197. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- New Kurdish Insurgency Threatens
In addition to its many other problems, the Near East may have to face a new round of fighting between the Kurdish guerrillas and the Iraqi army during the next three or four months. Mulla Mustafa’s followers are growing restive. Minor clashes are occurring more frequently between the rival Kurdish factions, and between Mustafa’s bands and isolated small army units. The Kurds probably would not move in force before late September, when the harvest is in, but action could be triggered earlier by government miscalculation or by outside pressures.
Kurds Feel That They Must Be Militant. Several factors, both local and regional, tempt the Kurds to reopen hostilities at a time of their own choosing. Locally: The government is defaulting on peace promises. The financial strain of the oil cutoff, first in November-December and then during the war with Israel, paralyzed the Iraqi government’s plans for extensive reconstruction in the Kurdish area, which were part of the [Page 385] peace agreement with the Kurds. The Kurds distrust Tahir Yahya, the new Prime Minister who took office July 10. The Kurds feel that he played them false in earlier dealings. Yahya further angered Barzani by appointing as Kurdish minister in the present Cabinet one Abd al-Fattah al-Shali, an opportunist who is soft on the rival Kurdish faction of Jalal Talabani. The Arab defeat encourages Kurdish militants. Younger Kurdish militants must want to seize the opportunity to pounce on the defeated Arab armies, and Mustafa may be concerned to hold their loyalty. The government is weak. The Iraqi Cabinet and regime are very shaky. Mulla Mustafa believes that only by demonstrating his readiness and ability to fight can the Kurds make their weight felt politically now or with a successor government. Also, he must maintain his standing against Talabani.
Kurds May Receive Israeli and Iranian Support. Unsupported, the Kurds would probably not attempt full-scale hostilities, even of the guerrilla type. Mustafa’s outside supporters, however, seem now in the mood to sustain some limited Kurdish action. At least, they apparently wish to keep alive Mustafa’s capability and will to fight. An Israeli second front? Just before the war started an Israeli agent reportedly visited Mulla Mustafa to arrange, if possible, some Kurdish action to tie down the Iraqi army. He did not succeed. However, convoys of materiel to the Kurds resumed around the end of April. For some months before that time, assistance had been limited to relief supplies. Israel may now be urging on the Kurds in order to keep up pressure on the Arabs. In view of Syrian intransigence they might now want to extend the agitation to Syrian Kurds who had begun to take a minor part in the revolt just before the truce. Iran suspicious. The Iranian government, once a strong supporter of the Kurdish insurgency, was pursuing a slow and delicate rapprochement with Iraq before the June war. This policy has been shaken by Iraq’s extreme pronouncements during the war, and by the appointment of Tahir Yahya, whom Iranians regard as pro-Nasser. Moreover, SAVAK reportedly believes that Nasserite subversive activities have increased since the war. The Iranian government is said to believe that neither Mulla Mustafa nor the Iraqi government has the confidence for a major showdown at this time, but it does not rule out strong harassing action on the part of the Kurds. Iran shares Mulla Mustafa’s view that the Iraqi regime is in serious trouble and it may well be tempted to renew its aid to the Kurds in an effort to help topple the present government and get a successor regime more sympathetic towards Iran.
A New Kurdish Rising Potentially Dangerous. Kurdish guerrilla activities against the Iraqi government have occurred periodically for a long time. Just now, however, renewed fighting in the Kurdish area could be a further unsettling factor in an already brittle situation, particularly if unrest were to spill over into Syria. Should any Israeli or Iranian [Page 386] involvement become known, Arab radical propaganda would no doubt claim that this is a new “plot” against the Arabs instigated by the US.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 IRAQ. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.↩