Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

265. Telegram From the Consulate General in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Dhahran, April 23, 1966, 1805Z.

297. From Ambassador: Meeting With Sultan re Hawks.

1. Had two and half hour meeting with MODA Prince Sultan today in Riyadh. UK Ambassador Man, with whom I flew to Riyadh, met with Sultan just before me since he required take early afternoon plane back to Jidda be present at Queen’s birthday reception. Able have only brief snatch of conversation with Man when he came out looking very distressed. Told me Sultan in bad humor and had insisted he must have operational Thunderbird battery in five weeks and specifically made this a condition for signing of BAC contract.

2. I then saw Sultan who was most affable although at times became quite excited. I first recalled his urgent request of several weeks ago for loan or sale Hawk battery and accelerated naval visits and mentioned in passing USS Thomas visits to Yenbo and Jidda had been success. While we had had to tell him no Hawk battery available on off-the-shelf basis due US military’s operational requirements elsewhere, we had continued look at how we might help as next best thing. In this context, US had now authorized Raytheon indicate availability one Hawk battery, capable of split deployment, in October, about six months’ time. Said we aware his request to Brit’s for Thunderbirds and, as I was sure he understood in matter involving joint US-UK air defense package, had been consulted by Brits who had indicated availability two Thunderbird batteries in four to six months’ time, i.e. about same time as battery of Hawks now available. Added I wished him clearly understand that October delivery of Hawk battery was USG’s response to his request to it and not to Raytheon’s request be allowed schedule earlier deliveries. It being made at some sacrifice US military commitment, but we hoped it would satisfy his immediate requirements. In this connection, I noted his frequently expressed desire for standardization in Saudi army and undesirability moving his SAMs systems which will only cause problems in training, logistics maintenance, etc. Stressed Hawk and Thunderbirds not interchangeable. I also reiterated USG estimate UAR will not attack Saudi Arabia unless there provocation and noted that current Kuwaiti mediation effort appeared be of interest to Egyptians as well as Saudis and, hopefully, makes entire problem of early establishment SAMs capability slightly less urgent than it seemed to be several weeks ago. Noted Hawk battery would have additional advantage of being in context contract SAG presently negotiating with Raytheon and should obviate need spending on SAMs additional monies which might better be used elsewhere.

3. Sultan replied by again relating SAG’s concern over UAR intentions. Recalled he had first gone to his “best-friends”, USG and only after they unable help had he approached Brits. Some of UAR talk might be mere sabre rattling, but he under pressure from his officers provide early SAMs capability protect coastal region between Jizan and Jidda and also Riyadh. He agreed SAG desire is standardize if at all possible and said he would prefer Hawks if first battery for Jidda be made available in five weeks and second battery for Riyadh by October. Claimed Brits told him Thunderbird battery could be available in seven weeks. When I commented dummy missiles not likely be of much use to him, he said had insisted to Brits they must be operational missiles. I said knew of HMG instruction which expressed hope SAG would find advance delivery schedule for Hawks agreeable. He acknowledged this had been done by Man, but insisted BAC representative (Edwards, who was in outer office) had yesterday assured him operational Thunderbird battery could be available in seven weeks. He had therefore let it be known to Brit Ambassador Man that signing of BAC contact conditioned on early availability operational Thunderbird battery. (He said this with broad smile as if to indicate this likely be helpful spur to get Brits respond positively.) He reiterated that if USG could provide Hawk battery in five weeks, he would much prefer Hawks. He appreciated effort make Hawk battery available in October, but asked if USG could in meantime guarantee safety of Jizan area. He felt there 80 per cent chance Egyptians would not attack Jidda, but Jizan perhaps yes.

4. I said would pass on his remarks, but I wished make few personal observations. Saudi Arabia’s friends in USG have worked hard try to be helpful, but it sometimes very hard when SAG seemed to have almost complete disregard for problems confronting its friends. USG involved in shooting war in Vietnam against Commie enemy who as King had told me equally repugnant to SAG. Understandably this conflict had first priority on allocation our resources. Despite this real effort had been made be responsive SAG’s concern. USG could obviously not guarantee there would be no attack on Jizan, but in our view best way avoid such contingency is, as I had told him before, if SAG exercise restraint. Sultan surely aware of US security commitment to SAG which qualified only by need avoid provocation. King and Sultan had assured me SAG has not resumed arms aid to Yemeni royalists. So long as this true I would have thought Sultan would have greater confidence in long established friends than his present remarks seemed to suggest. There ample evidence UAR aware of US security interest in Saudi Arabia, which I personally believe probably main deterrent thus far rash Egyptian actions.

My remarks took Sultan somewhat aback. After some more comments on his possible security problems next few months, he said wanted amend his earlier request on Hawks.

[5.] He would welcome having Hawk battery delivered by Raytheon in October and appreciates USG’s help in making this possible. However, he also wished ask USG consider lending him another Hawk battery to be available in late June or July which might be for training purposes. Such battery would in his view, be effective deterrent to UAR attack and would ease pressure of Saudi officers and Saudi public on SAG for adequate defense capability. If this could be provided, and if no attack on Jizan takes place, he ready drop Thunderbird idea. Meanwhile, pending USG’s reply, he will put off Brits. He hoped might be possible let him have answer by end coming week. He again remarked with chuckle Brits working under pressure because of his threat not sign BAC contract unless operational Thunderbirds are made available five weeks. When I said hoped he was not also attempting pressure US this way on Raytheon contract, he quickly assured me he was not.

6. Told him I would report his comments and request, but that I could make no commitments. Would let him have answer soon as possible.

7. Comment: Sultan obviously in one of his more difficult moods. He seems to have panicked Brits by threatening withhold BAC contract signing, but I cannot be certain Edwards may not have put him up to this tactic as best way get HMG agree to quick BAC sale of two operational Thunderbird batteries. Although my personal comments shook him somewhat, his amended request to me is really no more than what some of his officers have told us he really wants, namely one battery of SAMs available by July from whatever source.

Unless we can stop Brits from running scared on this one, recommend we explore whether there any way getting Hawk battery here by July or shortly thereafter. Perhaps we could airlift to Jidda one or more sections of such a battery which might cut down transport time and make August delivery date feasible. Alternatively, we might review General Leahy’s earlier suggestion deploy Hawk battery to Saudi Arabia for EP-90 days’ training purposes pending October delivery first battery actually sold to Saudi Arabia. Would appreciate Dept/DOD’s preliminary reaction above proposals soon as possible since, if we willing explore these courses, I may be able conduct holding operation. But we should reckon with BAC pressuring HMG very hard be responsive Sultan’s latest request

Note: Since today’s SDI flight back to Jidda cancelled, I will not be able return until tomorrow night. Hence, am sending this message to Dhahran through General Leahy with request Dhahran forward immediately to Dept. Other subjects discussed with Sultan will be reported from Jidda following my return.

Allen

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 SAUD. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Jidda, London, CINCSTRIKE, and CHUSMTM. Passed to White House and USIA.