Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

297. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, June 23, 1967, 1528Z.

5517. 1. I met with King Faisal for two hours last night. Also present were Crown Prince Khalid, Dr. Rashad Pharaon and Acting Deputy FonMinMasaud. Prior going in, Rashad sent word to me not to mention separate West Bank entity as he had previously suggested (Jidda’s 5495).² I had not planned to do so but as talk developed, reason for Rashad’s request obvious. King wished focus on present, not future. Faisal looked fit. For first hour or so he spoke vigorously; thereafter he largely rehashed previous comments. While essentially critical some potentially helpful procedural suggestions emerged.

2. After congratulating Faisal on his successful state visits to UK and Belgium, I spoke of President’s deep appreciation for King’s letter of June 12. I assured him that HM’s views as expressed therein are being carefully studied by President who is devoting much of his time to Near East problem. I noted President’s address of June 19 emphasized continued USG desire act evenhandedly in present Near East crisis. USG has no blueprint that it is seeking impose on area. As President’s speech pointed out, USG trying to find some way in which parties themselves can constructively approach their own problems. Future of NE area largely for them to decide. Hopefully, this may lead to a permanent peace. USG would like to have views of both Arabs and Israelis how best to move in this direction. We particularly welcome Faisal’s thoughts on future of area. We also most appreciative of strong stand he has taken to resist Arab pressures to break relations.

3. Before I could proceed with script sent State 214082,³ Faisal did what for him is extraordinary. He broke into presentation. Said he wished President had accepted friendly advice set forth in his letter of June 12⁴ on condemning “Israeli aggression.” Not only is such condemnation justified, but forthright USG action along these lines would help America’s friends in NE area. He complained that “policy planners” in USG do not seem to comprehend what he called “mob psychology” that prevails throughout Arab world. “You are dealing with irrational people,” he stated. “This should always be borne in mind in developing tactics. Those of us who are trying to stand up for you are being let down. Your actions at UN are intensifying pressures on me and other moderate Arab leaders.” He expressed appreciation for UK FonSec Brown’s statement of yesterday re war not leading to territorial aggrandizement. That kind of a statement helpful. Why cannot USG take similar helpful approach? USG speaks of evenhandedness and such no doubt its purpose. To the Arab public, i.e. those “crazy people” (to whom he kept referring), it comes through totally differently. USG putting him in bad spot. There is nothing in US public pronouncements to which he can point at Arab summit or elsewhere to show genuine USG concern for Arab interests. He pleaded for some statement which would be helpful to him and other moderate Arab leaders in resisting pressure of Arab extremists and Arab public. Soviets are rapidly gaining ground throughout area simply by stating “truth,” namely that Israel started aggression. Like USG Soviets also seem to want some kind of durable peace, but their tactics calculated pander to Arab public opinion and to their advantage. In contrast, USG tactics working against USG and against interests its friends.

4. I told Faisal USG has made no judgment who started hostilities. We had no foreknowledge war would begin. Reports conflict on who started shooting. In any case, UAR actions in days preceding June 5 expelling UNEF, deploying massive forces to border, closing Gulf of Aqaba and bellicose radio Cairo statements equally responsible for outbreak of hostilities. I emphasized USG is seeking to avoid past recriminations and wants to look to future. This is only truly constructive way to proceed.

5. Here Faisal again broke in. He insisted there no question whatsoever that Israelis had moved first. Hence, whatever provocation may have existed, they deserve to be indicted for beginning hostilities. Apart from evidence of mass destruction UAR aircraft through surprise assault, Faisal claimed Israeli Government spokesmen have publicly admitted that Israel preempted conflict. Radio KOL Israel has broadcast statements of Israeli officers boasting how they had moved first, SYG U Thant has stated Israelis started shooting, President De Gaulle has done so, etc. Why should USG try to obscure this. He not asking USG fabricate anything. He simply asking that USG take Israel’s own public statements that they started shooting and censure party which first resorted to force.

