Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

300. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, August 27, 1967, 1230Z.

781. 1. I met with King Faisal for two hours Aug 26. Rashad Pharaon and Acting DepFonMin Mas’ud also present. Explained that following Essga and Khartoum meetings, I thought it might be useful have further exchange views on Middle East situation and where we go from here. In particular, with his departure next few days for Arab summit, I wanted be sure he understood fully USG position. I had earlier discussed this on number of occasions with Dr. Rashad, Saqqaf and Mas’ud and was confident they had conveyed substance our talks to H.M. Nevertheless some questions might remain and I would be happy attempt to answer them.

2. Drawing on SecState 14226² and 19843³ I then recapitulated USG views. Recalled President’s June 19 speech which had been drafted in knowledge Faisal’s much appreciated letter of June 12. While USG has not attempted suggest specific details any settlement, five principles contained therein remain basic guidelines which USG believes essential for durable peace. Speech had noted Israeli troops must be withdrawn. Such withdrawal remains integral part principle of policy independence and territorial integrity to which both USG and SAG subscribe. I explained Faisal’s procedural suggestions of June 23 had been carefully considered as are all of Faisal’s views. It had not been possible follow these since (a) situation too fast-moving in Essga and (b) as I had earlier told him, USG does not believe simple public condemnation of Israel, UAR and others involved in recent conflict would really help achieve Israeli withdrawal. As Essga debates had shown, crux of issue is to find some mutually acceptable formula for durable peace. We had made clear during debates that, in our view, Israeli withdrawal should be linked with Arab renunciation of rights of belligerency. Notwithstanding their cynical public comments, even Soviets had in final days Essga joined US in espousing similar concept as evidenced by US-Soviet draft resolution which Soviets had unsuccessfully attempted sell to Arabs. My understanding UAR and Iraq had privately indicated agreement, but Algerian and Syrian adamance had aborted project. USG continues believe that such linkage formula offers only meaningful prospects proceed toward just and equitable peace. USG cannot dictate to Israel any more so than it can to Saudi Arabia or any ME state. We can use such influence as we have to help achieve a settlement and are ready to do so, but initiative must in first instance come from parties directly concerned and must be based on realism.

3. USG fully appreciates Arab no less than Israeli feelings. It does not want settlement that will humiliate Arab states or require them give up any legitimate rights or interests. However, Arabs can hardly claim rights of belligerency for themselves and object if Israel exercises same claims reciprocally. Abandonment Arab rights of belligerency would not necessarily entail formal recognition of Israel or formal peace treaty, although these obviously desirable in long run. I thought we ought to be clear, however, that renunciation of rights of belligerency should include inter alia rights of passage in both Straits of Tiran/Gulf of Aqaba and Suez Canal. Also implicit in any state of peace is some agreement on boundaries. Our support for US-Soviet draft resolution based on understanding it would be so interpreted (SecState 27525).⁴ I said USG encouraged by apparent tone of realism at Khartoum and Baghdad meetings which we attributed to statesmanlike attitude of Arab moderate participants such as Saudi Arabia. With FonMins session now reconvened and Arab summit imminent, we hope Arab moderates will continue exercise constructive influence so that some means may be found to move ahead on resolving problem before respective positions rigidify still more.

4. Faisal listened attentively. After I had concluded, he immediately picked up reference to boundaries and wanted to know what boundaries would need to be agreed upon. Were we talking of areas overrun by Israel? I reminded him that USG wants Israeli withdrawal, but said precise boundaries would obviously have to be agreed upon by parties directly involved. He nodded but did not pursue point.

5. He then said wished to make some general observations: He could not speak for all Arab leaders who will first have to meet at Khartoum and discuss situation. Speaking for himself, he saw two difficulties, first, Arabs have not yet shared fully and frankly with each other their views on how problem should be handled. His recent talks with King Hussein, PriMin Mahjoub and President Arif had once again showed this. They had identified problem, but had been chary on suggesting solutions. Second, quite apart from views of individual Arab leaders, they have to take into account fact that people in street, farmers and tribesmen in every Arab country unanimously regard Israel as threat that has to be eliminated. Referring to my comment that USG cannot dictate Israeli policy, he agreed but noted that all Arabs firmly believe USG is responsible for Israel’s existence and development and can, if it wishes, exercise sufficient pressure to require Israel accept an equitable settlement. When I demurred, Faisal said did not want to rehash past history as immediate question is where do we go from here. Arab public sentiment about Israel limits scope of action for any Arab leader. For this reason, every Arab leader reluctant take initiative urge settlement based on renunciation of rights of belligerency and everything latter entails.

6. Given this domestic sensitivity which Arab leaders must take into account, Faisal felt Arab moderates are limited in what they can say or do. They, and particularly he, already under strong attack from Arab extremists for failing to react strongly enough to situation. Even many Saudis criticizing him on this score. In his view, therefore, question of solution should in first instance be decided by those Arab states who were directly involved in the conflict, specifically, UAR, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. USG should work on them. If they agree, other Arab states will go along. I reminded him that USG has no relations with UAR and Syria, but recalled that UAR had privately acquiesced in US-Soviet draft resolution. This was hopeful sign. Lebanon had hardly been directly involved in conflict, but I knew USG also urging GOL use its influence for moderation. I did not see how anything but obstruction could be expected from present Syrian Govt. However, having often heard King’s views on Baath govt in Syria, I hardly thought he would want to be guided by Syrian views. He laughed and agreed. This left Jordan with whom USG is discussing problem along similar lines.

