289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia1
206728. 1. During brief June 1 call on DepAsstSec Davies, Prince Muhammad ibn Faisal, son of Saudi King, made following points:
- a.
- SAG had to support UAR in current crisis2 and, like Hussein, Faisal might have to go to Cairo if situation deteriorated;
- b.
- USG action on Aqaba problem should be clearly based on world-wide legal considerations rather than as support for Israel;
- c.
- Any “action” USG might take should be clear, quick and effective; and
- d.
- Saudis would have “to do everything we can” oppose such action.
2. Davies stressed USG acting in accordance basic policies support for integrity every state in region and support for principle free international traffic through international waterways such as Aqaba. Prince Muhammad felt our actions so far had appeared unduly onesided in favor Israel and suggested more stress be laid on world-wide US policy on international waterways.
3. Comment: Prince Muhammad’s remarks add up to suggestion USG should act strongly against Nasser and accept adverse consequences such action at hands Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, since these would by implication not be of gravest character. We question whether Saudis could, in extreme circumstances Prince Muhammad had in mind, in fact so circumscribe their response.
4. We recognize Arabs will equate USG position on international straits with USG support Israel but addressees should nevertheless make every effort draw distinction between two. Dept plans send circular cable near future summarizing US legal position which may be helpful this respect.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 SAUD. Confidential. Drafted by Brewer on June 1, cleared by Wehmeyer, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Kuwait, Baghdad, Sanaa, Aden, and Dhahran.↩
- Documentation on the Middle East crisis is in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XIX.↩