Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

195. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, June 8, 1967, 1600Z.

2143. Iraqi Situation—Assessment.

1. The Iraqi regime entered present crisis reluctantly. Moderates were in saddle. They were carried deeper and deeper by events. First military demonstrations then commitment to action. Then concessions to some extremists in name national unity such as release notorious plotters. Measures on oil probably taken to safeguard own position but would not be surprised they now consider this essential weapon, et cetera.²

2. Iraqi’s position hardening, both official and private. Reflects disillusion with US not only on part those who believe story our military involvement (which very credible in Iraqi eyes given way it developed) but also on part great majority who feel our concern for Israel has dominated our statements and actions both inside United Nations and out. References to opposing aggression by either side were early dismissed as barest lip service to impartiality. They now claim our avoidance acknowledgment Israel initiated hostilities and our reference Israeli interests Aqaba Gulf while cease-fire in question are further proof our partisanship.

3. While obviously our information resources have sharply declined, we sense from press and a few other sources that an internal Iraqi political confrontation may be shaping up behind the scenes. Such plotters as Aref Abd al-Razzaq and Subhi Abd al-Hamid were released. The press is beginning to criticize different conservative elements for not contributing to the national cause. The long silent Shia Divine Muhsin Hakim has finally spoken out to support the cause (possibly motivated by fear of consequences if he doesn’t). The cautious and deliberate techniques of most of the cabinet members and President Aref probably cannot satisfy these extremists as the military situation becomes more critical. If UN efforts fail to calm situation soon, a major blow-up here is a real prospect.

4. Today is first in some time without reports of significant demonstrations, which government efforts, sometimes frantic, have so far contained. This may be breathing spell based on today’s newspaper reports British and American Embassies closed down and personnel departing within five days (we have only newspapers’ word on time limit however). All media continue blare reports of “tripartite aggression.” American professor checking out Baghdad University today told by girl cashier he lucky be leaving because “we’re going to kill all of you.” Asked by British Air Attache about disposition of British pilot instructors, Iraqi Air Force contact said he would prefer see them hanging from lamp posts. These instructors hope go out on British convoy tonight. Two captured Israeli pilots scheduled go on Iraqi television tonight.

5. Foregoing has somewhat grim ring. I think it about right for this traditionally violent and divided country which is only just now beginning to come to grips with the trauma of the outbreak of hostilities and subsequent Israeli gains. We think most Iraqis can still accept the concept of a compromise; but the longer the crisis continues, the worse the Iraqi internal situation is likely to become, both from the standpoint of public security and the survival of the forces of moderation.

6. In the broader area context as viewed from here, it seems to us that the various opportunities to compromise area issues in the broader interest of ourselves and the international community generally have each time been accepted too late or not at all. We think it is becoming critical to catch the next such opportunity and exploit it, or if necessary to generate some compromise proposals. While as noted above we think Iraqis can still think in terms of compromise, they along with several other Arabs are now beginning to make fatalistic sounds of accepting their losses and settling in for a long war. They presumably hope for Soviet resupply and believe they can exploit the obvious Arab strategic advantages of great distances and dispersed population.

Duncan

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 IRAQ. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to USUN, Beirut, Tel Aviv, Jidda, London, Moscow, Paris, CINCSTRIKE, and DIA.
2. Following the outbreak of war in the Middle East on June 5, Iraq severed diplomatic relations with the United States, suspended oil shipments, refused to permit U.S. aircraft to overfly Iraq, and announced a boycott of U.S. goods.