2. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
Mac,
Attached fascinating report (from a source reliable in the past) is one indication among many that Arabs sense a change in our ME policy.2 Though largely the product of circumstance (JFB’s assassination, Jordan Waters crisis), it comes out as LBJ being pro-Israeli and reversing the three years of skillful Kennedy handling of the Arabs. It’s around here too; Joe Kraft and Rollie Evans both mentioned it to me—and I most stoutly denied.
[Page 3]Somehow LBJ has gotten wind of this. He was strong against saying too much in Weizmann speech;3 more recently he chided Harriman for getting him in trouble with the Arabs.
But more is needed. I’m putting together with State a program of steps needed to protect our Arab policy through 1964, and to balance the things we’ll do for Israel: (1) a loan to the UAR under certain conditions, (2) reassurance we’re not helping Israel go nuclear; (3) LBJ letter to Nasser, etc. (4) Hussein visit; (5) another quiet try at arms control with Gamal. We’ve worked hard under JFB to come up with a promising NE policy; it worked—in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and at Cairo Conference. We can’t let it slide away by inaction—and I don’t think LBJ would want this, because among other things it would create painful problems for us in the area (which with luck and suppleness we can avoid).4
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret.↩
- Reference is to TDCS 3/572, 910, February 12, from Cairo; not attached.↩
- Regarding the President’s speech at the Weizmann Institute of Science on February 20, see footnote 3, Document 13 in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XVIII.↩
- A notation in Bundy’s handwriting reads: “Good, Do it—and let’s get LBJ Nasser letter ready to go with Eshkol answer.” For documentation regarding the actions Komer proposed, see ibid.↩