Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

280. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, July 14, 1966.

You will be interested to know that King Faisal since his return to Saudi Arabia has told a number of people that he considered his visit here a “complete success.” He has spoken glowingly both publicly and among his own advisers of his meeting with you and reiterated that his main reason for coming was to become personally acquainted. He deeply appreciated our hospitality and easily shrugged off his brush with Mayor Lindsay. Ambassador Eilts reports that the visit boosted the King’s spirits and has decidedly enhanced his prestige at home.

One of the most interesting indications that you really got through to him was his explanation to the British Ambassador after his return of your views on civil rights, education and Vietnam. He even took the British to task gently for criticizing any aspect of your Vietnam policy. The King’s eagerness and ability to expound at some length on your policies indicates that everything you said registered loud and clear.

The problem now—as always with these visits—is how to capitalize on the momentum we have generated. You have established a rapport with him that will be helpful for some time to come. But there will also be misunderstandings as we urge Faisal to give a little to get Nasser’s troops out of Yemen. However, we are already moving ahead on two fronts:

1. We are renewing our efforts to persuade him to give a fair look at Nasser’s latest offer on Yemen. We are not overly optimistic that anything new will come of this, but we do feel the King is in a specially receptive mood as a result of his talks with you and Secretary Rusk.

2. Ambassador Eilts has offered to pick up his discussions with the Saudi Government on how we might continue the exchange of views on Communist penetration in the Mid-East, and the King has jumped at this.² Our chief goal is, by working with his people, to bring him to a more realistic view of what Communism is.

Walt

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-4/67. Secret.
2. In telegram 66 from Jidda, July 7, Eilts reported that he had discussed with Faisal the desirability of closer cooperation in meeting the Communist threat, and had urged that discussions as to what the U.S. Government and the Saudi Arabian Government might do individually and jointly in that sphere be undertaken expeditiously. The King emphatically agreed and instructed Saqqaf to proceed as soon as possible with the talks. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 SAUD)