Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

278. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 22, 1966, 5:05–5:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

• President’s Second Meeting with King Faisal

PARTICIPANTS

• King Faisal
• Prince Sultan
• Dr. Rashad Pharaon
• Ambassador Ibrahim al-Sowayel
• The President
• Mr. Walt W. Rostow
• Ambassador Raymond A. Hare, NEA
• Ambassador Hermann F. Eilts
• Mr. Howard Wriggins
• Mr. George C. Moore, NEA:NE
• Mr. Isa Sabbagh (Interpreter)

The President first ascertained that the King approved the draft joint communique. Commenting that he had another meeting scheduled at 5:30, he asked if the King had any further matters to take up.

The King said that they had closed their meeting of the previous day while discussing cooperation between certain states in the area. He wished to affirm that this cooperation was possible if it were confined to states whose policies were consonant with those we all share. A disturbing element was that many people in those countries with whom we would wish to cooperate were filled with fear of propaganda and other activities of the states who wish to make trouble. However, these presently fearful states would be greatly encouraged if they clearly understood that the U.S. was willing to ward off threats against them, to assist them and give them guidance. Unfortunately, those who fish in troubled waters have spread the impression that the U.S. is not ready to oppose evil actions, but turns a blind eye to certain events, for example, those in Zanzibar and Yemen.

The King, continuing his comments on Yemen, said all the leaders on the republican side are Leftists, whether or not they have specific ties to Moscow or Peking. He recalled that in 1962, after the Yemen revolution, he had pleaded with his friends in the U.S. Government not to rush into recognition, but to give events time to clarify and show the real tendencies of the new government.

The King said he did not advocate that the U.S. use armed forces to interfere in the domestic affairs of other states but recommended that a clear indication that the U.S. supported the endeavors of like-minded states would stiffen the spines of those people who were presently fearful.

Saying that he was loathe to bring up the subject, the King noted that those who opposed our principles continued to argue that U.S. assistance to Israel was proof of American opposition to all Arabs. This greatly hindered the actions of states which in fact would desire to cooperate with America. Even the King had undergone tremendous abuse in the area for his continuing with his visit to the U.S. in the face of the recent U.S. announcement of its arms sale to Israel. It was claimed that this proved that the King and the U.S. were conspiring against Arab interests. However, the King ignored these attacks since he knew they were intended only to prevent his coming.

The President responded that it was the price of leadership that not all the 120 nations with whom we have relations are friendly with us. He agreed that it was not easy for us to use our influence wisely in every part of the world. He assured the King that we would carefully consider his comments and admonitions, and added that we cannot encourage other countries too much without being ready to back up our encouragement with military force if necessary. We were not able to use our military power everywhere in the world, but the 170,000 U.S. casualties since the end of World War II were proof that we used our power to oppose aggression, both direct and indirect. Just as President Kennedy had assured the King, we would continue to support those leaders who shared with us the principles of freedom, of working for the betterment of their own people, and of peaceful settlement of disputes. He told the King that our concern for the integrity of his country was no less now than had been expressed to him by President Kennedy.

Concerning arms sales, the President said that we supplied certain countries when we did not want them to obtain arms from other sources (e.g. Jordan, Israel) and when we thought that, by helping them with their own defense, we could ultimately keep them from fighting.

Concerning our relations with the U.A.R., we hope to maintain some influence with Nasser, particularly with respect to what he does in Yemen.

In conclusion, the President said that it is not easy to use our influence wisely in every part of the world. As you say, we cannot use our military power everywhere—we should not. We do, however, work on certain principles: (1) oppose aggression, direct and indirect; (b) support those who work for their people; (c) try to encourage peaceful settlement of disputes. It is not always easy to decide how to apply these principles. But His Majesty can be assured his views will be taken into account—and we are his friend—because he stands for all three principles. He thought the King’s visit had been most useful and he was greatly appreciative that the King had come so far to see us. The King responded with an expression of gratitude for all the warmth of the President’s welcome and the meeting of minds which they had.

While saying goodbye on the way to the car, the King asked the President to visit Saudi Arabia, saying it would be the realization of a precious dream which he had. The President responded that he would most like to make such a visit when the pressures of his work allowed.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-4/67. Secret. Drafted by Moore on June 24 and approved by Walt Rostow on July 11. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. The time and place of the meeting are from the President’s Daily Diary. (Ibid.)