6. He readily admitted that UAR actions prior to June 5 had been provocative and as such were a significant contributory cause. He suggested that in any statement, resolution or otherwise this UAR culpability also be cited along with “Israeli aggression.” This would be consistent with US policy of even-handedness. “I am not trying to defend Nasser,” he insisted, “all I ask is that USG give me something to work with in forthrightly condemning what USG must also know.” He rejected argument that inclusion of blanket condemnations will focus UN debate on past rather than on more important aspect of viable future arrangements. He pointed out course of current debate in UNGA is already focusing mainly on issue of who started shooting.

7. With some agitation, Faisal repeated that he unable go to Arab summit and defend USG position without something saleable to Arab public. He said he is trying to get the Arab summit postponed as long as possible in the hope that some helpful USG statement may yet develop. Without this he will be in intolerable position at such summit. What, he asked rhetorically, could he point to if an Arab summit were held today. “Nothing,” he answered.

8. I insisted this not so. He had more arguments in his arsenal than he was admitting. Quite apart from Saudi self interest, there much he able point to as tangible evidence long standing USG concern for Arabs. For example, I reminded him of President’s reference in June 19 speech that troops must be withdrawn and associating this with recognized rights of national life, political independence and territorial integrity of all states. To my astonishment, Faisal responded President had said nothing about troop withdrawal. After a brief “yes-no” debate, Rashad brought out both the English and Arabic texts of the President’s speech. I was able point out to King President’s pertinent statement. Faisal clearly puzzled and claimed it was news to him. (Khalid seemed to know about it.) I expressed surprise and recalled King had himself talked of the President’s endorsement of withdrawal just a few days earlier at the Diplomatic Corps reception (Jidda’s 5467).⁵ I had wondered at the time how he had gotten his information so quickly just a few minutes after the speech had ended and before I had any text. Faisal grinned broadly and said, “I made it up. I had to have something to defend myself.” He explained that immediately prior to going to that reception his radio monitors had given him President’s five principles of peace. He had decided that he should interpret political independence and territorial integrity as withdrawal. We had good laugh over this one, but I took occasion emphasize to him that President had indeed spoken of withdrawal. Moreover, Faisal had found this point useful at diplomatic conclave. What was more, his personal interpretation of the President’ remarks showed how much he and the President understood each other. Surely this mutual understanding should convince him as much as anything that I might say that the President is genuinely concerned with the interests of the Arabs and their future. He conceded this so. But he insisted his personal confidence in the President is of little help in dealing with Arab public reaction to USG posture at UN. In any case, he added as an afterthought, what does statement mean withdraw 10 kilometers or so? Or does it mean that Arab troops should be withdrawn? In the absence of some indication as to what it means, he did not see how he could make much use of general reference to withdrawal.

9. I repeated that the President’s withdrawal statement was linked to political independence and territorial integrity of all states of area. Ultimately all troops should withdraw from frontiers. Such is vital ingredient any durable peace. For this purpose Israel, just as much as the Arab states, must be taken into account. Arab states should be under no misapprehension re degree of influence which USG able to exercise over Israel. Notwithstanding, I wanted him to know in confidence that we have been in close touch with Israelis since crisis began. As result of these contacts, we believe that Israel is more interested in peaceful settlement than in territorial aggrandizement (SecState 212295⁶ and 212330⁷). This seemed to be a further reason to think of some viable peace settlement. He listened with interest. He then stated that, in addition his earlier point of public condemnation Israeli aggression, some public USG endorsement of the principle that Israel should withdraw to the GAA frontiers is essential. He dismissed the contention that the USG unable pressure Israel to withdraw. “If you want to do so”, he said “you can.” I emphasized that, whether he believed it or not, our influence with Israel is limited. It can only be constructively exerted if Arabs, on their part, show some genuine interest in durable peace.

