Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

316. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia¹

Washington, October 24, 1968, 1441Z.

260750. Jidda’s 5646.² For the Ambassador from Under Secretary Rostow.

1. Appreciate your 5646 and your forthright and effective actions. We will try to have significant telegrams on US views on Near Eastern problems repeated to you so that you can continue to explain our positions and policies systematically to King Faisal, his ministers and to American oil company officials in area. We hope that appropriate and regular briefings of the King may help restore perspective which we fear has been impaired by coterie of counselors around him.

2. Jarring’s mission is at critical phase this month. It is essential that both sides develop some confidence in professions by the other of willingness to move to an enduring settlement. We are seeking to encourage the exchange of substantive ideas on a solution. We are concerned of course to protect King Hussein at this delicate phase while pushing for a fair and dignified agreement between Jordan and Israel. At the same time we hope to maintain a dialogue with the UAR to encourage any inclination to move toward acceptable agreement. UAR October 20 gave Jarring written reply to Israeli proposals provided Jarring by Eban. Eban’s willingness to give Jarring substantive negotiating positions represents major modification in Israeli insistence on direct negotiations, obtained in part by U.S. diplomacy. While we do not wish discuss substance GOI and UAR papers, we believe important thing is for process of substantive exchanges to begin in earnest and to mature. Understand Jarring has similar view.

3. Announcement of Phantom negotiations³ made in light of considered U.S. assessment of trends and developments in the area including Soviet posture. It was in no way intended to set back process of conciliation on which Jarring is embarked. Regardless of when agreement concluded, delivery time obviously some time away. It is our hope that all concerned will push forward long before that time to agreement to establish just and lasting peace under November 22nd resolution.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Davies and Eugene Rostow on October 23; cleared by Atherton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs David H. Popper, Hart, and Brewer; and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Dhahran.
2. In telegram 5646 from Jidda, October 16, Eilts reported to Under Secretary Rostow that top Aramco officials were “very disturbed” at what they considered an imbalance in the U.S. position toward the Arab-Israeli dispute, and were clearly worried about the ultimate consequences of U.S. policy on the major U.S. interest in the Arabian peninsula. They were especially fearful that gradual deterioration of U.S.-Saudi relationships and confidence would increase Saudi pressures on the company and in the long run perhaps even lead to nationalization, and were concerned about the security of the Aramco staff in the event of a new outbreak of hostilities that could lead to riots in Dhahran. (Ibid.)
3. On October 9 the White House issued a statement by President Johnson saying that he had signed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 and taken note of section 651 stating that it was the sense of the Congress that the President should take the necessary steps to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Israel providing for the sale by the United States of such number of supersonic planes as might be necessary to provide Israel with an adequate deterrent force capable of preventing future Arab aggression.