Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

214. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait¹

Washington, June 30, 1967, 8:48 p.m.

220347. Following summary FYI only and Noforn. It is uncleared and subject to revision upon review.

1. Following FonMinSabah al-Ahmad’s delivery oral message from Ruler (reported separately),² President expressed appreciation and said he would give it serious study. He noted problems exist on both sides but said he appreciated the fairness, moderation and judiciousness which has characterized Ruler’s approach. Saying there enough blame to go around, President noted that Israelis had not been the ones to close Gulf of Aqaba which immediate cause hostilities, but suggested that was a bygone and we should look ahead. President stressed USG had in no way participated with Israel in fighting as UAR alleged.

2. FonMin said he wished speak frankly as representative friendly country. Arabs were human and not infallible. At same time they did not want to see one wrong followed by another. Many responsible Arab officials continued look to USG. Sabah stressed his hope that measures USG might take in present situation would not “force” them away from that position.

3. President reacted to notion that US actions “forced” moderates to take any position. He responded not USG intentions, but Nasser’s actions which had led to fighting, should be Arab concern. Sabah cautioned against taking Nasser “as point of reference.” Officials would come and go, but attitude Arab common people what counts. President replied USG would do what is right but could do little as long as moderates continue to follow Nasser’s misguided leadership. FonMin again asked USG do what it could remove “encroachments on our territory.” Sabah indicated our failure would leave moderates open to serious threat on part USSR.

4. President said solution could not be one-way proposition. Sabah replied all problems could be solved after withdrawal, to which President rejoined all problems should be considered together. Sabah said this very difficult and not question of one or two Arab leaders. Arab masses simply would not accept any package deal. President inquired whether masses seriously expected Israel withdraw without achieving right of passage. FonMin suggested authority could be given to UN or SYG to examine specific issues and work out settlement.

5. Noting we would be glad have detailed Kuwaiti views on latter point, President said we respected Kuwait and liked way Kuwaitis had handled their affairs. If FonMin submitted further thoughts, we would carefully consider them. Our rule was never to leave a friend, though regrettably a friend sometimes left us.

6. FonMin expressed warm appreciation President’s frankness which bore witness our continuing friendship and mutual respect. These factors explained why GOK had not broken relations with us. Sabah nevertheless pleaded that USG avoid actions which would put Arab moderates in position where they would be vulnerable “outside” pressure. President assured FonMin we would not do so but noted that others might and reminded Sabah that USG lacks power to control events.

7. In subsequent talk with Presidential Assistant Rostow, FonMin again voiced concern lest USG actions force moderates abandon moderation. Rostow noted Soviet policy appears aimed at Israel but in fact is aimed at Arab moderates. Problem was how USG could help moderates while still doing what is just and feasible in situation. Clearly troops must be withdrawn but Syrian heights, Aqaba and other specific issues would have to be worked out. FonMin said Arabs could not accept conditional Israeli withdrawal but would be willing have SYG given certain powers in wake withdrawal resolution to work out specific issues. Russians for own reasons were already taking advantage situation by warmly espousing Arab cause. Unquestioned Arab support for Nasser modified by recent events but, for this be meaningful, USG must take helpful position. Rostow said Soviets in recent discussions had noted they had ended war with Japanese 10 years before they signed peace treaty. He wondered whether this might be example for Arabs. FonMin rejoined that USG now had opportunity strengthen Arab moderates and encourage realism in Arab councils if we wished. Rostow concluded we would welcome additional suggestions. We had tried hard to prevent war but failed which indicated limits USG influence. Peaceful conditions in Near East depended mainly on peoples of Near East. President’s five principles designed be helpful but USG could not alone provide solutions.

8. Comment: Exchange with President was warm and friendly despite expression of sometimes opposing views. Kuwaitis subsequently expressed pleasure at meeting, indicating they might have further specific suggestions following FonMin’s speech at UNGA afternoon June 29.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 KUW. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Brewer on June 29, cleared by Saunders, and approved by Davies. Repeated to USUN.
2. Telegram 218799 to Kuwait, June 29, reported that Kuwaiti Foreign Minister’s Sabah al-Ahmad had called on the President on the evening of June 28 to deliver the Ruler’s oral message, which stated that Israel had initiated aggression and that the community of nations had long accepted the view that acquisition of territory by force should not be recognized. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR)