219. Memorandum of Conversation1

SUBJECT

  • US/Kuwaiti Relations

PARTICIPANTS

  • His Highness Shaikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah, Amir of the State of Kuwait
  • His Excellency Shaikh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jabir, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of Kuwait
  • His Excellency Abd al-Rahman Salem al-Ateeqi, Minister of Finance and Oil
  • His Excellency Talat al-Ghoussein, Ambassador of the State of Kuwait to the United States
  • The President
  • The Honorable Howard R. Cottam, American Ambassador to the State of Kuwait
  • Parker T. Hart, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
  • Harold H. Saunders, White House
  • Camille Nowfel, Interpreter

The President opened the conversation by expressing pleasure that the Amir was here and had brought some of his beautiful sunshine with him. He hoped the Amir would enjoy his stay. He was honored to have the Amir for his last State visit. As he had said in his arrival statement, the people of America are enthusiastic about Kuwait and its willingness to share its treasure with its fellowmen. He would be pleased to hear the Amir’s views on anything of common interest.

The Amir thanked the President for his invitation, for his kind words of welcome and for the warmth of his reception. He trusted that their conversation would be “as clear and cloudless as the weather.” He wished the President continued health and prosperity.

As for his views on substantive issues, he said he would like to discuss matters of direct concern to his area.

As for the “Arab Gulf,” he said he would like to hear what plans the US might have in view of the British withdrawal from the area.

In response to the President’s request for comment, Assistant Secretary Hart said Gulf affairs would continue to be of great interest to the United States. The US has no plan to take the unique place the British once held. The British position developed under circumstances that do [Page 418] not exist today, and it is the people of the Gulf themselves who will determine the future of the Gulf area. The Amir said he realized that the people of the area would have to carry a larger share of the burden, but he would like to reiterate his question about exactly what position the US plans to take. In response to Mr. Hart’s question about precisely what the Amir meant by “position”, the Amir said that there is no threat to the Gulf from the “Arab area.” The danger is from outside the area and the threat may be military or subversive or in unknown forms.

Mr. Hart said that if he had to look into the future, he would say that we will be just as greatly concerned with the independence and integrity of states of the Gulf as we are with the independence and integrity of states all over the world. We have demonstrated this beyond doubt. The Gulf area is no exception. We have strong ties with all the peoples on the Gulf shores.

The Amir said, “Suppose there is an armed attack on any countries of the area, could we expect armed support?”

The President said that that is a matter that would have to be considered through the Constitutional procedures of the US, taking into account the circumstances, the recommendations of the President at the time, the attitudes of the Congress, the existence of treaties, the justice of the causes involved and the American people’s views of the situation. He emphasized that one President could not bind another and, therefore, he could not speak for future Presidents.

The President continued, saying that we are very anxious that stability prevail in all parts of the world. We are anxious to make no statement that would encourage aggression. We have not had to deal with aggression by force in that part of the world, but the Amir knows of our friendship for the people of that area. The US will under its Constitutional procedures face whatever situation may develop and act accordingly.

The Amir shared the hope that no such situation would arise. He believed that problems of aggression should be solved “by men’s minds rather than by force.” However, he could not help but think about the problem and wanted to know what he could count on. The US is a symbol of peace in the world, and he just wanted to know what the attitude of the US would be in such a situation.

When the President asked Mr. Hart whether he wished to raise anything else, the Assistant Secretary asked about the meetings in Kuwait with the Shah of Iran. The Amir called them “100% successful.” Disagreement remains as far as Bahrein is concerned. He said that “we” are looking for a solution and doing “our” best to reach a settlement. The Shah “assured us that he has no ambitions,” but he has an old claim. The Amir expressed his view that the Shah is “seeking a way [Page 419] out.” He said the Shah had asked him to “help him find a way out.” The Amir realized the Shah’s difficulty.

The Amir said he would like to ask the President’s opinion of the Federation of Arab Amirates. The President asked Mr. Hart to comment.

Mr. Hart said we feel this was basically a good idea. It will help the states of the area work together in using their resources to best advantage. The main problem is the Shah’s problem with respect to the inclusion of Bahrain in the Federation. The main question is whether a solution can be found for the Shah.

The Amir said that Iran would “undoubtedly oppose” the inclusion of Bahrain. The Government of Iran is seeking a way out of this problem. The Amir felt that the US might possibly use its influence to help and encourage Iran to find a way out with dignity. He hoped the problem could be solved with US help.

Mr. Hart said that we would encourage this in an informal way. We understand the problems of both sides. We are encouraged that there have been recent meetings among the Saudis, Iranians and Kuwaitis and that some of the Shaikhs of the lower Trucial Coast have visited Iran. Considering the fact that there was little communication not too many years ago, we view this as progress.

