden shaikhs; he contended that they are financed from private sources. He acknowledged that insofar as these operations were mounted from Aden, HMG was placed in an embarrassing position. He called to the Secretary’s attention a recent report of YAR air attacks over Beihan on March 13 and a subsequent demand by the South Arabian Federation Supreme Council for British retaliatory action. He said that London was at that moment considering the matter.
The Ambassador commented that the British Government is “not necessarily anxious” to restore the Imamate, believing that the Yemeni consensus might favor such a development. He acknowledged awareness of the USG view that restoration of the Imamate appears impracticable. He stated that the British position remains flexible. Mr. Jernegan emphasized that our position is also flexible and that we welcome any regime which is viable. The Secretary alluded to the possible distinction [Page 619] between what we might wish to encourage and what is realizable. He expressed the view that a formula other than restoration of the Imamate had a better chance of being acceptable to both Faisal and Nasser. He recalled that Faisal had indicated readiness to acknowledge any government in Yemen acceptable to the Yemenis.
The Secretary, recalling the YARG public statement of December 1962 affirming a desire to maintain good relations with the South Arabian Federation, wondered whether another such statement at this time would be useful. The Ambassador doubted that such a statement would be appropriate unless HMG were on the verge of recognizing the YARG. Unless the latter were the case, he felt it would be extremely difficult to get the Yemeni regime to make such a statement. Mr. Jernegan expressed our concern at the fact that neither side appears to be making a real effort to prevent serious trouble from erupting along the Yemen-Aden border. He questioned whether the British High Commissioner and other officials in Aden have been sufficiently energetic in endeavoring to restrain the gun-running and other activities in support of the royalists. The Secretary inquired as to whether the YAR had mounted land attacks across the border. The Ambassador said that there had been cross-border shelling. He noted that there had been long periods of quiescence along the border. The Secretary commented that UAR disengagement from Yemen would be facilitated if the UAR and YAR could be satisfied that HMG in Aden offered no threat. Mr. Jernegan said that the UAR is fed up with the Yemen problem and wants to find a graceful way out. The Ambassador noted that the Yemenis also are fed up with the Egyptians.
The Ambassador concluded by saying that he would be happy to report to his government the USG interest in damping down the border conflict and to suggest that HMG take stock of the Yemen situation in light of the UAR-SAG restoration of relations.