7. Faisal noted that King Hussein badly wants some settlement. Hussein had told him of his talks with President and USG officials and of his earlier desire that USG “mediate” between Jordan and Israel. He recalled Nasser had told Hussein UAR recognizes Jordan’s need try to make some settlement and that USG could help him. Faisal said he cautioned Hussein latter should not go it alone. Nasser’s advice might be sincere, but no one could be sure. He referred to his earlier statement that first Arab leader who moves toward bilateral settlement with Israel, even if arranged through UN, could find himself in serious domestic difficulties. Jordan and UAR, with widest possible Arab approval (which might leave out Syria and Algeria), should do it together or at least concurrently along parallel lines.

8. Continuing on subject of Jordan, Faisal said Rashad has passed on my message that US economic aid to GOJ is continuing. They very good and very necessary. However, Hussein also urgently needs military aid. I noted all arms sales and grants to Middle East area now under review. Both Congress and Executive Branch concerned over ME arms race. President had mentioned need for ME arms control and registration. USG has never been major arms supplier in ME. Current Congressional debate re arms question will affect what USG able do in future about matter of arms shipments and it not possible now give clear answer. I could assure Faisal, however, that USG aware of Jordan’s problems and deeply interested in King Hussein (SecState 27534).⁵ Faisal said hoped it might be explained to Congress that Hussein needs resupply of arms, perhaps for his very survival. If he does not get them from USG and soon, Faisal expressed concern that Hussein might turn to Soviets who have offered arms. I suggested King should exercise restraining influence on Hussein in this regard, at least until the picture somewhat clearer. I also suggested SAG should assist Hussein in this matter. Faisal claimed SAG doing so, but its capability provide military aid severely limited.

9. Speaking of forthcoming Arab summit, Faisal said USG knows his moderate views. He will do what he can at Khartoum Conference. He reiterated that USG posture does not make it any easier for Arab moderates. He hoped moderation will prevail at Khartoum, but could not be sure. Much will depend on how Israel acts. Its refusal extend deadline for returning West Bankers had been most unhelpful. I pointed out USG has publicly urged that deadline be extended. Faisal said “you must do more than urge, you must insist.” I said was sure USG doing everything feasible, but Arab leaders should use their influence that returning East Bankers act as law abiding citizens. Otherwise, Israelis have no choice but take disciplinary measures similar to those which Faisal had himself taken against Yemeni saboteurs.

10. I then mentioned briefly oil embargo and adverse effects its continuation will have on Arab states. Faisal responded SAG very aware of this, but Arab extremists are calling on Arab states make “sacrifices” in order recover overrun territories. Even Arif had spoken of need for sacrifices and cited Iraqi actions. I reminded Faisal that Iraq had long ago made mess of its oil industry, hence Iraqi comment on alleged oil sacrifices hardly germane to Arab-Israel conflict. Faisal agreed and said SAG still hopes be able lift embargo before long. He hoped USG would continue show patience with SAG on this score, including not canceling naval contracts. I said that on latter point US naval requirements are continuing and urgent and we could not wait indefinitely. Current ad hoc arrangements might soon freeze into long-term contracts, but I had heard no suggestion contracts being broken since earlier message I had passed on to him through Rashad (Jidda 5581⁶ and State 216455⁷).

11. As I was leaving, I congratulated King on apparent agreement worked out by Mahjoub to move ahead on Yemen problem. I said all friends of Saudi Arabia pleased hear that progress might be made on this issue. Faisal quickly responded that, as I knew, he wants settlement Yemen problem. He cautioned that only general principles had been agreed upon, and he could not yet be sure what Nasser may have in mind in working out details. Saudi position unchanged, viz: (a) quick evacuation UAR military, (b) cessation Saudi aid, and (c) allowing Yemenis to decide their own future form of govt without any outside interference. He might know more of Nasser’s intentions after Khartoum meetings.

12. Comment: Meeting was cordial and as always frank. On my arrival, King looked drawn and tired but as talk developed he became more animated. However, entire talk had listless quality about it. Faisal obviously very alive to domestic political sensitivity any Arab leader moving first to suggest settlement and is not disposed place himself in forefront any such effort. Same time I believe he will support it if Jordan and UAR indicate they want such settlement. I am confident he will in general use his influence for moderation. He has long wanted another Arab summit meeting, but is now slightly apprehensive about situation which has finally catalyzed it and about collective Arab pressures which he will most likely have to face there.

Eilts

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret.
2. Telegram 14226 to Jidda, July 29, instructed Eilts to assure Faisal that the U.S. Government had in mind his comments regarding the need for it to adopt a public position to which Faisal could point at the Arab summit or elsewhere to show genuine U.S. concern for Arab interests. Nor had it ignored his procedural suggestions of June 23. As Faisal was aware, the United States had repeatedly stressed the need for Israeli withdrawal linked to the end of belligerency. However, withdrawal was hardly feasible when one party insisted it was still at war and refused to accept the right of the other party to exist as a state. The Department also instructed Eilts to assure Faisal that the U.S. Government fully recognized the current threat to Arab moderates from irresponsible Soviet actions and heedless radical Arab moves. (Ibid.)
3. Dated August 12. (Ibid.)
4. Not found.
5. Dated August 26. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 SUDAN)
6. Dated June 28. (Ibid., PET 17 US-SAUD)
7. Dated June 26. (Ibid.)