The Amir said that Kuwait had tried to increase contact between Iran and Bahrain. Representatives of the two sides had met in Geneva two months ago and “we hope there will be another meeting soon.”

The Foreign Minister said that as one looks at South Arabia one cannot but fear for the rest of the area. The “Soviets and the Communists” have established footholds in the area. Is the United States happy about this? When Mr. Hart answered quickly that we are “most unhappy”, the Foreign Minister said, “Then we find a meeting point.” He went on to say that he hopes the US would use its good offices with Iran to help settle the Bahrain issue.

Mr. Hart said he believes the Shah is aware of the problem and has just as much interest as anyone else in defending the area against outside interests, but he has a problem on Bahrain. “We all have to help him find a solution.” The Shah is dealing with a tradition of long standing, and it is not easy to bury a tradition. It is in the interests of all of us that he finds a solution.

The Amir said that it would only be through the joint efforts of the US, Iran and Kuwait, that a favorable settlement would be found. Mr. Hart nodded and said, “Quiet diplomacy.”

The President said that he had asked Secretary Hart to respond to the Amir’s questions because Mr. Hart is a career officer deeply involved in the area. The President felt that Mr. Hart’s judgment would be called on “long after I am gone” from office.

[Page 420]

Generally speaking, the President felt that his record on aggression was well known. He and his administration have looked with great disfavor on any power that tried to impose its will on others by might. Our position has been made clear all around the world.

On the Federation, we encourage regional cooperation and foster the association of neighbors in efforts to strengthen their economies. We have done this in Latin America, Africa and on continents all over the world.

The President expressed his pleasure that the Amir’s meeting with the Shah had gone well. He felt that “whoever sits in this chair” will do everything possible to encourage just solutions to problems of this kind.

The President said that, at the White House dinner in the evening, leading citizens from all over the United States would come to welcome the Amir and to pay their respects. He had had “fewer declines” on this dinner than on any other and he was looking forward to seeing the Amir in the evening.

The Amir said there were other points that could be covered, but he knew the President’s time was limited. He would like to mention in parting the Palestine issue.

The President said that we are “alert to it”. We believe that the people of the area should work out a solution. We support the UN efforts to help them. We are anxious to do anything we can on our side to help. If the Amir had any specific suggestions on how we might help, he might wish to take them up with Secretary Rusk.

The Amir asked how soon the US might resume relations with the UAR.

The President said that would be a problem that Mr. Nixon would have to act on. He said that we have been “anxious to resume relations right along.” We had been concerned that the record of our erroneously alleged involvement in the June 1967 war be corrected. We had let the Egyptians know that, if they would correct that record, we would be glad to resume relations. But that is now an issue which the new Administration will have to take up. The Scranton mission2 had created some hope in this direction, and he hoped something would come out of it. He would like to see a genuine move toward better relations. “We would be glad to resume tomorrow if they would just state for the record that we did not attack them.” The President reiterated that [Page 421] he could not bind his successor, but he hoped and believed that relations would be resumed.

The Amir pointed out that the UAR government had made a statement to Look magazine for the record. The President, smiling, replied that maybe we have resumed relations with Look magazine, but not with each other. He said he had seen and was aware of the Look article, but felt that the best way to clear up misunderstandings of this kind is to talk directly to each other.

The President repeated that we would like to see relations resumed, that we regretted their having been broken. He said we had not attacked the UAR and as soon as the UAR had made a statement directly to us, we would be happy to resume relations.

The Amir asked what the US position would be should Cairo request resumption.

The President said that, as he had just stated, “we would be very glad to resume.” When the Amir said that there had been an understanding that the Look statement was tantamount to an Egyptian admission of the error of its charges, the President said he did not have much to add to what he had already said, except to say that if we can have that statement in Look, why not have it in a cable?

The Amir said he had not been asked to pursue this issue. He was just personally interested in it. The President reiterated that we are very much interested in resuming relations. We are sorry they were broken and would be happy to resume under the conditions he had described.

In parting, the President said he looked forward to seeing the Amir in the evening.

Comment: Toward the end of the meeting, there was much conversation among the Kuwaitis in Arabic. Presumably the Foreign Minister and Ambassador Ghoussein were urging the Amir to get to the Palestine issue. At that point, the President was running behind on his schedule and was under some pressure to meet his next appointment.

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Kuwait, Cables & Memos, Vol. I, 11/63-1/69. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Saunders on December 17 and approved by the White House on December 31. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. The time of the meeting was taken from the President’s Daily Diary. (Ibid.)
  2. Former Governor of Pennsylvania Scranton visited the United Arab Republic December 6-7 as part of a six-nation fact-finding tour of the Middle East undertaken on behalf of President-elect Nixon. Documentation on the Scranton mission is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/SCRANTON.