10. I asked that our talk get away from exclusive focus on past and that we discuss future. We anxious have his thoughts on that all-important aspect of problem. Faisal said he not able speak for all the Arabs. Speaking for Saudi Arabia alone, he wished USG to know that SAG will (a) never make peace with Israel, (b) never recognize Israel, (c) never accept new Israeli territorial aggrandizement by force of arms, but also (d) never attack Israel. As for any broader Arab interest in a future settlement, this will have to be discussed and decided at Arab summit. That was why he did not wish to talk about future. His immediate and pressing concern is present, i.e. creating an optimum atmosphere for that summit. The extremist Arab states will seek to use Arab summit to achieve their ends. They will attempt to whip up anti-American public sentiment for this purpose. Unless the USG takes a public posture, which will help the Arab moderates to resist these pressures, he could not predict what outcome might be. It might not be good for us or for him. Again, he asked rhetorically, what can I say at an Arab summit to defend your position and mine?

11. I responded that, in addition to withdrawal statement of President, Faisal might attack the “big lie” tactic which UAR, Syria and others have so blatantly used these past few weeks to conceal their own blunders. He wanted to know how? I reminded him that one recent UAR “big lie” against Saudi Arabia involved charge that American airbase exists at Dhahran. I had myself heard him tell UAR Ambassador to go to Dhahran and see for himself. Similarly, USG has invited UN or other impartial investigators to check logbooks, etc., of carriers, but no one has taken up invitation. They have not done so because UAR and others know their charges are utterly false. Why not take leaf from his own book by reminding Arab leaders who make such charges that they are free to accept USG invitation.

12. Additionally, Faisal able use numerous examples of USG support over the years for territorial integrity of all Arab states against other Arab states as well as Israel. As he aware, Saudi Arabia has benefited from this. So has UAR which might well recall USG efforts of 1956-57 in connection with resolution of Suez crisis. Faisal conceded these points of use, but insisted they not enough.

13. He recapitulated that what he and other Arab moderates need is (a) some public USG condemnation of “Israeli aggression” even if coupled with parallel condemnation of UAR (or other) contributory action, (b) some public USG endorsement that Israel should return to GAA frontiers. He did not want USG to assume the role of policeman in the area or anything of that sort. However, in making these two points, USG might further its aim of working for durable peace by adding to these provisos any conditions, proposals, or anything else” which it thinks might be helpful. All of these items could be concurrently discussed, if necessary, by a UN representative or any other acceptable mediator. However, to defend his own position of friendship to US he needs some public US recognition of above two fundamental aspects of the problem. Without such recognition, neither he nor other Arab moderates can be sure they able contain situation. He hoped USG would take his observations as an old friend who had many times fought US battle in Arab counsels, but now needs some “positive USG support” if he is to resist major onslaught of Soviets and Arab extremists on Western and moderate Arab positions. He could say that USG had too long disregarded his many warnings, but did not wish to cast blame. He simply looking to present out of which future must flow. He explained that as an Arab he could never accept Israel. However he was trying put himself in our shoes in search some mutually acceptable approach. He agreed our two governments should keep in close touch on this matter.

14. Comment:Faisal visibly agitated about USG posture. He feels we are deliberately seeking to avoid censuring Israel. He considers it both necessary and right that we do so, but has no objection coupling this with related censure of UAR deployment of troops, Syrian terrorism, etc. He also considers that some public USG endorsement of return to GAA frontiers necessary. As seen from here, his position is not unreasonable. His idea of linking such public pronouncements with recommended proposals for future settlement is intriguing. It deserves careful study. He and other Arab moderate leaders have a very real domestic public relations problem which should not be ignored. While Faisal certainly overstated his alleged lack of ammunition for use at an Arab summit (no doubt for our benefit) he could use sharper weapons. Our reading of Saudi public opinion indicates that US tactics at UNGA continue to be totally misunderstood here and have won US few supporters.

Eilts

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to USUN.
2. Dated June 21. (Ibid.)
3. Document 296.
4. See footnote 2, Document 294.
5. Dated June 20. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 SAUD)
6. Dated June 17. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)
7. Dated June 19. (Ibid.)