Office of the Historian

257. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia1

Washington, November 8, 1965, 7:56 p.m.

239. Embtel 344.2 Saudi Air Defense.

1.
You may assure Sultan that US Hawk missile system is completely autonomous system and can be effectively integrated with British air defense warning radar (e.g., 3-D radar) and Lightning aircraft, provided UK does not attempt substitute UK components for US Hawk system components. If Saudis desire, US prepared to send OSD and/or Raytheon rep to answer technical questions or present price proposal, respectively.
2.
We do not believe we would have great difficulty in equalling UK credit terms for our portion of combined package. Suggest you so inform Sultan jointly with UK reps on Wednesday when they expected present their credit offer. (UK MinAv official Christie suggested this.)
3.
Providing Lightning aircraft, ground radars and Hawk system radars use Mark 10 IFF interrogator/transponder equipment and manual command control is used, the proposed joint US-UK air defense package consisting of Lightnings, 3-D radars, Hawks and communication systems does appear to constitute a viable air defense system. Categoric assurance can only be given after US and UK technical experts discuss detailed composition of UK package elements. Discussion expected within next two weeks.
4.
Raytheon currently preparing cost estimates on basis Col. Vaughn’s survey. Unable at this time to determine when such estimates will be available. However, will attempt have Raytheon ready to submit costing data within ten days. Advise how you think this data best submitted, i.e., through Lockheed, BAC, UK or US Embassy, or directly by Raytheon.
5.
Lockheed rep Hansen ETA Jidda Nov. 10.
6.
Re your 349,3 agree that if SAG accepts combined package we and British faced with much sorting out our respective roles Saudi Arabia. While it perhaps not worthwhile delve into details until Saudi decision known, we hope Dep Asst Sec Davies will have opportunity initial discussions with British during London trip toward end this month.
7.
For London: We have informed Brit Emb. of paras 1-3 above. You may also inform HMG.
Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1-4 SAUD. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Moore and Quinn; cleared by Warren, Judd, Feigl (DOD/ISA/ILN), Colonel E. Dreiss (DOD/DDRE/OAD/DS), Symmes, Colonel Byrd, and Stoddart; and approved by Davies. Repeated to London, CHUSMTM Dhahran, Paris, CINCSTRIKE, Dhahran, and Paris for DAUSRO.↩
  2. In telegram 344 from Jidda, November 3, Seelye reported that the King was “somewhat irritated” that, in view of the special U.S.-Saudi relationship, the United States had not revealed in advance of the British the nature of the combined U.S.-U.K. proposal. On November 3 at a meeting with Sultan, U.K. Ambassador Mann, and U.K. Ministry of Aviation officials, Sultan noted that he wanted the United Kingdom to understand that Saudi Arabia relied primarily on U.S. Government military support and on its undertaking to maintain Saudi Arabia’s integrity. He said he would be inclined toward the combined package if he could be assured: 1) that the Hawk system could be integrated effectively with British components; 2) that the U.S. Government fully endorsed it as being a viable air defense for Saudi Arabia, and 3) that the United States could provide the same credit terms as the United Kingdom. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Dated November 4. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 SAUD)↩