Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

255. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia¹

Washington, October 29, 1965, 7:18 p.m.

213. Joint State/Defense Message. Ref exchange letters UK Min Aviation Jenkins² and McNamara³ and separate Cirtel⁴ (being repeated to addressees).

1. You will note in developing combined package with British we have insisted that we cannot withdraw our own F-104G offer without risking serious damage US-SAG relations. We intend proceed with own presentation, as witnessed by McNamara response to Sultan. At same time we willing join with British in making available to Saudis another choice of equipment mix. (Latter may have pricing advantage in comparison with Lockheed offer, although this unclear until precise comparison of components can be made.)

2. We have insisted that new package be presented by British as having been formulated at their initiative; that they had obtained authorization from us for inclusion US equipment in this proposal.

3. After combined proposal presented to SAG by British, you should confirm to Saudis that we in fact have agreed to inclusion US equipment and stand ready supply full logistic, training and other requisite support for this equipment should Saudis choose combined proposal. At same time you should make absolutely clear we remain fully ready and willing supply completely US package, as reiterated in McNamara response to Sultan.⁵

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 SAUD. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Moore; cleared by G/PM Director for Operations Howard Meyers, Judd, Officer in Charge of Politico-Military Affairs in the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Regional Affairs Lieutenant Colonel Billy R. Byrd, Symmes, and Stoddart; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Beirut, Amman, Dhahran, Paris for DAUSRO, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA POLAD (by pouch), CHUSMTM Dhahran, and London.
2. On October 25 Jenkins wrote McNamara concerning their joint problems in meeting the defense requirements of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Lebanon. As part of an over-all program, he suggested a joint U.S.-U.K. proposal to Saudi Arabia of a defense package consisting of British Lightning aircraft together with U.S. Hawk missiles and a U.S.-U.K. combination of ground environment equipment, with U.S. concentration on communications and U.K. concentration on radar. (Telegram 1902 from London, October 27, ibid., DEF 12-5 NEARE)
3. On October 28 McNamara responded that since he had received a letter from Prince Sultan the previous week indicating his government’s decision on an F-104G package if arrangements for financing and missiles could be worked out, it was already late for reconsideration of the Saudi Arabian program. Nevertheless, there was merit in the tri-country program Jenkins had outlined and the United States would be willing to agree to inclusion of U.S. equipment in such a proposal if it was absolutely clear that the United States was also willing to stand by its original offer of F-104G aircraft to Saudi Arabia. (Letter from Secretary McNamara to Minister Jenkins, October 28, 1965; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Saudi Arabia 381, 3 Mar. 65)
4. Circular telegram 782, October 29. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 NEARE)
5. Telegram 207 to Jidda, October 29, transmitted McNamara’s letter to Prince Sultan. (Ibid., DEF 1-4 SAUD) In telegram 342 from Jidda, November 2, Seelye reported that on that day he had informed Acting Deputy Foreign Minister Mas’ud that the U.S. Government had authorized inclusion of U.S. equipment in the latest U.K. proposal, but that the United States remained fully ready and willing to supply a completely U.S. package. He added that if the Saudi Arabian Government decided to opt for the combined package, the U.S. Government was prepared to supply the requisite equipment, training, and support. In response to Mas’ud’s query as to why he had not communicated this when he met with Sultan the previous day, Seelye responded that he had not been authorized to do so until after the U.K. presentation. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 SAUD)