203. Airgram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State 1

A-209

SUBJECT

  • Secretary Talbot’s Visit to Kuwait

In two days, Assistant Secretary Talbot 2 had an intimate and wide exposure to Kuwait, its royal family, its bureaucracy, its business oligarchy, its oil industry, and its modernization. Two main themes of the discussions were: 1) US policy in the Middle East and 2) modernization of Kuwait. Every principal official directly or indirectly queried Mr. Talbot about US views and intentions on the Palestine issue: The Amir, the Foreign Minister, other officials, members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly and 25 prominent businessmen. Mr. Talbot sought to assure them of the evenhandedness, the continuity and the friendly understanding of the United States and the personal ardent desire of the President for peace in the Middle East and elsewhere.

The Amir asked for understanding and flexibility in US policy toward the Palestine question, implying that he expected unreasonable and uncontrollable actions which, if dealt with too abruptly by the US, might have disastrous results. The Foreign Minister and other officials more explicitly stressed that fear and affirmed Kuwait’s intention to aid and abet the inevitable unification of the Arab states. What Kuwait expected was a federation which will preserve independence of each (i.e., Kuwait could retain its higher standard of living). The Foreign Minister affirmed that while cooperation in cultural, educational and economic matters would proceed rapidly, political association was even more important. While he was less explicit about how political unification would be achieved, he acknowledged that many present Arab governments would fall as would others after them. In the meantime, the Arab people would accelerate cooperation in every possible way.

The Foreign Minister maintained that many Arab problems such as Yemen could be settled by Arabs themselves if left to their own devices. UAR, Saudi Arabia and Yemen had made considerable progress toward a settlement. US assistance was no longer needed there, the Foreign Minister affirmed.

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While GOK’s aid program permitted loans, it did not permit grants to Arab brothers (except for education and health through GUPAC). Kuwait aid and US aid programs to Arabs are not alike. Kuwait must treat brother Arabs as equals; hence, no grants. US should continue its grant aid to Jordan and to Palestine refugees. However, money alone would not be enough for the refugees, UN Resolution 194, Article 113 had to be implemented. Mr. Talbot’s mention of other aspects of the resolution fell on deaf ears.

The Foreign Minister asked how long US would continue its “foolish” policy toward Peiping, China. Kuwait would be evenhanded and non-aligned. Mr. Talbot gave an effective defense, but Sabah still felt GOK could handle two-China policy up to point of who would get the UN Security Council seat. The Minister implied that the UN General Assembly would have to meet the issue when it arises.

UK Ambassador Jackson told Mr. Talbot that GOK hadn’t recently raised question of the UK-GOK treaty. Jackson volunteered information that GOK had been spending too much and drawing down its reserves. With respect to Israel and oil, Jackson felt GOK would not cut off its nose to spite its face. The Prime Minister had told him recently that Arab world would be better off if it admitted that Israel exists.

Mr. Talbot’s visit served US interests effectively by providing an intimate dialogue on emotionally-toned subjects and by demonstrating US interest in Kuwait. He was well received and appreciated by everyone.

Howard R. Cottam
American Ambassador
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, ORG 7 NEA. Secret. Drafted by Cottam.
  2. Assistant Secretary Talbot visited a number of other Near East countries on this trip.
  3. Article 11 of UN General Assembly Resolution 194, December 11, 1948, called for repatriation of Palestinian refugees and compensation for those who did not choose to return.