Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

309. Airgram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

A-301

Jidda, February 11, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Annual U.S. Policy Assessment—Saudi Arabia

REF

• FAM Vol II, 212.3-5

[Here follows a table of contents]

Summary

U.S.-Saudi relations have been put to a severe test by the Arab-Israel hostilities in June, 1967, and the protracted Near East crisis still persisting. The U.S. and Saudi attitudes on the basic issues involved in the Palestine problem remain irreconcilable. However, patient exposition and explanation of our views, in exchanges at the chief of state level as well as through normal diplomatic channels, have helped to minimize the effect of these differences. Our close cooperation with Saudi Arabia in a variety of fields—military, commercial, economic, cultural and security—has contributed substantially to the maintenance of stability and cordiality in our bilateral relations, and should be continued. However, we cannot take Saudi Arabia for granted should there be a renewal of Arab-Israeli conflict.

Developments in adjacent areas of the Arabian Peninsula have created new problems for Saudi policy. The USSR and other radical elements have replaced the UAR in support of the republican faction in Yemen; a left-wing regime has inherited control from the British in South Arabia. U.K. military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf states has become imminent. We should continue to encourage the Saudi leaders to deal with these questions in a statesmanlike manner, avoiding rash adventures of dubious outcome which might react against the security of the Kingdom and its regime.

I. Strengthening U.S.-Saudi Bilateral Relations

The validity of U.S. policies toward Saudi Arabia during past years was put to a critical test by the June 1967 Arab-Israel hostilities and the continuing Arab-Israeli confrontation. The structure of U.S.-Saudi relations has been severely rocked, but as a result of King Faisal’s policy of friendship for the U.S. managed to withstand the strains. It is thus clear that we have generally been on the right track, and that the existing U.S. approach to relations with the country, suitably adapted to changing circumstances, provides a sound, proven base for the future insofar as broader considerations permit us to follow it.

The key limiting factor is, obviously, the tangle of issues related to Palestine, on which there is virtually no common ground between the U.S. and Saudi positions. The concept that history does not turn back to correct past injustices is utterly rejected by the Saudis, who can see no acceptable solution other than to return to 1947 and, instead of founding the state of Israel, make of Palestine an independent Arab state in which only the Jewish sabra community is accepted. Any proposal which seeks to deal with the problem in the shape in which it now confronts the world is, in Saudi eyes, an affront to right and justice. (A major factor in King Faisal’s refusal to attend the Rabat Arab summit conference proposed for January 17 was his apprehension that he would be associated there with a position compromising Arab rights in Palestine as he sees them.) Saudi emotions on the subject are heightened by the presence in Jerusalem of sites sacred to Islam, particularly the al-Aksa Mosque. Sincerely, whether or not realistically, Faisal considers that his responsibilities as custodian of the Muslim holy places extend to those in Jerusalem, and the fact that these have passed beyond Arab control weighs heavily upon him. The Saudis are unshakably convinced that American policy-makers are obliged, out of concern for the votes of Jewish Americans, to pursue a policy of partiality toward Israel and against the Arabs.

While we cannot hope to persuade the Saudis to agree with our views on this issue, there is definite utility in explaining them fully, as we are doing, to the Saudi leadership, particularly as U.S. positions are frequently distorted, misrepresented or deliberately falsified in the region’s information media. Patient exposition of our views, pointing out that they flow from general principles which the Saudis can accept (even though they draw different conclusions from them) helps to calm emotions and permit normal discussion and cooperation on other subjects where a meeting of minds is possible. The President’s exchange of correspondence with the King on the problem has been helpful. While it has not brought the U.S. and Saudi positions into harmony, it indicates to the King that the U.S. at the highest level respects and values his views, and ensures that he is authoritatively informed of our own. It furthermore affords opportunity to encourage the King to persevere in the moderate orientation of his over-all policy and to exert his influence in this direction in inter-Arab councils. This dialogue at the chief of state level has enhanced the effectiveness of the Ambassador’s frequent discussions with the King and his close advisors; it should continue as suitable opportunities present themselves, but not be overdone.

In the context of the June crisis both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia felt obliged to take measures damaging to our bilateral relations. The U.S. moratorium on arms shipment to the Near East was of particular concern to the Saudis, who had looked primarily to the U.S. as the source of equipment for their armed forces, and who had substantial quantities of materiel on order and paid for when hostilities broke out. Even though now totally lifted, the impact remains and the Saudis are looking to other sources as alternative military suppliers. The Saudis withstood pressure from the radical Arab states to sever diplomatic relations with the U.S. They felt forced, however, to demonstrate their solidarity with other Arabs by joining in the embargo on oil exports to the U.S. (and U.K.) until it was lifted by action of the Khartoum Summit Conference. While confronted with a considerable segment of public opinion aroused against the U.S., the Saudi leadership endeavored to limit the effect of the crisis on our joint activities. It was on urgent Saudi plea that we decided not to evacuate American dependents from the Kingdom. Whether this Saudi policy could have continued if the June conflict had been protracted is uncertain. We suspect some further retaliatory actions would have had to be taken against us.

During the ensuing six months, relations have evolved toward a situation approaching the normal. The Palestine problem, for which no solution is in sight, remains in the foreground, however, and retains its potential for setting off further crises. When these occur we should again try to minimize their harm to our bilateral relations by proceeding normally insofar as feasible with the various projects on which we are cooperating with Saudi Arabia. However, Saudi Arabia cannot be taken for granted and there is undoubtedly deep dissatisfaction with U.S. policies and the King’s policy of friendship for the U.S. at grass roots, military, intelligentsia and perhaps even some Saudi “establishment” levels.

[Here follow sections II-VIII of the airgram.]

IX. Recommendations

1. That we continue to seek to strengthen U.S.-Saudi bilateral relations wherever possible, continuing the present high-level exchange of views, and reiterating where appropriate the expression of our interest in Saudi Arabia’s security from unprovoked outside attack.

2. That we continue to urge the King and his advisors to seek a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the civil war in Yemen, and avoid actions tending to intensify or prolong it.

3. That we encourage the Saudi leadership to abstain from embarking on adventurous attempts to overthrow the present government of the People’s Republic of Southern Yemen.

4. That we maintain discreet consultation with the Saudi Government concerning arrangements for the security of the Persian Gulf region upon withdrawal of the British, encouraging the Saudis to make a constructive contribution to a viable agreement among Gulf riparian states.

5. That we continue to be responsive to Saudi Government requests for military advice and for a reasonable amount of arms purchases for purposes of defense.

6. That we work to promote expansion of U.S. exports to Saudi Arabia, and continue to encourage the Saudis to manage their reserves in such a way as to ease the U.S. balance of payments deficit.

7. That we respond selectively to requests for assistance in improving the effectiveness of the Saudi internal security forces, without becoming too openly identified with them.

8. That we continue to take opportunity to stress to the King and his advisors the importance of moving more rapidly in social reform, and in satisfying popular aspirations to participation in Saudi Arabia’s political affairs.

9. That we continue to schedule regular visits of U.S. Navy vessels to Saudi ports, as a visible indication of U.S. interest in the security of Saudi Arabia.

10. That we explore means whereby scholarship aid for study in the U.S. by a strictly limited number of Saudi students, where a specific U.S. interest would be served.

11. That we keep under review circumstances in which a visit to the U.S. by Prince Fahd bin Abdul Aziz, Second Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, might be arranged.

12. That we consider arranging for a visit to the U.S. by the Saudi Minister of Commerce and Industry, Shaikh Abid Shaikh.

Eilts ²

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 SAUD-US. Confidential. Drafted by Political Officer Robert W. Stookey; cleared by Deputy Chief of Mission Talcott W. Seelye, and in draft by Supervising Economic Officer C. Melvin Sonne, Jr., Public Affairs Officer George R. Thompson, Defense Attache Lieutenant Colonel Robert F. Merino, Consul General Arthur B. Allen in Dhahran, and General J.S. Addington in CHUSMTM; and approved by Ambassador Eilts. Repeated to Aden, Amman, Ankara, Beirut, Dhahran, Kuwait, London, Paris, Rabat, Rawalpindi, Tehran, Tripoli, Tunis, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, COMIDEASTFOR, and USMTM.
2. Initialed for Eilts in an unidentified hand.